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INTRODUCTION
Purpose and Scope of Thesis
The point of departure for this work is to sympa
thetically critique American radical criminology from an
anarchist philosophical and theological viewpoint.

Most

criticism of radical criminology has thus far come from

1
politically conventional and orthodox Marxist sources.
Anarchism is to the left of Marxism or scientific socialism
and has been characteristically left of conservatism and
2
liberalism.
By sympathetic critique what is meant is that
this author tends to favor and support most of the criticism
radical criminology has levelled against conventional crim
inology.

However, radical criminology is apparently unwil

ling to critically comprehend its own essentially anarchoreligious, rather than authentically Marxist character.
Thus, the criticism herein is mainly to assist radical crimin
ology in its search for a Weltanschauung which best fits its
purposes and e n d s .
A philosophical and theological critique of radical
criminology is a difficult task, especially since it is to
be done in a sympathetic rather than hostile manner.

For

reasons of clarity the author has restricted the theological
discussion mainly to the Epilogue and deals with differing
ideological and political questions in the bulk of the thesis.

2

The reader should understand that at back of all that is
presented herein is the question of what relationship does
religious anarchism have with radical criminology?

Such

terms as orthodox, heterodox, heresy, prophetic, secular and
existential confusion should clue the reader into the author's
own Weltanschauug which is Christian anarchist in focus.
Further and also for the sake of clarity, this thesis inter
prets orthodox Marxism as the equivalent of scientific social
ism, while unorthodox or heterodox Marxism is seen as the
equivalent of a New Left anarcho-utopian and religious world
view.

This interpretation does not deny that Marx was anarch

ist, utopianist or religious but rather it tries to be honest
to what Marx himself believed his system to be: scientific
socialism.
Anarchism, Marxism, Radical Criminology and Religion
Nineteenth century secular anarchism was viciously
attacked by Marx for being a brand of "left utopian opportun3
ism".
Engels denounced anarchists as "madmen and provaca4
teurs".
Lenin accused anarchism and utopian socialism of
being little more than "left-wing communism: an infantile
5
disorder."
Contemporary secular anarchism as represented
by New Left ideology, has been accused by orthodox Marxists
and non-Marxists alike of moving beyond scientific socialism
or Marxism in that, contrary to Marx, it has "stressed the

6
individual, the deviant, the Utopian and anarchistic aspects"
of Marx's prophetic beliefs.

Terrence Ball, an orthodox

3

Marxist -sociologist, commenting on the contemporary American
academic "doctoring of Marxism" by New Left social theorists
has written that:
Indeed, today history repeats itself.
If
the bowdlerizing of Marx by the Revisionists
/■Bernstein and Kautsky: mine; was a tragedy,
the current "rediscovery" of a respectable/
young/Hegelian/humanist/social democratic
Marx has all the making of a farce. The
farceurs include those whose brand of Marxism
has affinities with religion of one kind
(Christianity) or another (Zen Buddhism);
with a contentless "humanism"; with philo
sophical idealism with piecemeal reformism,
and social democracy; and so on.7
8
Contrary to the unconscious "academic prophesy"
of radical criminology Marx himself held that "the criticism
9
of religion is the premise of all criticism".
Marx under
stood his own system to be scientific and thus unprophetic
and irreligious to the extent that:
It is the task of history, therefore, once
the otherworld of truth has vanished, to estab
lish the truth of this world.
The immediate
task of philosophy, which is in the service
of history, is to unmask human self-alienation
in its secular form now that it has been un
masked in its sacred form.
Thus the criticism
of heaven is transformed into criticism of
earth, the criticism of religion into the
criticism of law, and the criticism of theology
into the criticism of politics.
If in terms of orthodox Marxist criticism,

law

and politics are seen as secularized transformations of
religion and theology, then, of course, the flip-side is
true: religion and theology are the sacramentalization of
law and politics.

The result is that the combination of

law and politics is theoretically, if not functionally,

4

equivalent in as far as orthodox Marxist criticism is con
cerned.

Without advocating extreme elasticity in thinking,

radical criticism of law and politics must entail a simul
taneous criticism of religion and theology.

Unorthodox

radical criminology, following this line of thought, should
not only be critical of the political and juridical statusquo, but more, the religious and theological establishment.
Practically speaking the historical and present reality of
American attitudes towards the interpretation and disposition
of criminal action have been shaped by both combinations of
11
law and politics, religion and theology.
Moreover the
shaping of American attitudes on crime has come from ortho
dox and heterodox combinations of law and politics, religion
and theology.

In order for radical criminology to take this

leap or judgemental step of becoming critical of the ortho
dox religious influence on crime, it must realize that such
an influence is there.

This author thinks that such a step

can be taken if radical criminology first understands its
own prophetic quality.

The difficulty of such an understanding

becomes acute because of radical criminology's association
with the orthodox Marxist paradigm which seeks to dismiss
religion and theology on plausible but fallacious grounds.
One religious system should not critically dismiss
another religious system on the grounds of the other system's
religiousness,

for that would be akin to the Marxist and lib

eral criticism of each other as ideology.

Ideology and pol-

5

itics are relative and so is religion.

A religious system

should point to another religious system*s insufficient
religiousness.

Just as much as anarchist ideology criticizes

orthodox Marxism for not being true to its ideology.
But, Marx and Engels themselves mistook orthodox
Christianity and Judiasm for ’’religion as such” and in so
doing misunderstood two things.

First they misunderstood

the difference between religious orthodoxy and heterodoxy,
such that their criticism of religion as an ideological
apology for the power of the ruling classes never dealt with
revolutionary Christianity which has also been historically
critical of state, and juridical power, private property
and hierarchial social relations

12
(see the Epilogue h e r e i n ) .

It is not that Marx and Engels were totally unaware of rev
olutionary religion,

for they both, along with later ortho

dox Marxists like Ernst Block and Roger Garaudy, appreciated
the eschatological Messianism in the thinking and practice
13
of revolutionary Christianity.
Second because their
critical attention was focused on orthodox and not hetero
dox religious radicalism; Marx and Engels failed to compre
hend their own inverted religiousness—

i .e., where

the God-hypothesis is inverted to read mankind writ large
across the universe—

— and by such failure did not grasp

the transphysical, moralistic, prophetic and unscientific
nature of their system of socialism.
Given Marx and Engels failure to comprehend the

6

religiousness of their system of thought, New Left radical
criminology in its acceptance of the Marxist paradigm has
unconsciously repeated the religious error of the founders
of scientific socialism.

Hence, herein radical criminology

will have its religious dimension exposed and it will be
shown that even this religious dimension is more in tune
with a political theology of anarchism than with ChristianMarxism which itself promises a new fusion of orthodoxy in
14
left religious and political circles.
The prophetic anomaly in Marx's thought has been
commented upon by political philosopher Robert C. Tucker
and a host of others:
The religious essence of Marxism is super
ficially obscured by Marx's rejection of the
traditional religions.
This took the form
of a repudiation of religion as such and an
espousal of atheism. Marx's athiesm, however,
meant only a negation of the trans-mundane
God of traditional Western religion.
It did
not mean the denial of a supreme being...
From a structural viewpoint, moreover, Marxism
invites analysis as a religious system...it
has a number of basic characteristics in common
with Christian system in its Augustinian and
later medieval expression...Marx defines class
ification under any one of the accepted modern
specialized headings, such as, economist, soci
ologist, historian, or even philosopher.
This,
of course, indicates a source of his system's
appeal to some modern men in whom the hold of
traditional religion has loosened but the
craving for an all-inclusive world-view remains
alive and strong.15
Radical criminologists may be such modern men who
crave for an all-inclusive grasp of the reality of crime.
The logic of the radical investigation into crime and its

7

disposition pushes far beyond the confines of conventional
approaches to crime.

So far that radical criminology has

begun to deal, however with questions of ultimate human
reality i.e., metaphysical questions which are commonly
thought to be in the domain of political philosophy and/
or political theology.
Ultimate Questions that Radical Criminology
has Failed to Answer
Radical criminology is now engaged in a dialectical
criticism of criminology and is thus forced to deal with
ultimate questions about human realities.
has not adequately,

It attempts, but

come to grips with such ultimate quest

ions as:
1.

What is the most rational approach to a
7
crime free society.

2.

Can individual and social alienation, the
basic foundations for the existence of
crime, ever be overcome, no matter soci
ety's economic organization?

3.

Are injustice and inequality,

in the forms

of class antagonisms, racism,

sexism or

plain-old socially differentiated politi
cal domination, essential or otherwise
unnecessary features of human existence?
4.

Is human order possible without resort to
state enforced governmental control?

8

Given the above questions radical criminology
requires a left political-theological criticism because of
its misunderstanding of itself, in relation to:
' 1.

Its claim that it is not ideological thinking.

2.

Its claim that it is not utopian thinking.

3.

Its claim that it is authentic Marxism.

4.

An unconsciousness of being part of New Left
theorizing.

5.

An unconsciousness of being more of a secular
prophecy and system of anarchistic thinking
about crime, than a strict Marxist view of
crime and crime control.

The religious char

acter of radical criminology must be brought
to the surface.
Radical Criminology's Theoretical Confusion
This work's main line of argument is thus developed
around radical criminology's theoretical confusion about its
Mew Left anarcho-religious alternatives to the existing soci
ety.

It is not that the radicals have not pointed the way

toward such alternatives.

On the contrary, radical crimin

ology is unique in comparison to conventional criminology in
its willingness to offer a liberative vision of society and
should certainly be applauded for its efforts to date.

Exis

ting society does need to be changed root and branch and not
just maintained for the benefit of a powerful segment.

Essen

tially, though the claims and proposals of radical criminology

9

are inadequate when faced with the admittedly difficult

16
questions posed above.

It is to these "perennial questions"

of political philosophy (and to this writer political theol
ogy) that radical criminology has thus far fallen short.
As an instance, most radical criminologists confus
edly posit ultimate human freedom in collectivist terms and
end up opting for a majoritarian state power of the many who
would exercise hegemony over deviant minorities.

Tne call

of Richard Quinney for even a democratic socialism is a call
/

v

for a political society where power will be located in some
17
ruling segment of society.
Those who would not enjoy power
are those in a deviant political minority or the enemies of
socialism.

It is not too difficult to understand that those

in the powerless minorities would become easily suspect as
criminals.

It will be contended, throughout these pages,

that most.brands of socialism or for that matter liberal democ'Zracy can ever "require the elimination of bureaucracies and
18
all hierarchial forms"
because of the simple reason that
v
both of these political philosophies view power in society
as necessarily unequally distributed with respect to the
hegemony of a dominant social class or segment over and
against the desires and wishes of other classes.
Concerns of a Political Theology of Anarchism
One of Christian-anarchism's guiding principles is
to overcome state power which is the highest expression of

10

organized political society.

In this regard it is not in

19
any respect different than secular anarchistic communism.
^As a left political theology it converges at most points
with radical criminology's critique of conventional crimV
vinological thinking.
But unlike radical criminology it does
not see the state in either its capitalist or socialist guises
as a legitimate guarantor of social justice and the potential
for human freedom, either in theory or relevant empirical
practice (e.g., human rights violations are as much a part
of American state power as is the same category of violations
in the Soviet Union).

Rather than merely a protector of cit

izens in their struggles against criminal activities state
power usually serves the crime control interests of some ruling
class.
To Christian-anarchism the conditions for a guaranteed
social justice and human freedom must be found by a resort to
a theory and praxis wherein people freely associate themselves
into decentralized arrangements for specifically agreed upon
social ends.

This conception of society radically diverges

from the social contract tenet of liberal democratic thinking
where an absolute social contract under state enforcement is
20
falsely presumed for all of society's members for all time;
no matter the social inequality in actual existence or the lack
of social consensus about different issues. Moreover, a soci/
" ety of voluntaristic associations parts company with orthodox
21
Marxist socialism
in that social theory's insistence upon

11

collectivist material production as the perpetual organizing
rationale for the existence of a liberative future society.
Anarchistic political theology interprets this element of
socialist theory as pure dogma in that it disallows the nec
essary flexibility inherent in including alternative societal
rationales and behaviors, some of which may consistently have
nothing at all to do with material production.
The origins of anarchistic political theology can
be traced to the earliest conceptions of Christianity where
the libertarian concern of a world without law informed the
22
thinking of the first Christian theorists.
The early Christian
conception of a society without law was in direct revolution
ary opposition to Romanist state power and its companion legal
istic theories.

The first Christian theorists sought to spir

itually and politically undermine not only Roman power but
indirectly the foundations of every human society dependant
upon the restrictions of legal compulsion, whether criminal
23
or otherwise.
Social compulsion was seen as the unjust anti
thesis of human freedom and it was understood that state power
could not force society's members to be free, but on the con
trary, state power would continue social enslavement.
Social freedom from the yoke of state enforced legal
control continued to inform much of early Christian thinking
24
until the period of Constantine.
At this historical juncture
established Christianity officially aligned itself with the
state and Christian-anarchism became a dangerous deviation

12

in the thinking of a heretical fringe.

Therefore 19th

century secular anarchists like Michael Bakunin, and even
Karl Marx (in his post-socialist view of communism) were
entirely correct in their bitter denunciations of what they
viewed as the alienating and hypocritical theology and pract25
ice of orthodox religion.
Indeed orthodox religious intol
erance and participation in state enforced ideological and
legal repression of the masses of people remains ’’the opium
of the people"to this day.

However, in all fairness to

orthodox Scholastic and Reformation political theology, it
26
27'
must be remembered that the Schoolmen
and Luther
consis
tently condemned the devices of interest and usury in early
capitalist development.

These religious thinkers developed

the concept of jus turn pretium or just price which was founded
on a strictly labor theory of value; a theory of value essen
tially in agreement with M arx’s own notion of economic value
28
and from which his theory of surplus value derives.
Thus, although orthodox religion stands in constant
need of denunciation for its on-going collusion with the cap
italist state’s repressive tendencies, upon a sound historical
reflection the close kinship between modern secular anarchism
and its sentiments for a communistic world without law, if
compared to earlier Christian-anarchism, remains in fundamental
accord.
In its course of development this critique will expand
on the above issues in a more incisive manner.

Before that

13

the main features of emergent radical criminology in its
confrontations with conventional criminology must be dealt
with, because to a great extent radical criminology is an
outcome of criticism leveled against conservative and lib
eral (conventional) theories of crime.
Chapter Descriptions
Chapter I, The Ideological Character of Recent
Criminology, analyzes the role ideology has come to play in
contemporary American criminological inquiry.

The chapter

is investigatory and has the objectives of:
1.

Explaining how and why the ideological
dimension emerged.

2.

Defining ideology as essentially a political
manifestation which reflects contemporary
political struggles in academia and the atlarge society.

3.

Showing that ideology is relativistic and
ubiquitous in that all criminological theory
has at least a tacit political quality and
is value-ladened; radical criminology not
withstanding .

Chapter II, A Thematic Analysis of Ideology in
Conventional Criminology, critically compares recent works
of the "left" liberal Ramsey Clark, and the neo-conservative
James Q. Uilson with a series of ideologically differentiated

14

criminological constructions developed by Walter B. Miller.
The objectives of such a comparison are to:
1.

Illustrate the unspoken ideological under
pinnings of liberal and conservative crimin
ology.

2.

Demonstrate that on most questions of polit
ical import liberal and conservative crimin
ology are in fundamental accord.

Thus both

can be viewed as conventional.
3.

Comprehend radical criminology as politically
different from conventional thinking with
respect to general purposes, functions and
goals.

Chapter III, Radical Criminology: Is it a Marxist
or New Left Theory of Crime?

Speculatively explores the

evolution of Anglo-American radical criminological thinking
from the early 1960's to the present.

Selected writings of

Richard Quinney, Anthony Platt and the British criminologists,
Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young are critically exam
ined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the career
evolvement of radical criminology is toward or away from au
thentic Marxism,
The author will attempt to show that radical crimin
ology has been, from its inception, a theory of crime in
search of a philosophical orientation.

It has infrequently

found comfort with itself and continually seeks new theoret-

15

ical horizons.

To date that search has lead radical crimin

ology, like radical sociology, to its present unclaimed
identification with New Left ideology; a New Left that has
an undeniable affinity with anarcho-utopianism rather than
with Marxist scientific socialism.
Some of the primary avenues to be.explored are:
1.

Why is radical criminology existentially con
fused about its political allegiance?

2.

Can there be an orthodox Marxist analysis
of crime?

3.

Has radical criminology transcended orthodox Marxism?

4.

Is radical criminology based on the New Left
ideology of anarcho-utopianism?

Chapter IV, Radical Criminology: Is Its Heretical
Marxism Actually an Unconscious Anarchist Theory of Crime?,
proposes that American radical criminology, as a New Left
and heretical deviation from Marxist orthodoxy, is an uncon
scious anarchist statement about crime.

The chapter explores

the works of secular anarchist thinkers, from the classical
period to the present.

To build support for the foregoing

proposal, a comparison is made between secular anarchist
political philosophy and ten major theoretical features in
radical criminology thinking.

The outcome of the comparison

suggests that radical criminology, especially in its consis
tent employment of a liberation ideal with respect to the
nature, function and disposition of crime in society, is more

16

akin to anarchism than it is to Marxist orthodoxy.
Further,

the chapter proposes that radical crimin

ology should become conscious of itself as an anarchist theory
of crime.

Toward this end, the proposal illustrates what a

deliberate anarchist criminology would entail, by examining
four questions regarding ultimate human reality in light of
the possibility of a crime free future society.

In the exam

ination of those four questions, it is noticed that overcoming
social divisions,
domination,

in the form of racism,

sexism and political

should be as important to anarchist criminology

as the overcoming class divisions is presently.

With this

in mind an anarchist criminology would be mandated not to
engage in economic reductionism as in the case with Marxist
orthodoxy.
In the Epilogue, Christian Anarchism in Relation to
Radical Criminology, the present author offers a defense of
the religious facet of radical American criminology from the
standpoint of a political theology of Christian anarchism. The
purpose is to explain the sources from which the religious dimen
sion in radical criminology is most probably derived by a h ist
orical interpretation of Christian anarchist literature.

The

question of how religious anarchism became secularized is
dealt with, as is Christian anarchism's historic relationship
to other forms of Christian radicalism.

Moreover the differ

ences between Christian and Christian-Marxism is clarified.
Of primary importance is the argument that the libertarian

17

ideal of Christian anarchism is the probable influential
source of the prophetic quality in radical criminology.
The examination also attempts to explain the religious
facet of radical criminology by an analysis of left-wing
political faith in the secular "religion of humanity."
Further, an examination of the history of conven
tional sociological criminology suggests that it also has
held a faith in the "religion of humanity" and since this
is the case the grounds for an eventual reconciliation
between it and radical criminology can be understood in
religious terms.
The Epilogue ends by proposing that reconciliation
is possible if both variants of American criminology are
willing to emphasize and connect those elements in each
theory that speaks to human liberation.

18

CHAPTER I
THE IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF RECENT CRIMINOLOGY
The Problem of Ideology
The role ideology plays within American criminology
is currently a question of no small amount of discussion and
concern.

In the past few years several criminologists have

begun the task of ferreting out the ideological basis of much
of the discipline, and in so doing have sought to make the
discipline’s various ideological underpinnings explicit while
speculating about the implications of certain ideological ten1
dencies within the field.
The newly emergent criminological
investigation of its ideological basis signifies a quest for
2
alternative social arrangements,
and is an overt challenge
3
to received thinking within the criminological enterprise.
The importance of the concept of ideology in crimin
ological thinking can be seen as matter of proper concern
because of the very nature of criminology itself.

The study

of crime is often directly concerned with the making of pol
icy proposals about how society is to best view and proceed
4
with the disposition of crime related behaviors.
Questions
of individual and social freedom, social control, morality,
distribution of power and justice are of utmost import to the
field.

These kind of questions have long been at issue within

19

the general society.

Criminological approaches that seek

to answer any of these questions ought to do so with skill
and caution, since studies and answers offered may dramatic
ally effect the status of individuals in society.
Ideological viewpoints held by criminologists then
have a bearing on the fortunes of individuals and groups in
society.

Given this, a contribution toward the further invest

igation of criminological theorizing as informed by ideology
is of clear value.
Although recent criminological thinking has shown an
increased attention toward ideological content in theorizing
few writers have dealt systematically with ideology as a con
cept.

Often, as it shall be shown, criminologists have not

come to agreement on what ideology means politically and definitionally.

The concept of ideology is used in ways that are

somewhat ambigious, obscurant, and frequently bewildering, even
contradictory.

This lack of clarity and thoroughness about

ideology severely limits discussions of ideology and crime to
a decidedly meager understanding of the role which ideology
actually does play.
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to clearly
define the meaning of ideology and its practical significance.
The focus of attention will be primarily on academic crimin
ologists in their theorizing about crime.

Obviously, other

personnel within the criminal justice enterprise hold their
5
own ideological views;
however, the scope of this work is

20

restricted in the main to formulators of criminological theory
who are academically situated in American universities, al
though reference is made to Eastern and Western European crim
inologists and other social thinkers, some academic, some not,
who have been engaged in activity that influences "thinking
about crime".
Ideology as a Reflection
of Political Struggles in Society
Essentially the concept of ideology emerged
from political struggles— — the suspicion of
ideology grows more formidable with the increa
sing bitterness of political conflict.6
All definitions and theories of deviation
and social problems are normative.
They define
and explain behavior from socially situated
value positions.7
No kind of social inquiry can honestly proceed in
a vacuum divorced from the ebb and flow of political debate
about the course society should take.

Criminological inquiry

with its unique subject matter necessarily operates within a
political environment.

A.s Radzinowicz has noted "a comprehen

sion of attitudes toward the study of crime’must make refer
ence to the culture and society which gave them birth in the
8
pas t ."
The recent history of political struggles in American
society, and criminology's reflection of these struggles, at
least since the mid-1960's, has lead to an increased awareness
of ideology as a component part of criminological thinking.
The field of criminology has been recently moved to criti-

21

cally question and confront established theoretical formu
lations about crime.

At back of this internal questioning

have been the spectre of political struggles in the larger
society.

Such larger societal issues as: racism, sexism,

human rights, imperialism and neo-colonialism have forced
criminological thinking to critically reflect upon its pur9
poses and objectives.
The result of these reflections
has been a new consciousness of the role that ideology plays
in theory construction.

The increased awareness of ideology

as a component of criminological thinking has in turn led
to political struggles within the discipline and has been
felt most sharply at the University of California at Berkeley
where the School of Criminology was recently "sanitized” of
its radical challengers by administrative elimination of the
10
School itself.
In a major part then, a good portion of criminolog
ical thinking since the mid-1960,s has been ideological to
the extent that it has been an internalization of struggles
over power in the at-large society.

Awareness of this ideo

logical element in criminology is also monotonously predict
able: increased societal conflicts will tend to increase
ideological conflict over the appropriate course and direct
ion of criminological inquiry.

Decreased societal conflicts

will tend toward a corresponding decrease over the ideolog
ical nature of criminological inquiry.
Since political struggles in the larger society have
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their reflection in recent criminological thinking, it is
important to know the ideological issues involved.

The pri

mary conflicts are over what Allen, among others, has called
"the questions which criminological inquiry has traditionally
( 11
either neglected or excluded from discussion."
The questions that traditional or conventional crim
inology excludes may be summarized as follows:
1. What should be the ultimate purposes and
goals of the American criminal justice
sys tem?
2.

What is the legitimate use of state power
as administered through the system of crim
inal justice?

3.

What kind of societal behaviors should be
selected out as criminal or deviant?

4.

Can criminal justice be fairly and equitably
meted out to all segments of the population?

5.

Does the criminal justice system foster or
thwart the potential for human liberation?

6.

Have traditional approaches to crime and
crime control been merely exercises in sup
port of an economic and political statusquo which seeks to repress individuals and
movements aimed at wholesale societal change?

7.

Are there any real alternatives to the exis
ting criminal justice system?
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A close inspection of the foregoing seven questions
reveals that they are clearly questions with deep political
reference.
They testify to an "explicit political conscious12
ness"
with regard to issues in criminal justice.
No longer
can theorists luxuriously construct paradigms of the crimin
ological universe in some neutral or detached manner without
being called to account for holding some particular ideolog
ical view about how society ought to function.

Indeed some

recent criminological inquiry is more akin to the enter
prises of political science, political sociology, political
13
philosophy and even political theology.
The seeming apoliticality formerly portrayed by
most in the discipline has changed so much in the past few
years that Jerome Slcolnick has declared that he sees, "....
less and less of a distinction between political science as
a discipline and the sociology of crime, or criminology as a
14
discipline."
Ideology relative to criminological theorizing
15
thus implies at least a "tacit theory of politics"
where
certain courses of theoretically informed action are prefer
able to others because of the criminologist's peculiar world
view and social situation.
If "law and order is the basic political question
of our day",

16

then a clear and forceful specification of

the politicality in criminological thinking is required.
political definition of the ideological element in recent
criminological thought is not apparent in the conventional

A

24
17
18
writings of Miller
, Gibbons and Blake
, Gibbons and
19
20
Garabedian
and P.adzinowicz
all of whom have recently
written extensive articles about ideology and criminology.
Only Miller specifics how he is using the term ideology.
Gibbons, et al talk about perspectives, schools of thought,
approaches and the like without as much as mentioning the
term ideology.

Radzinowicz employs the terms in the title

of his work and stops there.
labels of conservative,

All use the standard political

liberal and radical, but one is

left with little political feel for any real tug-of-war
between competing ideologies in these works.
On the other
21
22
hand, radical criminologists like Quinney
and Platt
have
written works which are definite engagements in political
23
24
polemics.
Taylor, Walton and Young
along with Krisberg
25
and Pierce
have also shown that the historical development
of criminological theory is associated with intermittent
political conflicts between the various schools of thought
within the discipline.

Bucholz, et al have even seen the

birth of classical criminology as,
. . . a scientific discipline filling the gap
left by the bourgeois jurisprudence of the
day.
The new discipline was seeking to answer
the questions which the official criminal law
theory either failed to pose or was reluctant
to answer. Much as the ruling bourgeois cir
cles were interested in defending, their crim
inal law theory, the bourgeois nevertheless
demanded a theory which it believed would ex
plain criminality as a social phenomena and
propose more effective measures than those of
criminal law, in hope that it might thus suc
cessfully wage the social war between society
and crime.26
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A Political
Definition of Ideology
For the purposes of this work ideology i s : that
component of any criminological theory which seeks to study
crime within a normative framework that rationalizes and
defends certain political ideals about how society should
operate.

The questions of whether the ideological compon

ent in various criminological approaches are true or false,
conscious or unconscious becomes relativized in this defin
ition.

All criminological thinking has some degree of truth

and never are all ideological assumptions about crime explic
itly formulated in a particular criminological theory.

Hence,

a criminology^without an inherent amount of ideology is im
possible since all social theory comes with at least a tacit
theory of political ideals.
It may be that the non-radical criminologists are
attempting to uphold what Wagner calls the "cherished social
27
science tenets"
of objectivity, detachment and value-neutrality in their interpretations.

Whatever the reasons are,

the real consequences are ideological in the sense that non
radical authors attempt to defend an unnamed point of view
and refute or repudiate the works of others they disagree
with.

Without risk then, the non-radical authors mentioned

have not come to grips with a precise political understan
ding of ideology as a concept.
Besides a primary political dimension, ideology,
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in all kinds of social inquiry refers to what the Theodorsons
define as,
The system of interdependant ideas, beliefs,
traditions, principles and myths held by a social
group or society, which reflects, rationalizes
and defends its particular social, moral, relig
ious, economic, political and institutional
interests.28
At its most abstract level ideology is the
W e 11anschauug or worldview of interconnected ideas held by
particular sub-groups and individuals within criminology.
Most often non-radical criminologists do not announce their
particular ideological perspective.

Some may not even be

aware of the ideological element within their thinking.
Even
29
authors like Miller
may define ideology in the abstract
politically but omit applying the definition to their own
concrete situation (i.e., by taking note of the particular
ideology that underpins the work they have at hand).
Other more specified definitions of ideology would
be:
1.

Ideology as a set of value assumptions about
reality which serves the interests of class
domination.

2.

Ideology as a manifestation of false conscious
ness held by a politically subordinate group
would be understood as an active participant
in its own oppression.

Illustrations of the above two definitions of ideol-
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ogy in recent criminological thinking are in order here.
Ideology as a servant of class interests becomes generally
apparent when criminology is "engaged in legal concerns for
the purpose of preserving the capitalist order, including
30
the welfare state associated with that order."
Moreover,
when criminologists, as experts, are employed by the govern
ment or private foundations, as is more and more the case
recently, the deliberate or unconscious creation and dissem
ination of value assumptions about crime and its control
becomes a tendency directed toward the maintenance of soci31
etal class interests.
The manifestation of false con
sciousness by a subordinate group is somewhat more difficult
to point out (assuming that most criminologists are not
normally subjected to the outcomes of their own formulations).
In an important sense the liberal rehabilitative ideal of
contemporary corrections can be viewed as an example of the
production of false consciousness if it is true that rehab
ilitation is for all intents a myth in that it does not work.
Prisoners must, as a requirement, conform to expected behav
ior patterns based upon the rehabilitative ideal.

If these

behavioral expectations are internalized by the convict this
can be understood as active participation in one's own sub
jection.

A better example of a similar sort would be one

where some convicts refuse to overtly act in concert with
other convicts as they protest prison conditions and treatment.
A refusal to act being based on some narrow advantage they

28

expect to gain from their institutional oppressors (i.e.,
the prison bureaucracy).

Obviously the spectre of penal

coercion would enter into and distort this example, but one
could avoid this objection by pointing out that prison trust
ees in their relations with other convicts may often falsely
conceive of themselves to be unoppressed because of their
more intimate relationship to the prison bureaucracy.
Coping with
Ideological Relativism
Obviously the relativism or ubiquitous nature of
ideology is problematic for those concerned with grounding
their theories of crime in some kind of ideological void.
Karl Mannheim, the liberal oriented father of the sociology
of knowledge, attempted to overcome the difficulty by re
sorting to a neo-Platonism, where intellectuals become the
social group who were "able to reach Olympian detachment
32
from the mundane traces of earthly involvement."
Orthodox
Marxists, on the other hand, ground the truth value of their
social theories in the supposed historical objectivity of
the proletariat (historical objectivity being supposedly non33
ideological).
Pecent criminological writings concerned
with ideology hardly broach the question of ideological rel34
ativism.
This is the case for both radical and non-radical
criminologists.
Prather than trying to deny that any criminological
theory has an ideological component by resorting to devices
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which in themselves are value-loaded,

the reasonable prescript

ion for coping with ideological relativism would be for theor
ists to:
1.

Admit quite frankly that their theory comes
wrapped with ideological ribbons.

2.

State exactly what it is in terms of polit
ical ends the theory is aimed at.

3.

If the ideological component of the theory
is seen as a great hindrance, seek to denude
the theory of as much ideology as is humanly
possible.

4.

Seek to state the ideology in terms of a
clear-headed political analysis of crime
in relation to society and not feel defen
sive about others attacking the view as false
consciousness or as mere opinion.

William E. Connolly, a liberal political scientist,
has proposed an idealization of the responsible ideologue:
The responsible ideology is one in which
a serious and continuing effort is made to elu
cidate publicly all of the factors involved in
its formulation and in which a similar effort
is made to test the position at strategic points
by all available means.
A continuous shuttle
is established between the levels of self-clari
fication, formulating and testing beliefs about
the environment, recommending appropriate public
action and attitudes, and specifying the expected
consequences of the proposed action.
In this
way a maximum effort is made to keep all factors
involved in the formulated ideology at the fore
front of attention, and every opportunity is
grasped to confront these recognized factors

30

with the hard facts of the environment:
The responsibly formulated ideology, in
short, unites . . . analytical precision . . .
self-awareness . . . and the commitment to
social relevance. 35
While an honest coping with ideology is obviously
important, what is socially and politically relevant to one
interest group in society may not be to another.

For this

reason ideology must ever be conceived of as a tool of politi
cal struggle and interaction.

For example, a conventional

criminologist may be analytically precise and honest about
the nature of his or her conservative belief.

But it is the

conventional belief itself that leads to conventional praxis.
Thus no amount of even honest coping can earn the political
36
’’respect and consideration”
for ideology that Miller has
recently called for.
For an ideological perspective to earn political
’’respect and consideration," the respect must be earned in
a social atmosphere where all ideological viewpoints would
have an equal opportunity,

for not only theoretical express37
ion but also practical application.
No such atmosphere

exists, although radical criminology has earned an equal
opportunity to express itself theoretically,
ities and publications.

in some univers

Given that the hallmark of academia

is its so-called openness to theoretical debate and discussinn,
even this opportunity is no mean feat for radical criminol38
ogy.
Yet, unlike conventional criminology, the theoreti-
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cal conclusions of the radicals are not presently applied
in the field of criminal justice.

Equality of opportunity

stops short of allowing a radical praxis, in an academic
environment which, through criminology, supplies policy opt
ions to the criminal justice system.
Two rather obvious reasons explain this disallow
ance of radical praxis: 1) radical praxis as revolutionary
activity (at least ideally) is set against the cherished
interests of conventionality and as such is political ana
thema; 2) conventional theory and praxis wield ruling power
both in academia and the general society.

Ruling power

usually concedes little without a protracted period of pol
itical struggle.

Out-of-power radical criminology cannot

determine the concrete conditions for its application to
what it studies because it is by political conventionality
that such an application is determined.

This second reason

may indirectly explain why radical criminology, like New Left
sociology, but in contrast to scientific socialism or ortho
dox Marxism, has tended toward a non-violent revolutionary,
39
rather than a violent revolutionary strategy of social change,
even though the radicals call their theories authentically
Marxian.

For radical criminologists to engage in an authen

tically Marxian revolutionary praxis would necessarily mean
a renunciation of their academic existence and a switch to
the status of the criminal lumpenproletariat because as,
the liberal professor of criminal law M. Cherif Bassiouni

32

has recently noted in his "horn-book", The Law of Dissent
and Riots:
Some lawyers may wonder why a discussion
of the rhetoric, tactics and goals of the
New Left is relevant to them.
The link is
the law and what we call the role of the law.
In the final analysis, we are dealing with
the guarantees and highest products of civ
ilization itself . . . freedom, order, respect
for the rights of others . . . and with an
attack however haphazard, misguided and, one
may hope, foredoomed to fail - on those ultim a tes. We lawyers have society itself as our
client. We should attend to legal and illegal
challenges to that society.
The violent wing
of the New Left is such a challenge .^
Unfairly then, radical praxis, in order to exist
inside academia, must submit to at least the minimal demands
of political conventionality, even though radical ideology
may be given a relatively free avenue of expression.

Submis

sion must obtain until the radicals leave academia or until
social evolution or even revolution transforms power rela
tionships inside academia.

An honest coping with ideology

for radical criminologists may therefore be an unrespectable
and inconsiderate suggestion by Miller, because his suggestion
assumes a non-existent equality of power among competing
ideologies in criminology.

However, as is evidenced by soc

ial revolution in socialist countries, ideological struggles
do not necessarily cease with a revolutionary take-over
41
of power.
In the final analysis, the archetypical revol
ution has merely meant a change of political guard (then
the issue becomes who will guard the new guards?).

In the
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event of social revolution in America what is now radical
criminology would probably become conventionality and viceversa.

The relative nature of ideology would remain intact.
Thus, as a tool in political vocabulary and action

ideology cannot be overcome until the social divisions of
society are eliminated.

Situated within criminology an

overcoming of ideology in thinking about crime is dependent
upon the elimination of crime itself.

Coping does little

more than require the ideologist to state a particular pol
itical line or affiliation or, in the case of radical crimin
ology, to suffer the handicap of not being able to immediately
realize its revolutionary praxis.

Nevertheless conventional

criminology should openly admit and take steps to cope with
its ideological dimension.

Pvadical criminology should become

aware that political expression in itself is synonomous with
ideological expression, thus radical politics and radical
ideology are equivalent, the so-called nnon-id.eologicaln
objectivity of the Marxist proletariat notwithstanding.
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CHAPTER II
A THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY IN
CONVENTIONAL CRIMINOLOGY
To this juncture the main contention has been that
the concept of ideology, however frequently mentioned r e c 
ently by criminological theorists, has not received proper
attention.

Further a clearer understanding of ideology emer

ges if the concept is defined politically in the sense of
a justification and defense of certain ideals.

As a way of

illustrating this contention the thematic presentation below
analyzes several recent idealized propositions from the
recent writings of two well known criminological authors,
1
James Q. Wilson, a political scientist and Ramsey Clark,
2
a former Attorney General , against the work of Walter B.
3
Miller.
The works of Wilson and Clark were selected because
they are representative of ideological distribution between
4
5
conservative and liberal
thinking respectively.
Moreover,
both of these works attempt to examine a broad range of crim
inological issues which gives them depth and thus makes them
attractive for analysis.

Miller's work seeks to lay out an

ideal construction of the left and right (politically spea
king)

ideological underpinnings of criminology and is also
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broad enough to be useful in the presentation as a tool in
comparative and contrastive analysis.
The purposes of the thematic analysis is to:
1.

Illustrate the ideological presuppositions
of liberal and conservative criminology.

2.

Demonstrate that the lack of disunity over
political ends indicates a fundamental un
ity of conservative and liberal approaches
to criminology and thereby these approaches
can best be viewed as politically conven
tional .

3.

Comprehend the disjunction between conven
tional and radical approaches to crimin
ology as a political difference based on
differing ideologies.

Six categories of investigation will be employed in
order to give the analysis coherence and clarity.

The cate

gories are:
1.

Ontology of human nature and

society.

2.

Social value orientation.

3.

Etiology of crime.

4.

Function of crime.

5.

Function of criminal justice

6.

Ideology, change, politicality and utopianism.

system.

In some of the above six categories of analysis all
three of the authors may have nothing to say.

The authors1-
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silence may have to do with their unconsciousness of the
relationship the category has to their statements.

For

example, few conventional criminological theorists would
readily admit that their theories articulate certain polit
ical lines, or that their thinking is utopianist.
Again,
6
the ontological or metaphysical basis of their theories
of human nature, for instance, would be difficult of admit
tance.

On the other hand their silence may be interpreted

as a deliberate strategy of mystification.

If the authors

are silent with respect to a particular category, the pres
ent author will attempt to glean (by inference) an answer
to the omission.
When a comparison is made between the statements
of Wilson or Clark or both to Miller's idealized construction
it will be indicated by an equal sign (=).

By the same

token a contrast will be indicated by the not equal sign (^).
After each of the categories of analysis is a comment by
the present author which makes inferences about the equiv
alency or non-equivalency of the statements to each other
and to Miller's idealized proposition.

Miller's construction

schematically distinguishes left and right ideological posi
tions; this procedure will be followed except for the interpositional modification represented by the actual statements
of Wilson and Clark.
Miller's left construction will be signified by
M-L;

hi's right construction by M-R.

Clark's statements
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will be signified by C, while Wilson's statements will be
signified by W.

As a precaution, Miller's constructions

use a five point scale to measure what he calls "a single
major parameter of substantive variation along a left-right
7

scale;

however this author has reduced Miller's scale to

one approximate and composite proposition or construction
in order to simplify the thematic presentation.

The reduct

ion brings together into one focus the moderate and extreme
propositions and thus functions to negate the possibility for
a centrist position of which Miller is not concerned with
8
presenting in any case.
Finally, the question of whether
the ideological constructions are moderate or extreme like
the previously mentioned concern of ideological consciousness
is relativized:

ideology is ideology, whether moderate or

extreme, conscious or not.
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Comment on Ontology of Human Mature and Society
Clark’s ontology compares favorably with Wilson's
partial assertion that behavior is the result of socializa
tion.

Human existence is a kind of tabula rasa, a clean

slate that must be informed by external forces.

However for

Clark there is apparently no free will or choice:
behavior is equated with socialization.

all human

Wilson and the M-R

construction posit freely willed behavior as the essence of
being human, noting that people must deal with the consequences
of their behavior irregardless of the social conditions.
Wilson obviously wants it both ways and as a neo-conservative
he stands in the murky horizon between conservatism and
liberalism.

Countering these views the M-L proposition admits

of humanity as being ontologically or existentially free but
socially forced to make decisions that are contrary to its
existential nature.

Thus any comparison of H-L with the

liberal statement of Clark i s 'cancelled by virtue of Clark's
omittance of the question of will shaped by force.

A reason

able conclusion here would be that the M-L proposition bears
little relation to either of the actual statements of Clark
or Wilson and that Clark's position is akin to the liberal
residue in Wilson’s neo-conservatism.
As regards the ontology of society, threats to the
existing moral (social) order inform the thoughts of both
Clark and Wilson and compare well to the M-R construction.
Wilson equates specified immoral behavior with the possible
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destruction of present society.

Clark's position is more

problematic for he does not manifestly deal with the question
of morality anywhere in his book.
may be that morality,

One explanation for this

like free will, is not a part of his

ontology of humans in society.

However, in actuality Clark

himself does emphatically take ethical or moral stances, just
as much as he also makes volitional choices when social con
ditions allow.

From his statement on society one can glean

a latent moral posture by noting his emphasis on such terms
as: ordered liberty, social discipline and social stability
with respect to "present conditions" of society.

These

three terms compare well with Wilson's "moral horror" and
M-R's "moral order".

All three imply that present society

should be based on ethical imperatives strong enough to
cope with the challenges of destructive anti-social action.
Clark even wants present society to use improved and less
complex technology to insure that future society is not
threatened by actions which would cause social instability.
The M-L construction, in contrast to the other perspectives,
views present society as ethically unjust in its relation to
the needs of the majority of people.

It holds that the major

ity of people are not being honestly dealt with by those who
have the power to influence behavior, even though present
conditions in society hold the. possibility for change.

Again,

the M-L proposition stands alone relative to the actual state
ments of Clark and Wilson, while in an ontology of society
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their statements best correspond with M-R.
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Comment on Social Value Orientation
On the three questions of social value orientation
both Clark and Wilson are in fundamental agreement with the
M-R construction while they divorce themselves from associa
tion with the left point of view.

On revolution, Clark assures

us that reform must come without instability to the social order.
He is certain that revolution is at minimum an obsolete roman
ticism, at most intolerable.

In the introduction to Clark's

work Tom Wicker calls Clark "the most revolutionary public
voice in America today," but as can be seen, Clark wants some
thing other than what the M-L proposition is calling for.
Reform and revolution are not synonomous terms.
wants reform but in a right direction.

Wilson also

His view is to confine

criminals as a way of securing society against the threat of
criminality produced by evil people.
The stratified nature of existing society is appar
ently of positive value to Clark and Wilson.

Wilson wants

to divide blacks along class lines, with the black middle
class as the moral superior of the other black classes.
the other hand Clark's view is problematic.

On

He at first seems

to agree with the M-L proposition in its emphasis on crime
as an outcomes of desperate maintenance; however, as it turns
out he is more concerned with a liberal balance between order
and justice or worse, by inference, justice and injustice,
and the separation o*f criminal from the law-abiding.
M-L perspective:

In the

struggles for justice and liberation arise

from situation of disorder and instability not the contrary.
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The M-L construction represents threats to the exis
ting society as acts of rebellion against social immorality.
Wilson holds such left-wing talk in contempt and retorts that
all societies evidence criminal behavior, no matter their econ
omic arrangement.

Again, Clark by proposing the rule of law

as an end, seems to be suggesting that legality is the equiv
alent of social morality and that as long as decisions are
arrived at by democratic means all will be well.

The problem

with Clark*s reasoning with respect to the M-L proposition
is: existing law itself is seen in left thinking as illegiti
mate, as an immoral set of rules arrived at in an arbitrary
and thus non-democratic manner.

Any appeals to such laws,

especially in circumstances of rebellion, would be interpreted
as ideological apologetics for the status-quo and hence more
in tune with the M-R construction in its concern for the main
tenance of prevailing authority.
Faith in technological control unites Clark and
Wilson and distinguishes them from the M-L proposition.
Neither deal with the question of technology as a method of
repression.

9

For them, science and its application is the

answer to social instability, not revolution.

The M-L prop

osition does not fear the existence of technology, but does
fear its use which increasingly has been aimed against the
interests of the poor and minorities.

Technology has a

middle-class bias in the same fashion as law.

Technology

47
according to the M-R proposition is to be used to direct m a x 
imum force against threats to the present social order.
Decentralization presents problems for both Clark
and Wilson.

Neither can agree with Miller's left or right

constructions but they do agree with each other.

Both want

to maintain an organizational span of control which is ulti
mately divorced from community auspices.

To them crime is

infinitely larger than the resources and capacities of any
one local community.

There must be more coordination and

cooperation among fragmented elements of the criminal justice
system.

The need is to professionalize through training and

other methods the existing criminal justice system.

As for

control, the power to determine policies would remain in
the hands of crimunal justice administrators and the most
the people could hope for would be better community relations
with a crime control apparatus they are not to control.
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Comment on the Etiology and Function of Crime
Throughout

his book Clark projects two mutually

exclusive views about the cause of crime.

The first is that

crime is a function of distinctive social forces; the second
is that crime is a result of faulty personal psychology and
disregard for the customs and conventions of present society.
His main emphasis though is on the second view and thus he
must take exception to the M-L proposition's view of crime
as a product of society's differential power flow.

Moreover,

he would object to the notion of regarding criminals as heroic;
so long as criminals disregard the rule of law they demonstrate
to Clark that they care little for the "systems and standards
10
of society."
The fatal question for Clark's ideology is:
11
"whose law, what, order?"
For Wilson there is no difficulty.
Poor and psychologically disturbed blacks are the cause of
most crime.

If these people could only cultivate white middle-

class values like self-control and moral consciousness most
crime would be almost eliminated.

Wilson gives little credit

to the historical and social forces that continue to enslave
most blacks, nor is he or Clark concerned with an analysis
of ruling class social control, which the M-L construction
sees as problematic.
Most crime is dysfunctional for all the positions,
but to the M-L proposition the bulk of crime is also justi
fied.

To the M-L construction the value is revolution not

order maintenance, hence crime may provide a eufunctional

50

service to the structure and activities of revolution while
remaining dysfunctional to the ends of existing society.
Clark sees crime as corrosive to society and if practiced
by the more fortunate (upper class), crime presents great
questions about the moral order.

Clark agrees with the

M-L construction about (upper-class) white-collar crime,
but could never countenance crime as justified, even though
society is oppressive or "criminal” in its behavior toward
the oppressed.

Wilson in his concern for the security of

middle-class communities views crime as creating the condi12
tions for Hobbes' "war of all against all."
It is interes
ting that the competitive element of present capitalism is
geared to individual calculation and advantage, rather than
group sharing.

Maybe in contradistinction to Wilson, crime

is merely another word for capitalism, for both atomize soci13
ety and both are predatory.
The question for Wilson is:
why condemn crime without an equal condemnation of capital
ism and its pathologically immoral excesses?

51

O B

pj r t
P P*
CL CD
3

i
?d

CO

rt
pi
rt
P

cr*
P
rt

co

3
O
P
CD

'tt-

s:

ii
s

pi
p

o.

o

1

£ Hpi s

pi 3 Pi 3 H*
O P * P O CO
h ^
n> co
HH XS
O H H*
O
P* H- CO CO
CD 0 * 0 CO
CD O HH P H -CC
Pi Pi O H*
H H H (D
H
O •
(D CD 00
P X H*
P CO H
OP
on H P
P H* H P*
u> P *(D O 3 *
CD PI CO pi
Hi
CD
H
1 HH
P*
P
CO
(D
Hi

o

O P*
P CD
h—» H O- P

P o
(D P
CO »
P
X3 CD
H O -P <
CD H - O CD
Pi CO CO p
O- O HH- H H
ftp H 3 *
O H* o o
H- P P

r t O H i P> r t O O U ^ C h
P *0 O P H -P H O O P
CD P P 0 - 0 H *H i P*PCO
P
P N H *P O-Tt
CLOi o pd CD O CO f—*
P CD O CD O O-CD O *^ Pi
Pi h-*P <J H i
PP
CO
H i CO •
H -P i
r t CDT ) CPP*
co coco
• < H- 23 P CDO
rt O
pi p • •
h-*o P3P
CO H*
X) PJ p * p PJ
H -P CO COP PH-CD HO CTQ • XJ O ?C*<D COOQ
P
O CO H i H-P*
r t O O CDpi
O -rt
O O O ?s*0 P H*CD Hi
Hi
H i p rtp j p O
Hi
I P*2J H P
H*
I
I
IH*
P

P> H* r t Pi
co CD P* P
3 CD P - •
CO CO r t
O
H-OQ H*
P*
0-0 0 O CD pi
Pi 2 H i
P P
H P
rt P
H*
H O HO O* P*
PH *
p ^ CD Ct (D CO
CO
P* H*
P*TJ CD
OQ
H i H* O
CD
O COM TJ CO p
P
H - P ^ CD
p OO 3 P
CD CD CT“tO pi
0 • P> H*

H-*T) H CO
H - O P* Pi
cr* co Pi ^
CD CO H
P H r-N
pi O* P H*
H* H* O H i
v—/ CD H
- p *o
H
H- O
P* O P P
Pi p OQ CO
Pi

Hi

Pi £ H- H O- H i H* CO o co
O- Pi H P* H - O CO H H* O
O CO p
Pi pi O
P
H- a - pi coo p pi p H- H*
p CDH- CL H Q- 3 o
o
CO H*
X3 |—*
CD Pi CD
O
P
3 H * ^ P * CO
H -CDHH OQ
H CL D* p *
p O P CO pi P 0 VJ
P*
CD P P P
CD Pi o
CO P P - CT* H O P H i
l_».
H P O
ttoq p
CD Pi P CL P
CD P* pi
P- H O
O
P CD
H
H tO CD P Pi
H i H i H- CD H -P
1 H*
O O O P < o
P P CD
CD I
I
HH
CO

CD a * CD t, H* CD
P*P) CL
• OQ
H O £ P
CD CO H
Xi- O
GiP P ^ O CD Pi
O P H
on cltj
W (D P H P CO O
H - P
• P O
p
CO
H- P
P H O H- Pi •
P a* p
OQ
P P»L-i»
P
p
C OQ E
3H
H* CD O P
H HP
Pi a P* co
H* H- CD H
H* P P CO
H • CO -

O OQ a *
P PX
H* O
CD p o
CD
P
H CO P
CD
H
CL O Pi
HP
(D
Hi
rt
I

h

- pi

p

pi

o
p
H*
3
CD OQ

I
$d

H-

CO

CD
H D
H H
H Pi
H ,v<5
CO CD
H CL

H
P*
CD

System

c>
P
oS

O
3
3
CD
P

Justice

r-N p O
TJ CD O
• CO P
x i pu
X C
D H'
H- O P
n -' HOQ

3i o
r» «

of Criminal

1

Criminologists:

i
f

Function

A.

/ - \ r t co co P >
T3 O r t O CD O
• 3 P> O H iP l
pi P H - H 4 Pu
to p ct pi CD CD
00 Q- H- H»
N-/
£0
rt H
• r t H* CO K* O
p * H* O P
CD P} H-OQ
CD
H» O P Pi
CD P 0 O
H i H- CD P
r t CD - P - P
CD O
• P
r t H- 3 H
C
O
H* O
CD
O CTQ
CL
CO
P
cr*

52

HiHi M 3 o co o :>
H P (!) O Hlfl) Hi M
(1) H r t
H
H*
rr
O M*-< H O
..> H rt 3 3
co
n
M 09 3 '
■ M 0 9 H* P
co
o
i H3
C
T
Q
3 II h 3 (9 P f t
pr C
3 rt H H Si »3 ft) C
a* o
h*
n>
(!) 3 (D P H * 3 H O P
Pu 3 c_».
3
COCOCO3 W 3
OH
3 *0 t—
* 3 PI
C (D 9) P C ?!
m
h
3co
co m P 3 O. pi co 3 H 3 3 3
m o 3
3 * co co co
?! n> rt 3* o rt 09
Pl
3 O
* rt
COC
D fl> O HfD M CO
3 rt H
M O
M H 3
(D H O
CO a* m
o 3
U l p i d H O H O M i r t r t H O ft
pi H*0 H*0 P) O rt 3
□*N O 3 h i
.
_«
O H*3 W < IDH*0
3 co rt

H d O.H'H*

fll (D 9) H ^ O C

3* <

v£>
3 H H H M
^ C 7 * 9 i (D H*
H
* i ri tP
>9i
• (0 H d 3
3 HH
3

Pl O
3
(OHk

II
s:

H

O 13 P
H c 3
M 3 O
3 M
M O C
OM
O
3 3
-{S H* 3 Hi
C
Oo M
.
3 M
13 3 O
3
H
O 2 M
<J 3 O
O O 3
COH
• O O
<: Hi
o
H

/3

i
!*>

P
3
C
O
o

^ S

-.

3 *3O
a.O
3 0 M 3 M O v< 3

3*

II

3 0 0 0
3
O
M
J

C
d H*
M O
m3

S

3
3

X

3 * p r t D - O ' d rt(D
o
9i r t
O 3 CO CO
3 0

3 O 3 *0 3 91 H l 0 3 M COp 3
M09 3 [t >
O H ifl)O 3 3 P O H 3 M 3 O (D p H M 3 C 0
o Hm
c l
cdcdh
D COM
o 3 C
0 *3
p X 3 3
3
MU M O O
M
3
3
P
3
M
3
09 M
_____ I K O H C C
CO CO 3
Hi 3 o o
OH CO Hi 3 CO O CO CO CO
M 3
3 0
MC
O Hi O
o o M
O 3 O
3 H
>O M
MOP • 3 M
H o OM 3
C
D 33 H
°i P
* 3 3 3
3 OO
3
3 0
H
M M § M 3 H CPco
30
a. pi o
3 H 3 O 3 Hi
H
3* O O 3 o m i i 3
rt P CO fl> C
O O fl>13
3
M 3 3 O *<!
3 3
O
_ _
P *3 lii 3 H O 3 M M 3* O o
3
MOOOHi 3 M 3
OMHi M PHi O
t
O
C MO 3
m co co •
M
O

fss

23

P 0*0 H
3

a>

Law

I 3 I

C
Op O o 3
O 3 Hi O 3
M O Hi R O
3
12 •COO
3 M Hi
3
OP
OC
3 . C
. O C
OO
M 3
P
3 M MO
a. 3 co 3 3
3
3
C
O
P O P
OHi 3
o 3 C
M 3 C
O
M O O P 3
3
o 3 3
O
O
M
1
H
1

3

O cou O 3
H o P H 3
M 3 H M O
3 O 3 3 m
O
O C
M O
. 3 O 3
.
. P Hi p £
• 3
M 3
OO
P M 3 C
H O 3 •
p
M 3 O
C
O
H
o O 09 > o
C
O Hi O
3 09 3
O H O
Hi
H O 3
H
O
P P
M 3
3

H 3O
O OO
U
H
HU 3
O HP
0 .0

3 p < o
3 M O H
fD 3 H m
^
<J O 3

*3

H* O C
O3 3

3 Hi 3 O 3 H
3 O o M M 3
D
3 P 3 3 O C
CO3
H
o
3 co O O
OC
OH
13
3 C
<
■
C
OO O M
3 H
fl> 3
o 3 HiVJ
z13 M
3
3 3 O O o 3 3
M 3 H 3 U a> P
3 O M
<
T
>3 M
O
O
3 3 H C
C
O
3 3 M 3 P
3 P 3 O 3 o P
C
O3 p
C
DO 3
C
O3 o
1 M
i i
C
O
O
Hi

M
3
3
P
M

3o 3
oX 3

3p
o3
h m h p co
oco o 3
3 P C
OM
co
O .P 3

3 < d 3 H *3 3 P P 3 c o O
Hi P
3 O O M 3 09

OO
.M 3 O
3 3H
09
M
• 3 3
3 M

Criminal

• d cfo

3

o O
3 H
M
co 3
O M
o 3
M p

P

3 3
~ 09
3
_
MO
O C
O p* CP 3
O CPH3HO PO O
OO 5
Hi
M 3 O O 3 3 C
0 3 3
3 3 O 3 P
CO o O H
H H
O 3 co o
33HH1MC0
U 3 p 3 - 3 3
0
0
3
*
^
0
.
3
0
3
M O
d3
Hi
H O M H 3 • p 09 H C
O O
3
O3 P
U1 H 3 M <
09
OM C
O
vOO ^ M O 13
HO
Hi O O
3 *3 m 3 o co
3 H
3 3 C
O
ON
3 0
O
M
C
OM 3 I I
3 O
09

o

53

P X C f p n M S P
co H

n
o
w rt

H O' 0 P 0

3 crs w O H

p

M H» H i o '

^ ( 5 (5 H O a t J* H O ' ( 5 O
O (U
ro p -n p 0 *0 0 M P H H d H X

h( Hi< 0» P> (5 O H*HiO O Otj
d co m n 3 n H d p 3 P P
M
P 3 H
t-* O ' fD
H* h
0 CO fD o
d fD
0 o*x
0
rt rt fD 0 o n p o n co n 0 n
m n d
fl> O <09 3 co
H p
h * n>
d o
H
H*
i CO
0 h
co
CO
P
1
d
..

o

§
Ou
'3!

i

£
i
?cf
£
H*
n

O'
o
ft)
0
n
h*

o hiH

H * n ?d

l—
*X O X) rt O d n o d ft) n
O M H fD o' 0 CO P* H ft D*H
O P H* H H* fD (D fD H* O M (D
d
3 rt X
ft) o 3 CO CO
n n * t i id
n (D C
Dh»
CO
H
f
t
)
H*
P
CO
H
*
ft)
h* d
H
n fD O rt H

Hi H* •
O 3 '
O
rtXJ ft)

g

►3X d ft) d

5! n

n

3:

i

ti

t) H'H'fl) 3 * H (t» O H - R O ' (D H i fD fD 0 O ' h co ft) Cl. fD O
• n o (
D ft) fD 73 CL. CO O p) 3
H i n co H* co r t
< ft) ^ o 3 n
O' n n n <
•< H* co
ft) ft)
a> H 3 H*OQ
m
h«
H* CO
H I 0 r t P X CO H« 0 H* ft)
4> co o
O. ft)
rt ft.r t O
nJCW § ft) n 3 0
0 o H
O'
X
n> 0 H
d h*
ft) H i CD
£ O
ft).
fD O
ft) n> p
M H
a
O H O o h h - r t a (o > H « H i H * a ' n m
a- m
o jd o' O' r t
d H* d O 0 o •
dfi O'
o 0 OQ n • x « $ m o' o fD H
*3 P
co . o
a>
op)
m h
n
OQ ft)
o
0 \ H» f
t) • O n r t H i t l
W H O H* H* ft) H* H H H* (D CO a 3 o J
w o M 0 n
ft) M §
o o ft)
OQ
^ 3
P HH
**
O'
CO fD 0 n (D
• H p
CO
n
i 0 H
o
0
o0
CO t
rt I
(D
fD O
ft)
a
• P
O

v - XJ .
d
ft) d co
fD •
3 0 O ft) CO rt rt
ft) fD d n ^ n H O'
y -\ 0 H
H*
H ft) ft)
X o fD O' o o' fD rt n
• rt M O 3 O (D O
O 4^ s ^ s n H H
CO CO (D
v£> fD
£
cr> H d 3 H* M •
►o
'w'
n d
H* d M O
.
CO O M 0
o H*
1 O ' OQ 2J H
(D
O

0 n

•

CO

O

H» M 3
O H- ft)

ft) fD
o CO
H* d ft) d fD CO
CO fD
H
0
0X <
n
rt o t co H CD
H* CD fD
O'
o ft) h-* M CO H<
CO
M ^ fD 0
CD H
0 o
fD X CO O H
1 H (D fD fD
O n
0)
CO
cr
i
(D

on

o
0

/-s ^ h

o

/*■>>n H* ft) d X n o H* d h 3
X O'O 0 (D ft) O' H i 3 p O'
d ft) o fD
O n P
• fD
CO O
M H* H*X H H*
-P* fD H O h* n H O P o O
d H pvcj
M ft) 0 H
U)
H*
w n> CD H-OQ
n h - CO
• M H 3
rt fD O p H n
H* 3 O O fD CO P H*
fD
hQ o
O'
3 n 3 H*
(D O ft) rt d 0 n> h* d p

M O' co o
rt H
fD M
CO n> n> H
o
0 M ft) HiOQ

o 0 H* M
H
H
o n P P
fD 3 * co H

o

3 3

0

d

S' (D
X H
o
n
fD

0
n

fD d
3 H*
fD O
3 P

O H* CO CD

H

H-

O p p CO P P
P M 0 M CO
n M
d N CO CO
CO
H* O
p H* H*
<$ n
0 P
1
p d

3;
1

!*>

Police:

o‘OM*3aH'
m 3
p
r t H* co C r t
0 rt H -X m
• P O'n P H - r t r t 3 * r t H t o ^
O P P P ^ £ JT*
O 15 H
O
H*
H
I O
/—nn p
nn> n
X
X H O' o o
• rt O ^ O H 3 0
O
0 *0 P
>~hn>n £ hj(5 n>
O' £

54

/-> O P 3 OhPJOT P

B

n a. oj #

O P P O 3

0

3 0

.

»
—
•

o

cl

»

O I

C
O
I

hi

—
»
•p o n
Op O
QC
0 3 rt H P 3* 3 C
p 3* o 3 3 3 3 P O
P33<2
3
3 >1 O (D P- p o 3 a* p co
p 3 3 cr p
P P
3 p ^ co
C
O3 p 3 O 3
rt p* o rtX 3
O O P co
^ O P • O P o O
O
P
O P O 3
3*
3 3
co 3 03
c
o
3
CD co p rt
3
p
C
L
^
2
O
C
D
O
<2 3 rt 3"
° <
p. -3
o co o o
p* rt 3 3 rt p* O 3 co
3
3 3
Ou P o o
O
Q
os p cl o
0 0 ^ 3
rt O
O 3 3 CL P PC
O
3 3 O
O C
OO
P
3* 3*
p O rt o. p*rt o 3 3
P o
cr o eu3 n 0
<2
O
O
3 0 3 *3
P
o
o
_
— »• p 0 o
0 3
3
2 0
3
P 3 3 P 3 *3
3
3
3C
O
P3 p o o
1 o O
P
0
ID(UP O ^ O
P 3
P.
o
3
3 3P
co 3
p
i
1
Ou
3
IC
T
Q
I

O rt O 3 r t r t S
•3 O X 3\QP O O O O
3 00 3 0 3
P
O* O
03 O* *3 O
O
P P 3 h-* P O
«sj3 ft O
c
d rt ti rt
o\ n> p.oq c_i. co o h> o
O
cl < p* 3
O C
OC
O 03 C
O O h{
{?»

o

•3
0>
h{
rt

0

hh

cr

P
p
3

OO

Cn

£

1
3

0

p*
O

co

B

O
Q

II
K
i

OQ P 3 p
P O 3 P rt P P > POQ 2 CL W
OP 3
co 3 H- O 3 3 C
co O P p. 3 3*
3
O
P3
O P
o
Q
p ^ OO
O p
TJ
3 o CL P 3 p 3*P- hti p 3 3 3
3
CL p 3 O
3
O
Q
0 0 3 0 3
3 • O
O O
*3 0 0
O • 3 .3* p P CLO O 3
^
3
°
C
L
P
O
O
O
O
P P
3 SJO P <2 C
P
C
O CL p
P P 2
P O
O O 3 < o
3 3 V
<
2
c
o3 p
3 O 3 2 o p p
P o
P O P 3 P o 3
3 CO P P
3* 3 3
O 3
P P P C
O p 30Q >3 p. 3
3
O
P
3
3 CO 3
3 co p 3 o 3 0
3
C
O
o O
3 0
o
O O O
3
O
O
3*
c
o
cr
p
rt
o
O
o
O X
3 0
3 htj
P *3 O
Q 2 0 o o HiO P) 3 o o 3
P
+»
3 P • 3 O CL O 3
P P P P 3 *3 3 h
C
OO
3
o
O
p o <2 3 O
J3 O o
o o
o
0
C
O o 3 <2 p o o
P 3
1
C
O
1 P C
O3
I

p o co ht, 3 O co p
ax O 3 O P O p*3
-03 P 3 3 3 O *3
^ O. 3 co 3 O 3 P
O
• 3 O* O P o
3*3
O P
*
g
O P
3 P P
P
• CL 3 o
C
O CL !-h O

/-s

<2

*3 0 3 3 0
• ht»O 3 P
O

3
0x3 3 0 cr
h
h
o
U> 0 P
1
P
S'* 3
P 3* O

.

5.

/"^co PC2C-J. 3 o P* 2 p o o P CL O
rd O P P C 2 P 3 3 P , P P 0 OO P O
• 3 O 3 C L 3 P 3 3 2 PPOQ 3
O O OO
Q 3 0 O 3 ^ O 3 p *-<
2*3
O
PP
O 3 O P PO
C
O rt O P 3 P 3 CL
3
W PO
3 o o 3 w . o * *dCQ
o 3
CL
o
P^OQ
P o 3 p o
3 O
0 o p p
P 3 3 3
*3 3 3 p p " H O 3
o :3 p o o
O 3 p p 3 O
P o co g *3
3
p p p 1 o
o
o 3 p co
O 3 P p O I
3
*3
£
O
Q
PCD
o 0 P P
O P CO o
P
p
P
p
C
O
3
3
p
3«
$
CO
3
3 p 3 P O P 3 POQ co
p C
Oo 3 o 3 3 P 3
03C LP

%

3 H
3
O

3 *3
CL O

o $
o

y

p

p

3

o p

3 3

33

o o

P
co p p p
P 0 3 o
O O P3C L3 3 3 0 3
P O
OC
OC
2
PPOOQ P 3 P P O CL I O O C
O CL
0
3
p P
P
3
3
C
O
3
3
3
PJ S(0
1

O

O
Q

p oO
Q

I
3

O

Judiciary

3 ij O3
a.9JrtWH*0J’T3>
d H n 5 > ilj* C 3 0.0
o
^03
ii Hrt 3 h h H Hii « 3 i p
rt O 3
O
O
O
O
P
P
O 3 P 3 3 H rt
U> P P P
rt ^ D .3 crn H O O
3 co P O P
O 3
H
rt S O
p
*C
P O P P P P P P 'P P
3
hi 3 o- m c 0 ^ 3
w » H rtH
P 2 3
o c
3 P <-»•
cr
O 03
0.0*1^ 0 * ^ 0 H*tt
• P
PC
p P
3
rP
*OP
4>rt H*H*
OO
N 3 *3
O
3
co^
3 coCL O P
uiO n (Dr t H H - w (D tu »i
3
3 P 3 O
^
H*m J J 'h rt'd Cl 3 O H
0) co O P _ rt 03 c-j.
• *d p
o co
o
cl o 3 O
h{
P < 3 3P C
h m o
3<-»*o p p o 3 p
rt^ C
Drt P O O O CL
id ^
hhH (J C h * 3 M o-cn
O
Q
<
(T
) CLtfl hhOidC
O 3
P OO C
O
P O
03
rt C
D• rt p*
p p
P OP
O CL P 3 P*3 o
Q
h
i
C
O
P P 3 O
P O
NO
P P 3
t o
H H ( 1) I
o
o co
g P CL 3

55

3

CD (D

Pl

H CL13

vd g

3 <

K
I

tr*

3 Cr*rt •

3

o> o> o>

n
C
O
rt
§
CL

C
O
cr
P*
rt

co
fD
p

rh

»p»3ooCMrtH*ortrrrHO(DW
O
O
P*
fD
rt

fD cr po

d O O rt pi rt d* d p d* O
i O ijT r jr t <3
CLftS fD P 0) fD <~u
01 C
O CT fD CL C
D fD
P rt. H
cl
d ^ d u rt fD p*

rt p * C cr* pi CL

C U H rt 0 H-VJ

rt fD

h * cr c
d o
r n
n (d d
£ <d o cr
Hi rt cocl rt H*
13 fDO rt fD rt d
rt p
rt
r n O H p id P o O fD ^
d* 01 p rt fD p
rt H cl 3
P* rt
CT
rt rt p•'<
o cr w p. rt
P
rt co
p to t cr cr o
rt 0) fD co
P d r{ p .^ ft) d o O rt
. (_>'
O
Hi
O cl CLC
P h. " 2 C
rt cr p*
to C
O cs cl fD o CL fD P) fD C
O
rt (D
O r t u O CLO P- rt
rt P
rt
P* <
o
p fD
. co
cr o p. p.
O cr* fD p.
rt C
• P
pi rt 0 fD
VJ rt CL
cr
I
P rh
rt

0>

/—Vpl
13

1

y-^13 P< o Hi rt cr
13 p co o
rt
• d
co
P* rt rt
fD rt rt ro
d
O
^1
rt
o • P< rt
co p*
rt

C
Op U

P*

01

cr

1

Pd
cr*
d
K

1

O

3 3

P p» Pl

o

Hi C
O Hi
o p«0 3 0>
rt
rt
rt
d rt CL
P’ P
p4pi p co p o cr cr cd
CL rt
O ^ pl
fD fD cr
pi
p» fD cocr* fD H
01 O
r+ P <J fD o cr
cr* pP P co fD (D
CL P»t_i. P
1
f
D
C
O
(
D p*
O C
Oo
01
O rt
rt p4
o Cl
H 01 O 3 Cr
rt CT
Hi
C rt o p rt p>
fD
C
O
rt
fD^ HiV* rt P H fD P«
pi
rt
P
fD P* fD
(D
(D
p. Cl
CJ*PO rt rt Pi O
d C
O
rt cr p d d
P CL
CL rt
01
I Pi fD CL
C
O fD
cr*
fD
I H
1
rt
C
O

HW O
cr

0 O
l— Cl
P>

rt

"H*

Odd

OOO

CP*fDCrp*rtO<rt

&

rt pi

o cr cr

O (D P*
p
O rt
rt rt O
Q P*
fD O rt
fD
rt rt p rt
p.
p.
O
P Hi C
S
d
co
p
0 P
CL C
O
CL
1
1 rt

p. cr o

1

g * g.

00

O vj - d 3

cr

Cl

cr

3

ss Hi O 13 Hi pi rt P* Cd

d tt H d o p r o

ro

.
o
p H co fD ^ CT
w 3 13 P*
Pi
vO
fDC0C0pll3P*cr
g*^ 3 ro W p*
• Pi 3 3 p* cl 3
p
^ Pl (D Hi
13 Pl P*
1 d C3rt 3 fD
rt
pi fD rt
d H CL Pi
CT d
pi co p» p« rt
PrtPdHdcop*
CL
d CL
C
T
QO
QO
p* h
cr
d d
d fD rt O fD O P
0Q
(D
rti co pi
O fD rt01
fD C
o
co <;
rt
o
O P iH ip ip ir t r t iP i
O H* OP* d P* o
P*
rt d CL
H 13
fD
3 O PO
rt
d d
p»
VI
fD I
I
CL

3 cr

cr

3

3
I
po

P r is o n s :

p.cT rf rt Pi
O pd
«^n rt 13 0*0 MO rt
rtfD d 4 d* C o r o
"0 O d n> pi p * o d* d
O P* O fD13 C
O 3 CT
C
O P H fD C
HO rt 13 fD
rt co
O H p-rt o n co
p
p cr
cr*
fD d H h p j o ro
O
J h*. cr fD P*
13
00 (D d o n
^ Pd
r
o
rt h
C
O P< C
OO
ft) P-* H rt rt Hi
fD P*
P* P r t ^
ft** o H P* P« P ‘
C
D
rt
OC
O p* H fD fD rt CL
o co C
cr p pi
oo g
C
J4 O C
O fD fD13 P fD U cr
P3 H rf
OH H d
O
Q CL H C
H fD 3
O P* P<
"-'d fD CL C
co 3
P cl co r o cl p
• d rt
rt O C
O
DC
O
fD
fD fD
o
P* P C
cr
C
L
rt 01 p O <D P Prt
Hi
O
f
D
O
P*
03
C
O
C
O
C
l
O
C
T
3
<J CL P C
O
o fD
d C
D
fD
01 Hi 13 P
CL
p
r{
O
CL
P O C
C
Op
P H ft
CL
I I

56

Comment on the Function of Criminal Justice System
A.

Criminologists:

Both of the M propositions assert naively that crim
inologists are oriented toward the left as is most social
science.

This bi-partisan assertion presents certain diffi

culties which revolve around the improper use of political
terminology.

The term left in political discourse normally

refers to them who profess views which find fault with and are
characterized by a desire to overthrow the existing social
14
order.
In contrast, the right usually makes reference to
a political philosophy that is based on social stability and
which stresses the need to maintain established institutions
and preferring gradual social development and reform to
15
abrupt and through-going societal change.
Corresponding
to the usual meanings of the two terms one would find a left
criminology to be; the brand of criminology which at least
theoretically seeks revolution and change in the way crime
is defined and dealt with in the present society.

A right

criminology would define and handle crime in traditional
ways in order to insure the stability of the established
social order.
By the terms of the foregoing definitions neither
academic criminology, nor jurists or lawyers are anywhere
near being social revolutionists or leftists.

Revolutionary

criminology is not now offered in most universities: indeed
this writer cannot think of any American educational insti-
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tution with such offerings (mention has previously been made
of the "sanitizing" of Berkeley).

For a revolutionary jur

ist to be seated in an American criminal docket is almost
a contradiction in terms; the same goes for the non-revolutionary practice of law.

16

Moreover, most academic social

science itself cannot in any conceivable stretch of the
imagination be favorably compared with left or revolutionary
17
sentiments.
Wilson*s statement may hold the key to an explan
ation of Miller's naivety about the difference between left
and right criminologists.

Wilson finds most sociologists to

be liberal (criminology being for the most part derivative
from sociology).

He suggests that the presuppositions of

their discipline ought to guide liberal criminologists to
18
conservative conclusions, rather than liberal ones.
Many
of the presuppositions of conventional criminology have
already been dealt with throughout these pages,

i.e., social

order maintenance, preference for traditional morality,
criminal behavior as a product of poor socialization or
devious psychology,

and etc.

Thus academic criminology in

its conventional form is best thought of as an exercise in
political conservatism and is rightest ideology.

The term

liberal can best be viewed as a variant of rightest ideology
in the sense that when it comes to questions about the fun
damental reorganization of existing society liberals and
conservatives are in mutual agreement.

Both find the true
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left to be contemptible and both consciously do their utmost
to restrict the true left from any real participation in
the political,

social or academic arenas of American life.

An example of liberal conservatism (left liberalism)

is that

of Clark who for all his rhetoric about change, justice,
freedom, equality, etc., remains genuinely supportive of the
police and other coercive elements of the existing criminal
justice apparatus and who sought, while Attorney General,
to enforce his cherished ’’rule of law” against the leftist
activities of Dr. Spock and Rev. William Sloan Coffin among
others.
The M construction about criminologists are thus
in extreme error and ought to be restated to read:
1.

Academic criminology reflecting academic
social science is substantially oriented
toward the r i g h t .

2.

(M-R).

A major role in eliminating crime is
played by the great bulk of the great
bulk of elitist right-oriented writers,
educators, jurists,

lawyers and others

who contribute directly to crime reduction
by supporting the values of the existing
social order.
B.

(M-R).

Criminal Law:

Wilson is in agreement with the M-R concern that
criminal law be based on the requirement of strict social
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punishment or retribution.

The conservative bias places

a heavy emphasis on retribution.

The conservative bias

places a heavy emphasis on retribution because it is thought
that strict punishment of offenders will have a salutary
effect in deterring actions which threaten the social order.
Clark like so many liberals talks of a government of laws
and not men, and by such mystification, elevates criminal
law to some ethereal strata where men and law are separate
and unequal creatures acting out some strange and coercive
drama based on the requirements of social system maintenance.
To Clark criminal law needs to be made more efficient and
as a corollary more effective if society's legal system
of behavioral control is to be maintained.

In not criti

cizing criminal law application for its tendency to promote
an unequal and unjust social order, Clark and the M-L con
struction fail to reach any fundamental accord.

Yet in

his concern for the continuance of the existing social sys
tem Clark shares common ground with Wilson and the M-R
construction.
C.

Police:

The police,

as guardians against threats to the

social order, is a theme which both liberals and conserva
tives are comfortable with.

Wilson proceeding with the

scholar's guarded witness testify's that massive increases
in police manpower tends to reduce street crimes.

(The

term "massive increase" is usually accepted as part of
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conservative jargon when references to police arrangements
are m a d e ) .

True to his liberalism Clark views mass violence

for social change as a negation of the human potential.
Riots, rebellions and revolutions are to Clark a demonstration
of a lack of faith in the existing social system.

Police

to both liberals and conservatives are the "thin blue line"
between society and utter social destruction.

Yet there is

no evidence in either Clark or Wilson's writings that police
serve as a force for the maintenance of societal class
interests as the M-L construction claims.

To the true left

police are little more than the armed protectors of a class
based society which refuses to deal humanely with its marginated masses.

To call for faith in an apparently hope

less situation of police repression, as does Clark,

is to

exposit the absurd.
D.

Judiciary:

According to the M-L proposition it is the bias
of the lower courts and a greater rationalization of crim
inal procedures which require remedial attention.
in this state, without abridgement,

Left

the M-L construction

bears a positive relation to Clark's concerns for perfec
ting the existing judicial system.
to Miller's construction of

However, contrary

left views about the judiciary,

a true left position would understand, as the radical attor
ney William Kunstler has that,
Unfortunately,

it is not enough.to point
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out that, no matter how unjust the system
may be at the trial level, [lower court:
minej there are always the higher courts
to undo the damage.
The judges on those
lofty tribunals come, in large measure,
from the same milieu as their colleagues
below, and react in much the same fashion
to the social order which created and m a i n 
tains them.
Furthermore, even assuming
courts which can rise above their own in
stincts of self-preservation, the gradualism
of the appellate process often runs counter
to the immediacy of human needs at the very
moment they most cry out for recognition
and f u l f i l l m e n t . ^
As was pointed out above criminal law rationaliza
tion and its justification,

is not the aim of the true left.

The present legal system, as a whole,

is to the true left

the antithesis of justice and liberation.

To make the exis

ting legal system more effective and/or efficient without
revolutionary change in the conditions that create the need
for such a system,

is an exercise indouble-think or bad

faith and it is not really a part of an authentically radi
cal posture.

Thus,

the M-L construction is in fundamental

error.
Wilson and the M-R construction hold seemingly
divergent views about the judiciary.

The M-R typology rep

resents an extreme rightest view wherein left-oriented law
yers and judges are deemed responsible for allowing criminals
to go free.

Wilson, as a scholar and neo-conservative is

concerned about the dichotomy between judicial theory and
j u d i c i a l 'pra c t i c e .

Of course, the M-R view is based on the

misuse of the term left.

Very few lawyers and judges are

revolutionaries,

theoretically or in social praxis.

There

may be a predominate liberal and even left liberal tendency
among higher court judges and a comparable conservative
tendency among most lower court judges, but to describe
either of these tendencies as revolutionary or left-oriented
is to completely obscure reality.

The convergence between

Wilson and M-R comes at the point where both are disgruntled
with the prospects of not having their conservative views
about morality, retribution and deterrence always taken into
liberal judicial sentencing determinations.

As seen through

out this analysis the conservative view is that criminals
sould be strictly punished by judicial decision-makers.
When some liberal judges go counter to conservative ideals
for the disposition of criminals a cry of intense anguish
will most assuredly be heard from conservative q uarters.
E.

Prisons:

Wilson and the M-R construction are in perfect
agreement as to the function of prisons:

prisons are estab

lished to isolate and punish offenses against society, not
to rehabilitate.

Interestingly enough, conservatives and

left radicals are in agreement that rehabilitation is a
myth and must be abandoned as a policy.
servatives advocate prison punishment,

But where the con
left radicals

cate the abolishment of prisons in their entirety.

advo
Clark

is the odd-man out in the dialogue about rehabilitation
though it is his liberal view that prevails in current penal
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thinking.

Rather than seeing the incarcerated as basically

political prisoners, Clark wants to force rational people
to adjust their behavior to a 11just society which has the
ability to provide health and purpose and opportunity for
all its citizens” .

Clark has no problem in calling present

society just and healthy but a true left comprehension of
rehabilitation would reveal that the concept of rehabilita
tion is a complete mystification of the real function of
prisons which is to mainly isolate and punish society*s marginated masses.
VI.

Ideology, Change, Politicality and Utopianism

The thematic inquiry has thus far dealt mainly
with substantive similarities between liberal and conserva
tive variants of conventional criminology while simultantously
delimiting the vastly divergent substantive horizons that
separate conventional and radical criminology.

The m i s a p 

plication of the political term "leftist” has been demon
strated by reference to Miller*s L construction which fails
a positive comparison to the statements of Clark whose views
are in essence "left” liberal and not really politically
leftist.

The next and final major category of thematic

inquiry will vary from the preceeding five categories in
that attention will now focus on some prime modal contrasts
between the conventional and radical criminological statements
expressed in the works of Clark and Wilson as compared to
the idealized constructions of Miller.

Rather than employing
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the schematic arrangement used above,

the following presents

four statements in sequential form:
M-L: The left provides the cutting edge
of innovation, the capacity to isolate and
identify those aspects of existing systems
which are least adaptive, and the imagination
and vision to devise new modes and new instru
mentalities for accomodating emergent condi
tions (p . 34) .
M - R : The right has the capacity to sense
those elements of the established order that
have strength, value and continuing usefulness,
to serve as a brake on over rapid alteration
of existing modes of adaptation, and to use what
is valid in the past as a guide to the future
( p . 34) .
C l a r k : To live in ordered liberty we must
develop social disciplines and institutional
actions relevant to present conditions and
future directions...Through technology this
generation first liberated mankind from bondage
to nature...If human reason and purpose can
control technology...Tragically neglected
processes of criminal justice can enlarge both
security for society and liberty for the indi
vidual.
(pp. 18-19).
W i l s o n : I argue for a sober view of man
and his institutions that would permit reason
able things to be accomplished, foolish things
abandoned, and utopian things forgotten.
A
sober view of man requires a modest definition
of p r o g r e s s ...Were we to devote resources to
a strategy that is well within our abilities --namely, to incapacitating a larger fraction of
the convicted...
then not only a 20 percent
reduction is possible, but even larger ones are
conceivable.
(pp. 198-199).
These four statements will then be examined in
light of their:
a.

Ideological allegiances.

b.

Position on social.change.
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c.

Line of political articulation.

d.

Utopianisms in political articulation.

a.

Ideological allegiance:

By ideological allegiance reference is made to
the ideological line of progression in each of the author's
statements.

If the essential difference between conventional

and left criminology comes precisely at the juncture of r e 
ceptivity to or rejection of existing social arrangements,
then it is reasonable to presume that conventional criminol
ogy, in its rather uncritical receptivity is a theoretical
defense of the present power distribution in society.

The

contrary would be true of left criminology in its offensive
against present arrangements and its advocacy of a new means
and strategies which would undermine rather than bolster
the structure of existing society.
The M-L proposition goes strangely astray when
viewed in terms of ideological loyalty.

Not only does it

not take offense with the existing social order, but it u n 
fortunately seeks to creatively adapt parts of the existing
system to changing circumstances without changing the essen
tial nature of the whole system.

The erroneous M-L construct

ion is a defense of the status-quo and merely calls for the
introduction of technological novelty into a system in need
of systematic overhaul.

It advocates treating symptomatic

criminal phenomena instead of treating the diseased whole

6*

social apparatus.

Clark's statement correlates well with

the erroneous M-L construction.

His innovation would be

to use greater and more rational technology to insure social
stability and, by inference,

to control anti-social behavior.

Further, Clark's insistent rhetoric about society's ills
places him at the cutting edge of a "heretical" or left
liberalism which stops just short of advocating means dir
ected towards the revampment of the entire pathological
social order.
Wilson's "sober view of man" is akin to Clark's
instrumental gradualism where innovative technological
methods of control are devised to shore-up the present
social order.

To maintain sobriety in a situation seemingly

demanding urgent attention is analogous to the calm of fis
cal conservative Herbert Hoover just prior to the crash of
1929.

The only difference between Clark and Wilson on this

point is whether to choose between selecting a new tool of
social control (for Clark computers) or resorting to an old
one which has fallen out of favor (increased incapacitation
or punishment for W i l s o n ) .
b-

Position on social change:

The modal contrasts here are extremely sharp.
Conventional criminologists seek to extend social control
by calling,

like Clark does, for technologically efficient

response to criminal behavior.

Miller's construction,

if

it were restated to represent a true left position, would
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necessarily posit a radical rupture of social control by
a revolutionary transformation of the whole social apparatus.
The probable reason that total transformation is a threat
to conventional thinking is that control of the transforma
tion would not be exclusively located in the hands of est
ablished societal power brokers or the ruling class.
vations,

Inno

on the other hand, are usually controlled features

’'rationally1’ introduced into the social system and designed
with a view toward merely ameliorative "band-aid" type
20
action.
Adaptation of improved methods of social coer
cion, as in the case of the M-L statement is definitely
not the theoretical posture of social change advanced by
revolutionary left criminoloyg.
c.

Line of political articulation:

What is meant by the line of political articulation
is the a u t h o r ’s unconsciousness of or deliberate attachment
to and advocacy of a particular political philosophy.

Mention

has been made above with respect to the improper use of p o l 
itical terminology as was evident in some of Miller's left
constructions.

The M-L construction quoted above is a sum

mary statement which reveals M i l l e r ’s entire position on what
he thinks the function of left criminology is.

One can only

conclude from his summary that for Miller left criminology
is in reality based on the principles of political liberal
ism; a classic definition of political liberalism being:
the favoring of principles which call for a disdain of con
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servative reactionalism, coupled with a pronounced emphasis
on economic and individual liberty and the introduction of
political reforms to smooth over social demands.

Clark

unlike Miller at least acknowledges his allegiance to lib
eralism and resists being associated with revolutionary
leftist extremism.
W i l s o n fs caution in pushing his "sober view of
man" belies an adherence to a political philosophy of con
servatism.

The ideologies of sobriety, reasonableness,

objectivity and scholarly detachment in the face of demands
for drastic social change lend themselves well to conserva
tism with its traditional emphasis on the maintenance of
existing views and support of established institutions.
Wilson,

in confessing his pragmatic views below, remains

decidedly confused about exactly where he is at in the
left-right political continum.
Those who argue that we can eliminate
crime if only we have the "will" to do so,
whether by ending poverty (as the left argues)
or by putting more police on the street and
more gallows in our jails (as the right believes)
seriously mistake what we are capable of under
even the best of circumstances, and place the
blame for our failings precisely where it
should not b e
on our will power, and
by implication on our governing morality. ^
Wilson in his pragmatism cannot escape being desig
nated as a political conservative exponent of rightist ideol
ogy, although he may advocate a line different (neo) from
plain old conservatism.

6'9>

Like liberal and conservative (conventional) crim
inology,

left or radical criminology also adheres to a p a r 

ticular political line of articulation.

As shall be shown

in later chapters left criminology can be associated with
Marxist socialism, utopian socialism,
and secular or religious anarchism.

syndicalism, communism,
All of these are revo

lutionary left-oriented political viewpoints and as such
are highly critical of existing society,

including the pur

pose and function of the criminal justice system.

Yet each

of these radical political viewpoints are distinct entities
unto themselves and are not revivalistic in the sense of
W i l s o n ’s moderate neo-conservative posture.
d.

Utopianism in political articulation:

The great modern moral idea is that of
individuality; it is at the heart of the
m o d e m liberalism, m o d e m humanism, modern
radicalism.
There is no understanding utopia
apart from these movements of thought: utopia
is their culmination.22
Admittedly the concept of utopia is difficult of specifica
tion.

Some believe that,

like Karl Mannheim, utopian thought

was transformed into various ideological tendencies after the
23
French Revolution.
Others, along with the political philos
opher Crane Brinton, see the American Dream and modern w e s t 
ern democracy as a diffuse secular utopian experiment which
first emerged with the 18th century emphasis on the rule of
reason and unashamed pursuit of the good life as summed up
in the credo of liberalism:

liberty, equality and the inev-
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24
itability of progress.

Orthodox Marxism most often at

tempts to explain away its utopian vision of communism
25
where the good life is finally achieved.
Modern conserva
tism for all its professed realism and moderacy retains a
profound nostalgia for an idyllic yesteryear that never was
26
part of reality at least for most people.
This author
subscribes to the view that utopian tendencies are still
part of the political landscape,
...eschatological and paradisiacal elements
in the colonization of North America by the
pioneers, and the progressive transformation
of the "American Paradise", giving rise to the
myth of indefinite progress, to American opti
mism, and to the cult of youth and novelty.27
Utopianisms in political articulation also makes
the broadest references to:
1. Speculations and images about what society should
be in the light of its deficient actuality.
Utopianisms in political thinking and action
is the secular counterpart to religious esch-

atology where, instead of God, humans mobilize
themselves to "make over the barbaric earthly
world...here man has a primary responsiblity
28
to create a better future."
2. A compassionate concern for social humanitarian
ideals that call upon humans to constantly lib
erate themselves from all kinds of tyranny.
3. A visualization and conceptualization of a
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future society,

either near or far, that

is better in most respects than the immed
iate society.
4. A consistent and insistent focus on social
policy changes which encourage the realization
of social humanitarian ends.
Life magazine describes C l a r k ’s book as one that
’’could stir people of conscience to demolish the courts, the
prison networks and to replace them with a system that is
29
decent.”
As has been demonstrated throughout this thematic
inquiry, Clark is not really about demolishing or replacing
any

part of the criminal justice system.

He is however, a

passionate liberal humanitarian reformer with a utopian
vision of what society's response to crime control ought to
be given what is.

The point is that one does not necessarily

have to be a revolutionary to be utopian.

Utopian visionar

ies since Plato's Republic have more commonly been supporters
30
of the prevailing political ethos of society.
Clark's
gradualism is slow but it is definitely aimed at social pol
icy changes which he believes will encourage the realization
of social humanitarian ends.
not leftist,

Thus,

though Clark's vision is

it is very much utopian in its call for the a m 

elioration of crime engendering and control activities.
W i l s o n ’s moderate neo-conservatism is somewhat
more difficult to weigh on the utopian scale.

He is at

once concerned about what works and advocates the abandon-
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ment of "ideological preconceptions about what ought
31
^emphasis: WilsonJ to work".
Yet Wilson also believes
that justice has suffered because criminal justice policy
makers have not emphasized criminal incapacitation or strict
punishment.

Thus community and individual security are

threatened because of the lack of will on the part of crim
inal justice policy makers;

lack of will in the sense of

not using the tools already at their disposal.

To solve

this apparent paradox between ideals of justice and security
and the lack of will with respect to criminal justice policy
makers, Wilson advocates a pragmatic, utilitarian calculus
for policy setting which entails an emphasis on what he
thinks has worked (criminal incapacitation)
future policy implementation.

as a guide to

The crucial question is:

has criminal incapacitation actually ever worked in as far
as deterrence is concerned or is this utopian thinking on
the part of Wilson?

At best the evidence is that criminal

incapacitation or strict punishment for crimes is and has
been an ambiguous project.

Norval Morris and Gordon Hawkins

have noted recently that deterrence,
....figures most prominently throughout
our punishing and sentencing decisions...yet
we know very little about it.
Punishment sometimes deters, sometimes
educates, sometimes has a habiticative effect
in conditioning human behavior; but when and
how?
Our ignorance is a serious obstacle,
whatever our regulatory objectives.32
Wilson's display of scholarly ignorance with respect
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to what he advocates leaves one with yet another question.
If his proposed criminal incapacitation denies a rehabilatative dimension and is ambiguous concerning deterrence,
then what is left as the basis for policy?
societal revenge against law-breakers.

The answer is:

Thus Wilson's util

itarian calculus ought to be translated to read:

the re

venge element of criminal incapacitation has worked in the
past and should work in the future.

But to admit that r e 

venge is the essential substance of punishment is to put
forward an ages-old view that by itself has not worked to
33
any appreciable degree in the course of western history.
There is thus little reason to expect that revenge will
decrease the occurrence of criminality in the future.
On the utopian scale Wilson's pragmatic realism
harks back to a revengeful society of yesteryear —

one

long before the eighteenth-century criminological reform
34
movement
that really did not work then (if it had
there would have been no need for reform) and, in the pres
ent atmosphere of increasing personal freedom and social
revolution, will not work.

The chances for a better soci

ety, which Wilson obviously values, would be jeopardized
if revenge were the only object of a criminal justice p o l 
icy of punishment.

In sum, Wilson's humanitarian concern

for community cohesiveness and security against threats
of crime, coupled with his consistent and insistent advo
cacy of a neo-conservative version of criminal sanction
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reform, puts him squarely but moderately in the utopian
orbit.
Radical Criminology as a Political Reaction to
Convent ionality
It has been shown in the foregoing thematic presen
tation that conventional criminology, in both its liberal
and conservative forms, is in essence identifiable by its
ideological tendency to support existing social arrangements.
Left or radical criminology is identifiable mainly
by its counterideological denial of the validity of the
present social order; pointing instead toward a utopian
vision of a society quite unlike the one now in existence.
With this utopian view of a new society radical criminology
of necessity has to announce and advocate in critical terms
the means to such an end.

It does this by conceiving of

crime and the criminal justice apparatus in ways ideologically
offensive to the received orthodoxy of conventional crimin
ology .
Radical criminology can thus best be interpreted
as a studied political reaction to the faults, sterility
and lack of adequate approaches of conventional criminology
in entertaining alternative conceptions of society.

Ideo

logical objectivity would seemingly require an admission
by conventional criminologists that their construction of
theory is an automatic engagement in a particular political
stance.

Paradoxically, radical criminologists themselves

should counter the emerging radical dogma that radical
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social theory is not ideology.

All social theory is laid

out in line with some preconceived but not necessarily e m 
pirically valid notion of what reality is and what it should
be.

For radical criminologists to deny that this is the

case, while criticizing conventionality, borders on intel
lectual dishonesty.
In the last decade certain malcontented criminolo
gists, unsatisfied with conventional notions about crime,
began to ascertain that whatever was needed in the field of
criminology was not the forward reforms of liberalism or
backward reforms of conservatism, but, more importantly,
some kind of critical method of criminological analysis
that would incorporate a political dimension which in turn
would give meaning to the political struggles that were
36
threatening to tear society asunder.
Somewhat earlier
certain segments of disgruntled sociologists had become
unsatisfied with consensus theory in sociology and this
led to the development of a critical and eclectic sociol
ogy—

a sociology which saw a number of its antecedents

in the works of Karl Marx, Theodore Adorno, Max Horkheimer,
Max Weber,

Ralf Dahrendorf, Herbert Marcuse, Karl Mannheim,

George Lukacs and C. Wright Mills,

among others.

Academic

criminology also had its malcontents and being a sub-field
37
of sociology
initiated a critical approach.
The new

V conflict

based paradigm to emerge emphasized dissensus

instead of consensus;

social change rather than social

76

stability;

ideological advocacy in place of value-neutral-

ity; conscious defense of the powerless against the power
ful, and the democratic participation of the many over
and against the exclusivity of the few.
For criminology the radical emphasis brought about
new definitions of crime and consequent methods of solution.
Given the operation of dissensus in society, criminal law
was no longer automatically thought of as embodying the
highest ideals of a truly good society but rather criminal

^

law began to be viewed as the political instrument of dom38
inant segments in society.
The police, courts and prisons
became the enemies of the powerless in their just struggles
39
to gain power.
Democratic theory itself was criticized
40
for its glaring alienation from actuality.
The authority
and legitimacy of the state; which had been relegated to
the metaphysical heap of political philosophy, began to
be restored to their former eminence and became part of crim41
inological inquiry.
The lumpenproletariat, contrary to
Marxy were exalted, as victims of social control and became
legitimate sources of academic inspiration.
sexism,

imperialism,

War, racism,

capitalism were determined to be crim

inal acts in and of themselves and were so categorized for
42
radical investigation.
Traditional explanations of crime
were debunked as veiled exercises in ideological mystifi
cation and status-quo maintenance.

The whole enterprise

of criminology was up for radical reconsideration.
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At this writing this development of radical crim
inological criticism and reformulation is still in process
and shows little sign of completion.

It is in line with

radical criminology's criticism of conventional criminology
that this author aligns himself.

However,

to align oneself

with a particular point of view does not necessarily denote
a final concurrence as later chapters will seek to make
43
abundantly clear.
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CHAPTER III
RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY:

IS IT A MARXIST

OR NEW LEFT THEORY OF CRIME?
Radical criminology, although it exhibits some
diversity in terms of style and particular objects of study,
is a fundamental unity in five over-arching ways:
1.

A persistent and critical challenge of
"the everyday political assumptions, prac
tices and implications... of the /conven■

1

tional: mine; science of criminology."
2.

The understanding that in capitalist soci
eties law and other components of the crim
inal justice system are founded on an ideol2
ogy of "science and technology" which is
supportive of order over justice in society.

3.

The employment of a utopian and/or prophetic
vision that posits a post-capitalist crime
free society.

4.

An attempt at balancing left political praxis

5.

with radical theorizing.
3
A New Left method of thinking about crime
that is distinct from orthodox Marxist soc
ial science.

Given the unity of radical criminology,

this chapter

contends that radical criminology in its dialectical criti-
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t/cism, its utopianism and its antiauthoritarianism,

is not

only explicitly critical of conventional criminology (the
argument of the last chapter), but it is also a critical
departure from Marxist orthodoxy.

The departure however

is not clearly understood as such by radical theorists
because these theorists have sought to identify their theor
ies of crime with the Marxist paradigm,

though Marx himself

would have disavowed them for such an identification.

It

will be argued that radical criminology is actually a New
Left theory of crime; a view of crime which initially emer
ged in the late 1960's and by its nature is implicitly
if not explicitly critical of Old Left Marxist "ortho4
praxis".
In short the contention, then, is that radical
criminology is a departure from or a transcendence of the
bounds of Marxist "orthopraxis'1 and as such is in the pro
cess of developing a New Left "heteropraxis" suitable to
its distinctive purposes and ends.
To substantiate the above contention the chapter
concentrates on a career analysis of five leading radical
criminologists and is divided into the following segments:
1.

Heretical liberal criminology of the
early sixties,

followed by this author's

co m ment.
2.

Political criminology from the period 19651973, followed by this author's comment.

3.

Radical criminology from the period,

1973
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to the present.

The question of is radical

criminology really Marxist?, will be broached
for the first time.
4.

The question of radical criminology as a New
Left theorizing in criminology will be explored.

Radical Criminology; A Career Analysis
The academic careers of Richard Quinney, Anthony
Platt and the radical British collective of Ian Taylor,
Paul Walton and Jock Young lend themselves well as examples
5
of radicalization within the field of criminology.
To some
degree all have evolved on a career lattice through initial
though heretical acceptance of conventionality to the p o l 
itical rejection and substitution of same.

Each has become

prominent as an advocate of the radical position since the
late 1960's.

These authors were selected because it is felt

that their careers and thoughts are symbolic of the most
important themes in radical criminological analysis.

The

career evolvement of the authors is below illustrated by
use of a time-consecutive presentation which shows the car
eer progression of the writers'
the early 1960's to the present;

thoughts on criminology from
following each time period

is a comment by the present author.
I.

Heretical Liberal Criminology: Early Sixties
A.

Richard Quinney
Quinney grew up in rural Wisconsin and
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is highly positive about the influence Midwestern
populism has had on his academic career.

As he

describes it in populism there is the "still basic
idea of the questioning of authority, of an a t 
tempt to obtain basic human rights, but also the
pursual of a decent life that was more than econ-

6
omic.”

Yet prior to the m i d - I960*s Quinney's

populism was basically unquestioning in any r a d 
ical sense and remained accepting of the authority
of conventional canons in sociological criminology.
Even before the completion of his doctoral disser
tation in 1962, Quinney's interest in criminology
was not in the least outside of the norm of con
ventionality.

His earliest work emphasized o f 

fender shortcomings and individual psychology
rather than oppressive social factors in relation
to criminality.

In fact his dissertation, Retail

Pharmacy as a Marginal Occupation: A Study of
Prescription Violation was, by his own account,
....devoid of legal considerations,
the law being taken for granted....Yet I
tried to go beyond the confines of crim
inology by looking at the occupational
structure.
Where criminologists had tried
to explain behavior in terms of the social
characteristics of the individual, I turned
to the characteristics of the occupation
in which the individual was employed. 7
From 1962 until late 1964, while teaching at the
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University of Kentucky, Quinney expanded on the
central feature of his dissertation:

the relation

between social structure and crime.

In his first

journal article, wrote in the fall of 1963, he
concludes that,
...White-collar crime reflects the p a r 
ticular structure of the occupation and is
a normal response to o n e ’s particular loca
tion within the occupation. 8
In April 1964 in an article on "Suicide, Homicide
and Economic Development", Quinney found, after
reviewing statistics on suicide and homicide
rates in 48 countries,

evidence which indicated

that economic development—

as measured by urban

ization and industrialization"— "bears a constant
relation to the frequency of suicide and homicide
and should be considered as causally separate
9
phenomena.
That economically developed countries
have higher suicide but lower homicide rates than
less developed nations is not a radically enlight
ening piece of information by any reckoning.

Yet

it is the kind of nuts and bolts conventional
criminology that occupied Quinney*s energies in
this particular period.
Though Quinney*s work in the early sixties
was conventionally oriented,

it did become part

of an emerging chorus of heretical voices that
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sought to incorporate the study of criminal law
into criminological theorizing.

This had the

net effect of locating responsibility for criminal
behavior in external social arrangements rather
than merely explaining all criminal behavior from
the behavior patterns of criminal a c t o r s .' By
studying criminal law, the criminologist could
better discover why a particular behavior came
to be defined as a crime in the first instance.
It was Quinney*s continuing study of white-collar
crime that led him to conclude,

in an article

devoted to a reorientation of criminological
research and theory, that:
...It is probably the c ase...that in
some occupations certain behaviors have
been a part (possibly deviant) of the occu
pation for some time, but the fact that for
some to reason a law was established made
the behaviors criminal.
The point is that
that the relationship between social struct
ure, criminal law, occupational norms, and
criminal behaviors should be given further
consideration. 10
B.

Anthony Platt
Platt comes from an English background

where he successfully completed a high school
"scholarship factory" and thereafter received
his B.A. in jurisprudence from Oxford in 1963.
He decided against a legal career because of the
conservative orientation of a law professor he
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read under while at Oxford.

His interest in

criminology began at a seminar in his last under
graduate semester at which he was put in contact
with a University of California criminologist who
suggested that he attend Berkeley.

But Berkeley,

prior to the 1964 Free Speech Movement, was a great
disappointment to him because of its nontutorial
educational emphasis and he decided to go back to
Britain.

Fortunately,

a psychoanalyst and legal

scholar got him interested in the discipline of
law and psychiatry and he took a job as a gradu11
ate research assistant.
Platt soon discovered that there were
interesting parallels between the legal definition
of madness and juvenile status; a discovery which
attracted him to David Matza's interactionist
perspective (as put forth in Delinquency and Drift) .
In addition to Matza's influence,

several leading

labeling theorists were then active at Berkeley
and Platt found labeling theory's critical posture
12
toward the criminal justice system appealing.
Platt has noted that the labeling theorists,
...at that time were the "young Turks"
of criminology and seemed to offer a radical
alternative to traditional positivism and
delinquency control theorists... and I embra
ced it Clabeling theory: minej too quickly
and without proper examination of its ideo
logical assumptions. 13
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Illustrative of Platt's early uncritical assoc
iation with interactionist and/or labeling theories
are some of the works he had published even prior
to his 1966 doctoral dissertation, The Child-Savers.
In the year 1965 Platt was named research editor
for the first volume of the Berkeley Graduate Journal,
Issues in Criminology,
was

Appearing in this journal

(to this author's knowledge) his first published

work:

"The Origins and Development of the Wild

Beast Concept of Mental Illness and Its Relation
to Theories of Criminal Responsibility."

The

basic concern of this journal article was to cor
relate the historically reitified "wild beast"
test of criminal responsibility with psycho-social
theories which defined madness as essentially des
tructive childlike behavior.

The article is n o t 

ably excellent for its characteristically liberal
and contradictory social policy recommendations.
On one hand, Platt was concerned that psycho-social
theories which employ the child model of mental
illness emphasize "the fixed, irremedial position
14
of such persons"
and thereby tends to arbitrarily
segregate the mentally ill from the more normal.
However,

though the mentally ill were selected out

for differential treatment from normal individuals
(that is at law they are "children" of the state)
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Platt held that social policy based on the child
model is to be encouraged because:
...the wider society relates to the m e n 
tally ill in paternalistic attitudes... this
social policy is to be encouraged because it
encompasses all the compassionate and tolerant
aspects of social welfare. 15
In a second early article, Platt discussed the
meaning of punishment as it relates to the schism
in modern penology "between some who take the
psychologically oriented treatment approach and
others who advocate an old fashioned punitive
16
approach."
Platt took the position that the
historical trend is geared toward those advocating
treatment as against retribution, while he admit
ted that treatment is a necessarily coercive
force set against criminal offenders.

His recom

mendations, which deal with the actual administra
tion of the treatment approach merely asks that
treatment,

like old-fashioned punishment, be

subjected to legal regulations as a way of assuring
17
offenders "freedom and justice."
Platt's recom
mendation falls short of any critical understanding
of criminal law's role as the formalized expression
of the retributive ideal in penology.
C.

Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young
The present author was basically unsuc

cessful in an attempt to secure biographical infor-
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mation about these young British criminologists
which would be relevant to their academic careers
in the early 1960's.

All of them probably began

publishing in the early seventies.

Prior to 1968
18
the authors had not met each other.
However,
there is scant information available which is

suggestive of the kinds of social and academic
influences which made an impact on their early
academic careers.
...Most of us were affiliated directly
or indirectly with Left parties, factions
or groups.
And one of the features of these
Left parties was that, however critically
they welcomed the advent of the Labor
Government in 1964 and the equivalent vict
ories of other European Social Democratic
parties in the early 1960's, they were u n 
critical on questions of crime, penal policy
or on questions of human dignity and diver
sity in general. 19
But being active in left politics even under the
most favorable conditions is not necessarily a p r e 
condition for radical scholarship.

Radical scholar

ship is in tension with radical activisim because
of what Howard S. Becker and Irving L. Horowitz
have called..." the differing time scales of the
20
two activities."
The social scientist takes time
to collect evidence but the political activist"
must often make decisions prior to the compilation
21
of adequate evidence."
The situation for Taylor
et al prior to their academic radicalization was
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one in which they drew important insights and
inspiration from "American symbolic interactionist sociology" as it was then manifested in the
22
non-radical works of Becker and Peter Berger.
The point is that they did not at first turn to
23
orthodox Marxism or Fabian socialism
for theor
etical insights to guide their early thinking,
even though they were at the time engaged in left
political activities.

They were disappointed with

the traditional positivism of most conventional
criminology, but early in their careers naively
latched on to theories held by "the young Turks"
of American criminology w h o m they later came to
criticize as failing to live up to their initial
promises which were made in the early 1960's
"social reaction revolt against the structuralism
24
of the Mertonian anomie theorists."
D.

Comment
In the early 1 9 6 0 *s much of American

criminology was interventionist and scientifically
oriented toward the administrative requirements of
25
criminal justice personnel.
Positivism and struct
ural-functionalism were the preferred methods of
criminological investigation.

Political consensus

in the social order was deemed to be the normal
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26
state.

Most criminologists took for granted

such concepts as: "bureaucratic rationality,
modern technology, centralized authority, and
27
scientific control."
The research activity of
criminology regularly represented the conserva
tive status-quo interests of the powerful at the
28
expense of the less powerful.
In this conservative criminological atmos
phere new and somewhat critical voices began to
emerge and offer rather unorthodox alternatives
to the dominant mentality.

These new voices can

be characteristically described as liberal young
Turks, rather than political academic radicals in
the sense of calling assumptions of the whole crim
inological enterprise into question.

This disjunct

ion between the "heretic liberalism" of the young
Turks and later radicalism in criminology is impor
tant to note because the tendency is to confusedly
identify any criticism of conventional orthodoxy
with radical criticism.

Young Turk alternatives,

such as what has been variously called social con
struction theory,
reaction theory,

social control theory,
transactionalism,

social

interactionalism

and labelling theory, were basically liberal ideo29
logically
and politically supportive of the
status-quo.

Thus in a paradoxical way "heretical
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liberalism" though it questioned some features
of conventional criminology,

accepted the domin

ant ideological assumptions and political practice
of conventional criminology.

Like positivism

and structural-functionalism,

"heretical liberal

ism" failed,
...to lay bare the structured inequal
ities in power and interest which underpin
the processes whereby laws are created and
enforced (the processes referred to in indi
vidualistic fashion by Becker in his dis
cussion of moral enterprise). 30
Even though "heretical liberalism" in criminology
is non-radical,

it did serve as a transitional

step for the radical authors considered above.
By offering a non-conformist understanding of
crime to the authors early in their academic car
eers,

the way was opened for later radical discus

sions about "the problematic nature of legal
31
order."
Heretical liberalism’s realization
that crime and deviancy may be stigmatized behav
iors which are created and fostered on some by
others, was the initial step in a more radical
criminology which has since come to define criminal
law as the arbitrary and formal imposition of
control by the powerful over the powerless.
Finally, by positing individual freedom as the
antithesis of social repression,

"heretical lib
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eralism" contributed to radical criminology's
utopianist vision of a new society where life
"instead of being controlled by the rigid m e c h 
anisms of the state,
with others,
II.

is to be lived collectively
32
in harmony..."

Political Criminology:
A-

1965-1973

Richard Quinney
In the m i d - 1960*8 Quinney1s work began to

emphasize the politicality of crime,

a studied re

jection of his earlier emphasis, which was mainly
content with a non-political investigation of the
relations between social (occupational)
and crime.

structure

Criminal law was a public policy out

come of unequal political activity in the general
society.

It followed that:

Criminality is not inherent behavior but
is a property conferred politically upon some
individuals by others in the enactment, enforce
ment and administration of the law. 33
Ouinney's political perspective on criminal law
was further an outright rejection of conventional
jurisprudences1s claim that "the rule of law" is
somehow an objective instrument of social control
which justly reflects the social consciousness of
34
the whole community.
Conventional jurisprudence,
following the line of theory began by Roscoe Pound,
had developed an interest theory of law based on
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a pluralistic conception of political interaction.
Law in the pluralistic conception is the result of
compromises between interest groups who hold social
values in common and have equal access to political
power in society.

Quinney's most representative

work of this period in his career development was
his 1970 Social Reality of C r ime.

In developing

his perspective on the politicality of crime and
criminal law he suggested, by implication,
there is an elite segment of interests

that

(ruling

class) which had more power and influence than other
35
interests.
Crime in this elite formulation is
fundamentally a product of social stratification
and its attendant conflicts among unequal segments
in society.

Yet parallel to this elite conception

Quinney posited an explicitly phenomenological
anthropology which relativized
elite argument,

and obsfucated the

forcing Quinney to draw uncritical

and subjectivist conclusions:
1.

It can accept no universal essences.
The
mind is unable to frame a concept of an
objective reality beyond man's conception
of it.
Thus we have no reason to believe
in the objective existence of anything. 36

2.

Though the content of the actions is shaped
by the social and cultural location of
the person in society, actions are ulti
mately the product of each individual. 37

3.

Crime begins in the mind.

In this sense
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a conceptual reality of crime is con
structed.
But the consequence of such
construction is a world of actions and
events; that is, a phenomenal reality.
The whole developmental complex of con
ception and phenomena in reference to
crime, is the construction of the social
reality of crime. 38
In compounding his confusion Quinney,

in another

1970 work,

interpreted crime as functionally neces39
sary to a well ordered society.
Crime maintains
the social order by allowing economic opportunity
(at some risk)

for those otherwise handicapped

in terms of access to legitimate economic means of
securing themselves.

Criminal behavior is thus

normal order maintenance activity which contributes
to society* s basic welfare and is flnot alien... to
the organization of society.../'nor; does it dis40
rupt society."
This structural-functionalist
approach of Quinney is bewildering and problematic
when compared to the conflict generating elite
theory implied in his thesis on the social reality
of crime.

Social order maintenance requires sta

bility and agreement on values especially when r e 
lated to economic production and distribution.

In

employing structural-functionalism, Quinney failed
to engage in a critique of capitalist economic
arrangements and thus showed uncritical allegiance
to the very same economic values he would later
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come to attack so vehemently.

Moreover, because

the functionalist view is based on an essentialist
conception of social reality,

it flies squarely in

the face of a phenomenalist anthropology of crime
causation:

the individual's mind and the meaning

it attaches to criminal activity is dysfunctional/
existential rather than functional/essential.
B.

Anthony Platt
Platt left Berkeley in 1966 to work on

a two-year research fellowship at the University
of Chicago where he was picked as Research Director
on a $100,000 Ford Foundation pilot project designed
to study the delivery of legal services to black
41
youth in Chicago's Southside.
The project had
a "technocratic orientation" which focused on
how best to implement the Supreme Court's Gault
decision,

i.e. how to make lawyers a "regular part
42
of the juvenile justice system."
In retrospect
Platt has lamented that the project was essentially
a fraud in that it existed for "research and not
service to the people" and that,
The program was typically liberal and
reformist.
While in the short-run it appeared
humanitarian and benevolent it did great in
justices to the Black community... it channeled
residents away from political action...it en
couraged reliance on professionals and e x p e r t s .
...More significantly, the project served
important public relations functions for the
University of Chicago.
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...It was a perfect example of liberal colon
ialism, of missionary-style politics based on
guilt and paternalism. A3
In 1968 a rather disillusioned Platt returned to
Berkeley to assist in the preparation of Jerome
Skolnick's Politics of Protest, a report to the
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention
of Violence.

Platt was primarily responsible for

the chapters on black militancy and the crisis of
the judicial system in its response to urban viol44
ence.
Contrary to conventional collective b e 
havior theory which conceived of collective b e 
havior as irrational, deviant and inappropriate
45
behavior,
Platt sympathetically set black m i l i 
tancy, in a historical and particularistic context
of Third-World protest against white Western domin
ation.

Thus rendered, black militancy was better

thought of as rationally motivated political
behavior,

consciously employed to overcome domes46
tic white colonialism or social control.
Riots

and violence were political strategies and not
simply some ambiguous psychological urge to destroy
indiscriminately.

Platt necessarily stopped short

of proposing that black militancy as violent p o l 
itical behavior could be made legitimate in the
eyes of white authority;

in fact the question of

legitimate black violence to overcome white oppres-
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sion was not discussed although the violence
of white police was criticized.

By not posing

this kind of question Platt's analysis of the
courts role in response to black militancy assumed
that not only is white authority legal, but by
extension,

legitimate, which obviously it was

not, at least from a revolutionary black perspect47
48
ive.
If internal colonialism
is a political
contest between oppressed and oppressor, with
both parties considering themselves politically
right (legitimate), then the colonialist judicial
system's ability to administer equal justice is
severely compromised.

This point becomes all the

more clear when Platt in classic liberal confusion
proposed that,
...every effort should be made to improve
the ability of the courts to administer just
ice efficiently and fairly, with full regard
to the civil liberties of defendants. 49
Only later did Platt come to recognize some of
the liberal contradictions inherent in the Politics
of P r o t e s t .
The book was sanitized of ideological dis
cussion on the grounds that policy-makers might
be off e n d ed... it was written for progressive
forces within the government and academia and
not for the movement it was studying... it was
reminiscent of my experiences in Chicago...
I don't think I will work for a commission
again.
Too many compromises have to be made.
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C.

Ian T a y l o r et al
A shared revulsion against the "correct-

ionalism, pragmatism and puritanism" of conven
tional British crimonology was the basis for the
51
1968 coming together of the three authors.
At
this initial meeting, which took place at Cambridge*s
Institute of Criminology, rhe three men decided to
form the National Deviancy Conference as a progres
sive alternative to the Institute.

Their concern

in organizing the Conference was two-fold:

1)

to counter the academic hegemony of established
criminology and 2) to provide an umbrella organi
zation for non-academic political activists as a
way of uniting progressive criminological theory
52
with a political p r a x i s .
The first published outcome of their assoc
iation was the 1971 Images of Deviance, wherein
a not-so successful attempt was made to move away
from both conventional deviance theory and American
53
symbolic interactionism.
The aim was to ascer
tain among other things n the political implications
of studying deviance."

They took note that con

ventional criminologists by focusing on individual
pathology had not dealt honestly with or made explicity the value orientations of their work and that
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academic research was strictly limited to funct
ional use by the official agencies of social con
trol.

The study of deviancy itself was thus p r o b 

lematic because of the political nature of the
criminological enterprise.

But the "skeptical

emphasis" of this work undercut its potential
for radical a nalysis.

Their naive skepticism

coupled with ethnographic methodology prevented
them from moving beyond the boundaries of heret
ical liberalism, which in Stanley Cohen's (another
radical British criminologist)

estimation,

...often implies little more than a plea
for a more tolerant attitude towards the dev
iant or reform at the level of specific insti
tutions ... 54
The 1973 Politics and Deviance, was as its title
indicates,

an explicityly political criminology of

deviancy and social control.

The authors had moved

from their earlier uncertainty and skepticism into
a historical conception of crime as a specifically
political activity deliberately created by the
55
selection processes of agencies of social control.
Criminal activity became for them a matter of who
was defining what as crime:

sub-cultural groups,

as for instance Hippies and the Weatherman,

inter

preted their own activity as normative, as did
corporations, which though not strictly engaged

100

in illegal activity, were purposefully engaged
in "socially injurious" actions as the normative
56
ethic of business as usual.
Since, for example,
both Hippies and businessmen were from the outside
engaged in behavior which was offensive to certain
cherished ideals of what is socially good,

the

authors raised the question as to the ultimately
biased nature of legal order.

That is harmful

business practices were viewed and treated with
deferrence by the same legal order that apprehended
and punished Hippies and Weathermen as cultural
and political outcasts.

By exploring the political

ramifications of deviancy the authors rendered a
necessary service in their critique of criminolog
ical orthodoxy.

However,

they were still far

from a radical criminology as discussed in chap
ter one of this thesis.

Liberal criminologists

have often engaged in politically liberal assess
ments

(even critiques) of the criminal justice

system.

The earlier example herein of Ramsey Clark

gives evidence of this kind of liberal political
analysis of crime;

the difference between Clark

and the three authors being the space between
liberal orthodoxy and liberal heterodoxy.

An

explicitly political analysis of crime is thus
not the equivalent of a radical political critique
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which is premised on the wholesale dismantling
of criminological conventionalism.

What the

authors ultimately did in Politics and Deviance
was no more than to make explicit the skepticism
in Images about the politicality of crime.
D.

Comment
Two salient and common features are a p 

parent in the career development of the several
authors during the period discussed above.
was the case in the early sixties,

As

all of the

authors addressed themselves to the search for
more meaningful approaches to the study of crime
than that which conventional orthodoxy provided.
The great difference between the early and later
period being an accelerated and more explicitly
self-conscious rejection of conventionality.
By contrast in the early period the authors ac
cepted, with a certain "existential Angst" the
57
major features of conventionality.
In the sec
ond period one is confronted with the beginnings
of a boldly explicit, but non-radical,

assault

on the entire criminological establishment.

The

primary aims and objectives of conventionality
were called into account for being directed toward
the maintenance of some social interests which
were in conflict with other interests.

The social
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reality of crime became a question of power
with the objective study of crime being located
in the subjective interaction of the powerful
/

✓

vis-a-vis the powerless.

In this process of self-

conscious reflexion the authors became acutely
aware that crime is essentially political behavior:
a contest between the punishers and the punished.
The social climate of mounting demonstrations,
riots,

and war added greatly to this acute sens

itivity.

No longer were criminological niceties

the main topic of contention at criminological
gatherings;

the politicality of crime and crim

inology as the servant of powerful political ele58
ments in society were the primary agenda i t e m s .
Existential nausea x^as beginning to turn into
political struggle within the criminological
enterprise itself.
Even with the political turmoil in both
the general society and criminology the several
authors failed,

during this period to develop a

strictly radical criminology.

The transition to

radical criminology was not complete mainly because
the goals of even liberal heterodoxy in criminology
are of social reform rather than social revolution.
Not yet had the authors created a politicaleconomy of crime which would have taken them
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beyond the classic liberal dilemma of wanting to
engineer incremental change and administrative
modifications in social systems without an equit
able redistribution of social rewards and privil
eges.

The rule of law and order so dearly loved

by liberals would necessarily become the u n pre
dictable rule of the people in a radical context.
The authors, in not adequately addressing the
contradictory nature of their liberal heritage,
failed to understand that the disjunction between
liberalism and radicalism is,
...the liberal belief that it is possi
ble to create a well-regulated, stable and
humanitarian system of criminal justice
under the present economic and political
arrangements.. Whilst it is true that crim
inologists have subjected social-control
institutions (police, courts, prisons,
etc.) to a variety of criticisms
including
inefficiency, mismanagement, corruption
and brutality
their reform proposals are
invariably formulated within the framework
of corporate capitalism and designed to
shape new adjustments to existing political
and economic conditions. 59
III.

Radical Criminology,
Really Marxist?
A.

1973 to Present:

Is It

Richard Quinney
For Quinney it was the comprehension of

the radical implications of a newly found critical
philosophy (critique of Legal Order,

1973)

that

served as an immediate backdrop for his embracing
of a particularly ’’curious*’ Marxist conception of
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criminology.

The philosophy of negation or crit

ical philosophy*
ulations of Hegal,

'drawing on the theoretical form
the younger Marx,

the Frankfort

School which included Marcuse and more recently
60
Habermas——
provided Quinney with a "radically
critical" and dialectical understanding of the
established legal order.

Critical philosophy,

because of its dialectical method, was for Quinney,
the alternative to the liberal dilemma which had
prevailed in his earlier work.
That i s , the legal order is founded on
the rationality of science and technology, and
the dominant mode of thought in understanding
that order is based on this same ideology.
Little wonder that we had been unable to break
out of our conventional wisdom. 61
Strangely enough in desiring a less abstract and
more concrete analysis of crime, Quinney rather
62
hastily aligned himself with "underground Marxism".
This alignment is strange first because Quinney,
since the early sixties had been highly critical
of liberal criminology for its insufficiency in
postulating alternatives to the established legal
order.

For him to pass from critical philosophy

to an unclear Marxism without hardly a mention
of the reasons for such a passage borders on the
incredulous, his academic desire for concreteness
notwithstanding.
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Quinney's strange passage from "radically
critical"

63

philosophy is also problematic because

as he claims,

"critical thought must ultimately
64
develop a Marxist perspective"
and vice-a-versa.
The question of why this is So is left open with
only passing reference to the need of uniting of
critical theory with a socially concrete p r a x i s .
Why critical theory must develop a Marxist praxis
rather than say an anarchistic praxis is never m e n 
tioned.

Again,

if critical thought is only possible

as a derivative of Marxism,

then are we to under

stand that orthodox (aboveground) Marxism has devel
oped in practice a "radically critical" analysis
of crime which is divorced in function from m a i n 
tenance requirements of the socialist status-quo?
After arbitrarily making critical philosophy
strangely synonomous with "underground" Marxist
theory, Quinney proceeded to develop a "critical
philosophy of legal order".

The goal was to demys

tify law and the crime control establishment by
exposing them as the coercive arm of society's
corporate-capitalistic ruling class.
the negation of official reality

By its terms,

as the project of

critically demystifying legal ideology, was a cor
rect and necessary onslaught against the prevailing
liberal ideology.

But Marxist praxis by its
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terms requires the actual working of a theory
which not only aims at a critique of capitalism
but more importantly a struggle to incorporate
a socialist existence.

In areas of the world

]/ where socialist existence is the official real
ity, criminology functions (as it does in cap
italist society) as an arm of the ruling ele
ments in a socially differentiated society.

In

this regard it is instructive to glimpse how an
existing socialist criminology views criminality:
A member of socialist society bears
a real responsibility actively and crea
tively to shape all social fundamental
relationships himself and to develop his
capacities for so doing.
The objective
foundations of socialist relations justify
socialist society to expect and demand
that its members should participate in
the shaping of these relationships.
If
the individual does not come up to these
expectations, and if in choosing his soc
ial options of action he takes his bearings
not from a mode of behavior possible for
him but instead chooses an antisocial or
or even society-endangering social behavior,
then, on the bhsis of his general responsi
bility, there arises an individual criminal
accountability and personal culpability.
This culpability... fails to observe or even
deliberately disregards the basic demands
of society, by a social behavior dangerous
or hostile to essential aspects of the life
of society; at the same time it also in
fringes the criminal law. 65
Obviously existing Marxist criminology like its
liberal adversary in capitalistic societies requires
a radical critique not on the basis of its social-

107

istic mode of material production but on account
of its plain-old allegiance to social control forces.
If Quinney would have done a cross-cultural crim-

^ inological

analysis of orthodox Marxist criminology,

before forcing the association of critical philos
ophy and Marxist praxis, he would have found that:
/ 1.

All official versions of social reality
are pervasively one-dimensional no matter
the particular economic arrangement.

2.

All official criminology support the
official version of social reality.

^ 3.

The almost one-hundred year old praxis
of revolutionary-to-administrative Marxism
has supported the official political
line of
^ tant to

the official party.

This is impor-

note because revolutionary out-

of-power Marxism rapidly converts into
an a-critical

(of itself) administrative

and conservative Marxism upon the taking
of power.
4.

Marxist

praxis has a collective or organ

izational need (both while in power and
out) to implement a social control appar
atus to discipline those who express atti
tudes in conflict with the official version
of reality.
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5.

Both capitalist and orthodox Marxist crim
inology are asy academic disciplines^part of
the same dominate,

technical, rationalist

and scientific world-view, which neither,
by the terms of their essentially m aterial
istic and totalistic focus,
selves from.
moreover,

can extract them

This shared Weltanschauug, is

a valued cultural feature that seeks

to discipline and punish (for similar reasons)
deviants worldwide;

even the technical domin

ance of nature itself forms the basis for what
Marcuse calls,
...the ever-more-effective domination
of m a n by man...Today domination perpet
uates and extends itself not only through
technology but as technology and the latter
provides the great legitimation of the
expanding political power, which absorbs
all spheres of culture. 66

v 6.

A truly "radically critical" criminological
analysis would, because of the above reasons
more probably have combined with a praxis which
has consistently dealt in a revolutionary manner
with the m o d e m phenomenon of rational-technical
domination.

Class domination being only one

of the many characteristic forms of social dom
inance in contemporary America.
Class State and C r i m e , reflects Quinney*s most rec
ent work in developing a "Marxist" criminology.

It
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is basically a restatement of the system of in
quiry first layed-down in his Critique three
years earlier.

Of minor interest is that the

descriptive term "underground" has mysteriously
disappeared and a supposedly mature Marxist posi
tion took its place.
Progressively the book again praises
critical thinking and then abruptly and arbitrar67
ily transforms it into a Marxian framework.
In building a Marxian critique of capitalist
political-economy Quinney*s main concern was to
answer the question of the meaning of crime in
68
the development of capitalism.
The answer was
that "crime control and criminality... are the con
ditions resulting from the capitalistic appropri69
ation of labor.
The historic capitalistic ex
ploitation of labor has continually generated classes
and factions within classes "whose interrelations
70
determine the essence of the mode of production"
up to the present advance state of capitalist
development.

The most important interrelatedness

of the classes has been and is class struggle.
The superordinate capitalist class through state
manipulation is responsible for social domination
71
and repression.
The subordinate working class
is the accomodating, resisting class

(objects of
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state c ontrol).

Crime control and crimes of

domination are crimes of the superordinate c l a s s ;
’’while nearly all crimes among the working class
in capitalist society are actually a means of sur73
vival.”
Predatory crimes and personal crimes
(e.g. murder, rape and assault)

"are pursued by

those who are already brutalized by the conditions
74
of capitalism.”
W i e n working class crimes are
consciously directed at the over-throwing of the
dominate class,

these crimes become political and
75
as such are revolutionary in character.
Since,
by the logic of dialectical materialism,

capital

ism is in a constant state of flux, so is crime
and crime control.

A Marxist analysis must also

change to keep pace with ever newer internal con
tradictions of capitalism which are now resolving
themselves into a socialist political economy where
the need for a criminal justice system will have
76
gone the way of capitalism.
This, in capsulated
form, was Quinney*s basic argument.
Because Quinney conceives of crime as ab
solutely a product of capitalist development,

it

is at the level of comprehending the transformations
in capital—

i .e . , the changes in capitalist pro

duction are reproduced in the social relations of
society of which crime control and criminality are
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elements of

that one must enter into criti

cal dialogue with Quinney.

It is necessary to

argue against Quinney*s dogmatic assertion that
all crime is inevitably a result of the social
relations of capitalist production (class strug78
gle).
All personal crimes like for example,
rape, murder and assault cannot be adequately
explained as a matter of economic survival; nor
can all predatory crimes

(e.g., robbery, burglary,

and etc.), when these crimes are committed by p e r 
sons with fair and equal access to good paying
and legitimate employment.

Even while granting

y t h a t the bulk of crimes may be rational responses
to economic conditions, some amount of criminal
irrationality is not thereby necessarily precluded.
For example, racism and sexism are not simply a
matter of economic exploitation, but have more to
do with questions of biology,

social status and

culture wherein the American criminal justice sys

j

tem has consistently upheld the superiority of
79
white and male privilege.
Racism and sexism,
as irrational forms of social dominance, may be
interrelated with the development of capitalism
80
but not inevitably dependent on it.
White ruling
class and working class crimes against racial m i n o r 
ities and women may be immune to a dogmatic Marxist
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analysis.

Recently several black radical scholars
81
with an Afro-centric ideology
have confronted
white Marxists with historical and contemporary
evidence of the racism that is an inherent part
of dialectical materialism or Marxist orthodoxy:
We must pose this question: can an ideol
ogy tailored exclusively after a Western
model, designed to serve exclusively proletAryan interests and construed in such a way
as to confirm, approve and extend the basic
propositions of white supremacy, act as a
guide to that part of mankind most directly
subjugated to international Aryan supremacy.
Can an ideology that incorporates subtle
philosophico-racist principles serve as a
tool or weapon against racism?
Marx and
Engels* political judgements, theoretical
conclusions and philosophical analysis...
were naturally conditioned by their being
W e s t e r n e r s ...whites, not blacks; free men...
not chattel slaves.
It is thus clear that
their ... evaluation of non-European mankind
must be categorically challenged.
We must
also challenge the "universalistic" p r e 
tensions of certain "general laws" emerging
from a strictly Aryan socioeconomic and
cultural mold.
Most important of all, we
must profoundly question the very utility
of Marxist-Leninism in solving problems for 82
which, in truth, it has no answers whatsover.
Radical feminists have also engaged in a critique
of Marxism not too unlike that of Third-World peoples.
For Marxists,

like Quinney,

to define a rapist, or

homosexual or child-molester as a person involved
in a struggle for economic survival is insidious
to non-Marxist radical feminists.

Even to hold

as Lenin did that sexism was a secondary contradict
ion of capitalist development is an insult to con-
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temporary non-Marxist radical feminists who have
witnessed sixty-two years of orthodox Marxist
83
socialism.
The results of the socialist experi
ment to date shows that female emancipation is
still "secondary11.

That is,

...economic revolution--i.e . change from
captialism, to socialism
can also be viewed
in terms of male interest.
Under capitalism,
the majority of men were exploited and con
trolled by a few men who held wealth and power.
By changing the economic structure to social
ism, this particular economic exploitation
was largely eradicated.
Women fought for and
supported such a revolution...but the Soviet
revolution remained a male power revolution...
Soviet women are teachers, doctors, assistants,
food h a n d l e r s . And when they come home from
work they are expected to continue in their
submissive role to men and do the housework,
cooking and take primary responsibility for
child r e a r i n g . 84
Perhaps Quinney's greatest naivety in Class State
and Crime is his hope of transcending the criminal
justice system and the intellectual specialization
85
of criminology.
He conveniently forgets that,
by the terms of his interpretation of dialectical
materialism,

class struggle will prevail even under

a socialist economy (the players switch but the
game of political domination goes o n ) .

Class strug

gle only ceases after the stage of pure communism
(anarchism) has been reached.

The state as the

executive agency of the proletariat will ultimately
control criminal behavior as it does in existing
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socialist and capitalist societies.

What Quinney

calls "popular justice" is in reality state spon
sored proletarian justice and nothing more than
wistful thinking on his part.

Moreover,

to des

cribe the socialist justice systems of China and
Cuba as somehow enlightened models for American
radicals to work toward suggests that Quinney has
86
not really investigated the matter.
For example,
the Chinese legal system is ethno-centric and
based therefore on not only the thoughts of Mao
but more importantly also of Confuscious.

Confucian

religious thought "eschewed formal legal rules
as inherently inferior to principles of behavior
derived from common consent or custom, and enforced
through community pressure and community based
87
mediation operating largely informally."
Cuba,
on the other hand, and after twenty years of
Castroism,

"mysteriously" maintains a criminal

court system based on the 1938 Cuban Code;

the

Cuban system even comes replete with judges decked

88
out in medieval r o b e s .
Quinney's hope of transcending the special
ization of criminology,

i.e., social theory must

be "capable of moving across the boundaries of

89
normal science with its normal division of labor,"
is based on the concern that social theory must
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serve the majority democratic interests of the
working class.

In response to this concern,

it

should be understood that the transition to social
ism, and even after socialism's entrenchment,

soc

ial theory will most probably serve majority working
class interests as these are immediately defined
by the state and mediately defined by the ruling
party clique.

The transition to socialism is not

the end of class struggle but rather its conscious
continuance.

That is, socialist theory,

like bour

geois theory under capitalism, will serve class
interests as these are defined by the state which
in turn will be subject to the conditioning of
ruling elements in society.

Thus there will be

no compelling reason to discontinue criminological
investigation given that under socialism crime
and crime control will still be extant.

So will

the state as the primary agency of social control.
By the terms of dialectical materialism,
minority interests under socialism will be defined
as either deviant or criminal.

This being so the

state will resort to the same or worse kinds of
crime control techniques that now prevail under
capitalism.

Socialist theory, manifested in crim

inology, will be called upon to provide the state
with explanations and recommendations.

Socialism
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will require,

as it does now in existing social

ist states,
...on the one hand a higher quality of
judicial practice— -with particular refer
ence to tne study of criminal law and crim
inal procedure
and on the other the devel
opment of a system of administrative and
social measures designed to overcome crim
inality and its causes, a task involving
in particular the participation of socialist
criminology and other social sciences. 90
Finally,

one could buy Q u i n n e y fs transcendent argu

ment if he were hoping for a post-capitalist revol-

^ utionary

critique of administrative socialism because

those in minority opposition (praxis) to socialist
state control would presumably require a critical
social theory to confront socialist criminology.

V But

this is not Quinney's argument;

for him only

I captialism can provide a causal explanation for
the existence of crime.

This economic reductionism

i

; keeps Quinney from dealing with those forms of
; social pathology which cannot be so categorized.
It also implies that criminologists become expert
economists even though socialist criminologists
may,
...ordinarily have no significant contri
bution to make as political economists or p o l 
itical sociologsists constructing revolutionary
theory.
They can, however, use their training
to develop critique of existing theories of
crime causation and corrections. A rare few
might even be able to creatively utilize inter
national criminal statistics and the record of

117

various attempts to rehabilitate law violators
to construct a new socialist approach to
these p r o b l e m s . 91
B.

Anthony Platt
In reaction to conventional literature on

the subject, Platt, in concert with Lynn Cooper,
produced the 1974 criminological reader Policing
America which was a radical criticism of police h i s t 
ory and represented Platt*s first attempt at locating
the police function within the framework of capital92
ism's historic development.
93
The reader,
which included articles by
Eldridge Cleaver,

"Domestic Law and International

Order", Alan Wolfe,

"Political Repression and the

Liberal State", and Karl Klare "Policing the Empire",
represented a challenge to the conventional view
of police theory and practice in several r espects.
First,

they were concerned to show that policing

is political and protective of capitalist interests.
Another way of putting this is, in capitalist soci
ety police necessarily function mainly to uphold
in practice conventional definitions of what crime
is and what to do about crime's disposition.
Second,

they connected domestic policing with

international policing suggesting that police pro
tection of capitalism in America is paralleled by
American imperialism abroad, which in turn is pro-
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tected by such agencies as the Office of Public
Safety and the International Police Academy.
Third, Platt and Cooper,

showed that the police

have historically used violence and a racialist
ideology against minority races.

Finally,

the

reader proposed a radical structural reform of
police and community interaction in the form of
community control of the police (Berkeley Referendum,
1972).
In sum the reader was a meaningful contri
bution to an emerging radical Interpretation of
American police history.

However,

the present author

is disturbed that the reader sought to reduce police
history to the history of capitalist development
in America.

An opportunity to interpret the origins

of the police as originally a product of racism
was apparently overlooked.

If the reader had ap

proached an interpretation of police history from
the standpoint of racial conflict, at least in so
far as the origins of the policing institution is
concerned,

the reader*s conclusion that "the police

neither inititate nor benefit from the policies
they implement", probably would not have been pro
posed.

The reader could have proposed an alternative

consideration which may have more historical accur
acy, such that:
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1.

"The earliest form of modern American police
lies in the Soutnern slave patrols which p r e 
date New York's 1845 accomplishment by almost
94
half a century."

2.

Slavery in the 1700's (the period of the begin
ning of the police) was in the main not slavery
under capitalism, but rather slavery under
American feudalism and/or mercantilism.

Prop

erly speaking American capitalism as a full
blown political-economy may not have begun
until it triumphed over mercantilist economic
95
ideology and praxis in 1828.
The point is
at least in contention among both conventional
and Marxist economists and historians.
3.

Southern whites of all classes did benefit from
black slavery in material and non-material
terms, police included.

According to a recent statement by Quinney,
It is debatable, nevertheless, in our study
of crime in the United States, whether America
was capitalist from the b e g i n n i n g ... or whether
...capitalist development has occurred in only
fairly recent times.
For the first hundred
years of nationhood the United States resisted
large-scale capitalist production.
Independent
commodity production predominated; farmers,
artisans, small manufacturers and other petty
producers were the mainstay of the economy.
Only as northern capitalists acquired land
from the farmers (thus appropriating their
labor power) and as immigrant labor power was
imported from Europe did capitalism finally
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e m e r g e . ..American capitalism emerged when
labor power. Surplus labor was not in the
hands of a capitalist ruling class.
Workers
could be exploited. 96
The police may have been first created as
a racist response to black revolutionary political
activity (political crimes) rather than as guardians
of capitalist hegemony over labor.

In that case

for Platt and Cooper to conceive of the antebellum
slave police as mere pawns who ’’neither initiated
nor benefitted” from the early domination of blacks
is to deny the range of rational and irrational
advantages that whites of all classes

(police

included) have historically accumulated from black
97
subordination.
The logic of policing's analysis
is also refuted if American capitalism is thought
98
to have produced the white crime of slavery.
As an extension of the refutation since American
slavery pre-dates American capitalism the "white
working class" or proletariat did not, strictly
speaking,

exist (i.e., in the Marxian framework,

a working class can only exist in relation to a
capitalist c l ass).

Therefore,

intra-class strug

gles, between white "working class" police and
blacks, probably did not exist during slavery.
Thus feudalistic race struggle, not capitalist
class struggle, may be a better and more precise

121

measure of the origins of American police.
Probably as an outcome of the inaccuracy
with regard to racism's role in the earliest devel
opment of the police, Platt and Cooper's proposal
of community control of police also missed the mark.
That is, from the standpoint of the history of race
relations and from what is generally known about
the concept of community for the reader to histor
ically interpret efforts at community control of
police merely from a class struggle perspective
is to be historically misinformed abut black inter
action with the police.
First, because Platt does not historically
separate out racism from class antagonisms, he
misses the point that the historical relationship
between "working class" white police and the black
public has been negative;

especially if compared

99
to police relationships with whites of all classes.
Even the introduction of monopoly capitalism
of today has not significantly changed the histor
ical facts of mutual animosity between the police
and the black community.
suppose",

"There is no reason to

according to Skolnick,

"that (police)

anti-black hostility is a new development...What
appears to have changed is not police attitudes,

100
but the fact that black people are fighting back."
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In corroboration of Skolnick,
Wolfgang,

a 1972 study by

e t . a l ,, strongly indicated that of

all the variables,

including race and class,

race most affected police disposition of cases
101
in which blacks are involved.
Secondly,

the historically negative qual

ity of the relationship between blacks and whites
can be more properly understood as a colonial
rather than class relationship.
Colonial subjects have their political
decisions made for them by the colonial
masters, and those decisions are handed down
directly or through a process of "indirect
rule".
Politically, decisions which affect
black lives have always been made by white
people
the "white power structure ...when
faced with demands from black people, the
multi-faction whites unite and present a
common front. 102
Thirdly, because of the historically verified ten
dency of whites of all classes to politically unite
in community solidarity against black aspirations
for independence,

the reader's proposal for the

community control of the police becomes problematic
for the following reasons:
1.

State power,

including the police function has

been and is exclusively under white control.
Even in cities where blacks hold high political
positions,

the police remain functionaries of

white power, however that power is defined.
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Community control of the police would in some
sense require control of the whole state appar
atus itself, which in a class analysis only
white capitalists have ultimate control of (e.g.,
blacks,

as corporate capitalists are extremely

few and can in no way be described as having
a direct influence on state power).
2.

Community control comes with the impliaction
that a given community police force will have
the power to transcend its jurisdictional
103
boundaries in order to be effective.
Crim
inal activity transcends neighborhood and com
munity localities.

If the black community is

to police the crimes of white colonialism it
must seek to eliminate white criminality at
its source:

the white community.

What is required

would be a well-equipped military force rather
than an internal police force.

Thus prospects

for a continuance of inter-community warfare
would be heightened rather than diminished.
3.

Traditional electoral politics will not secure
black control of the police because:
a.

Blacks are a voting minority and as such
are outnumbered by the white majority which
104
acts in solidarity against black demands.

b.

White advantage is gained by having the
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police control the black community.

Why

should the white majority vote against
its own narrowly defined interests?

For

whites to do so implies loss rather than
gain.
c.

White police themselves are better organ
ized and have historically had a greater
effect on local electoral politics than
have blacks,

at least when it comes to

issues in conflict between the police and
105
blacks.
4.

Police are subject to four kinds of influence:
"judicial, public, legislative and organizational"
106
al".
Hence, the black community would not
only have to control police organizational act
ivities but further the entire criminal justice
system in a given locality.

This would require

black sovereignity over a political territory;
a feat which even white "working class" national
minorities in the Soviet Union and other Marxist
107
dominated lands have failed to accomplish.
5.

The term community itself is n e b u l o u s .

The key

attribute in virtually all the literature on
the urban environment emphasizes the theme of
interdependence that "arises among groups as

108
a consequence of large-scale specialization."
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The notion that the term community has to
do with a relationship where individuals and
families share a commonality of primary values
and sense of communal identity is rapidly
109
disappearing.
Though black opinion may
appear unanimous in its criticism of police,
"nonenforcement and underenforcement of crim-

110
inal laws" and police brutality,

black

opinion is not necessarily in agreement as
to exactly how police racism can be controlled.
The majority of blacks may feel a greater
sense of urban interdependency in contrast
to a more radical sense of black independence;
if so, this dissensus over liberation meth o d 
ology m a y go far in explaining why most blacks
probably did not support the referendum for
111
community control of police in Berkeley.
The 1975 Iron Fist and Velvet G l o v e , is
1

1

a

a systematic Marxist analysis of the police,

collect

ively written by members of the Berkeley Center
for Research on Criminal Justice in which Platt
played a key role as editor.

The "iron fist" refers

to the reality of police repression while the
"velvet glove" refers to "a relatively non-coercive
thoroughly professional police force enjoying a
high level of legitimacy:

an unrealized dream held
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112
by liberal reformers of the Progressive Era.
The major difference between this work and Policing
is its more elaborate presentation of evidence
to support both books*

central thesis:

late,

capitalism's ever increasing contradictions p r o 
duce greater contradictions in social life which
in turn creates the need for more and more police
repression to uphold the hegemony of the capital
ist class.

As the author's report:

The class control function is always
the most essential function that police
serve in a capitalist society, although
they serve other functions as well.
Since
the democratic state requires some legit
imacy, the police must also make some
attempt to serve popular needs, as long
as these needs are not inconsistent with
the class control function. 113
Thus the work challenged a fundamental tenet of
criminological liberalism:
prevent,

the police exist to

control or eliminate criminal activity;

activity which resulted originally from the comp
lications of urbanization brought on by the Industrial
114
Revolution.
Platt and his co-worker's contribu
tion is in their understanding that the police do
indeed at times serve capitalist interests against
the interests of society's marginated m a s s e s .
However, not only is their unicausal socialist
approach insufficient as a total explanation of
police existence or even increasing police repres-
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sion,

their approach ultimately fails to say

anything significantly different from what lib
erals have said, the difference is in the type
of ideological analysis, for as has been suggested
above in reference to Quinney: all official v e r 
sions of social reality are pervasively one dimen
sional no matter the particular economic order.
Socialism to maintain itself in power must resort
to some kind of police action and control of dev
iance .
Moreover,

the concrete data of human exis

tence to this point in our evolution suggest that
we are social animals who come packaged with the
will to fashion and control our material

(private

or social property) and immaterial environments
according to certain dearly held ideological expect
ations.

When those expectations clash with expect

ations not held by our particular group the tendency
is to take action which furthers our group*s inter
ests.

That action could be thought of as repressive
115
or protective.
If the action is governmental
or institutionalized and is aimed at criminally
defined deviance within our group it is usually
called coercive police action.
To move beyond police action in human affair
(to this author)

is to move beyond institution-
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alized coercion, beyond the state (either cap
italist or socialist) and juridical relations;
such a move cannot be made if socialism itself
is geared to state power and police repression
of deviance.

Thus Platt and his co-worker's crit

ical analysis of the police is valuable in that
it represents not only

an explicit challenge

to

liberalism, but, more,

an implicit challenge

to

all forms of authoritarian socialism that repeat
the error of liberalism,

i;e., organizing and

arming police as the enforcers of state power and
guardians of ruling class interests.
C.

Taylor, Walton and Young
In their 1973 The New Criminology: For A Social

Theory of D eviance, the authors sought without much
success to construct linkages between subjectivist
approaches to criminology

and "the theories of soc

ial structure implicit
in orthodox /emphasis: mine;
116
Marxism."
They felt that since liberal positiv
ism, as a grand social theory,

"is wedded to the

position of taking social reaction for granted"
what is needed is a grand social theory which could
account for a social psychology of deviancy in a
dialectical way rather than in the determinism of
positive criminology which emphasizes a taken for
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granted need for social control and correctionalism
117
with
regard to deviancy.
Positivism had failed
to question the social order at all,

thus deviants

and not society were problematic (pathological)
and required social control.

On the other hand

subjectivist approaches like symbolic interactionism, phenomenology,

social constructionism and

ethnomethodology were inadequate for four primary
reasons:
1.

Their lack of any real theory at all.
For us, the social reaction literature
does not contain a theory as such.
Rather,
it represents an attempt to demystify one
side of a continuous dialectic of human
activity.
But this activity has determin
ants which cannot be encompassed by any
approach which relegates the etiological
questions concerning the causes of deviation
to an ambiguous location subsidiary to
social action. 118

2.

Their search for an individual meaning of dev
iancy has lead them away from developing "fully
social" explanations of deviancy:
The theory must be able, in other words,
to place the (deviant) act in terms of its
wider social origins...(it would place the
deviant act) against the overall social
context of inequalities of power, wealth
and authority in the developed industrial
society.
119

3.

Because these approaches tend to become resigned
when faced with the sheer complexity of "med
iatory variable", and thus fail to treat deviant

causality,

they "end up with a completely inde-
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terminate picture"
4.

of social r e a l i t i e s .

They are founded on and take liberalism as
given:
Like thepragmatists (positivists) before
them, the social reaction theorists, oper
ating within the confines of liberal ideol
ogies, fail...to confront the way in which
authority and interests enforce and m a i n 
tains sets of laws, rules and norms which
in themselves are part and parcel of the
creation of deviancy. 121
As an element within the grand social theory

of Marxism the authors had hoped that subjective crim
inology would lose its relativism and indeterminancy
and become instead dialectical;

at the same stroke

it would hopefully become consciously political and
the results of all this would be a "fully social
theory of deviancy,"

Dialectically, deviance theory

would interpret the deviant actor as proactively,
rather than reactively,

engage in a strategy of social

struggle.

This proactivity is consistent with the
122
vision held by "anarchists and deviants"
themselves
and is to be viewed as a conscious "political act...
where deviance is a property of the act rather than
a supurious label applied to the amoral or careless
by agencies of political and social control."
The authors are to be commended for their
criticism of conventional deviancy theory.

Subject-
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ivist criminology's main problem i£ that it tends
to over-emphasize individual action rather than
explaining action from a dialectical balance
which gives credit to both the individual and
society in the construction of criminal reality.
Yet one remains disturbed with the New Criminology
for several important r e a s o n s .
In chapter III of this work anarchism
will be distinguished from orthodox Marxism, m e a n 
while one is disturbed that Taylor et al thoroughly
confused anarchism with such Marxism,

and, in so

doing, ended up with an unconscious secular anarch
ist criminology instead of what they originally
intended.

Why the authors failed to distinguish

these two unique left political ideologies may be
due to their unfamiliarity with anarchist ideas
about the social order, or it m a y be that the authors
fear the historic ridicule which has been levelled
against anarchism by theoretical liberalism,
servatism and Marxism alike.

con

Paul Q. Hirst, an

orthodox Marxist, has assailed the authors for
their tendency to romanticize criminals; a "danger123
ous political ideology"
for authentic Marxism.
Whatever the cause of their confusion,

the follo

wing critique is to demonstrate that their goal
of linking subjectivistic criminology with Marxism
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missed its mark by a wide margin.
The argument that subjectivist criminol
ogy is merely descriptive and devoid of causality
and thus lacking the conditions of a theory is
at most an insipid misreading of the sociology
of knowledge.

A full six years prior to the New

Criminology, Berger and Luckman sought to hammer
out a sociology of knowledge which derived from
not only Marx but more importantly Max Weber,
124
George H. Mead and Emile Durkheim.
Their soci
ology of knowledge was very much a theoretical
project and employed a dialectical method i.e.,
it stood in the middle of orthodox Marxist deter
minism and the indeterminancy of strict subject
ivists.

Quinney in his Social Reality of Crime

was quite dependent upon Burger and Luckman for
theoretical insights and yet his work is also
dialectical in the sense that it posits a tension
"between coercion by interests and subjective
125
freedom."
Yet the Quinney of 1970 mentions
Marx in only one sparse footnote.
The debate about causation in criminology
is as old as the field itself.

"Clearly the con

cepts of cause and effect are related to concepts
of determinism and free will and these in turn
to the legal concepts of responsibility and the

133
126
reasonable m a n " ,
and just as clearly causality
has long had political and moral connotations in
criminology.

Quinney has even noted that,

...causal explanation need not be the
sole interest of criminologists. The object
ive of any science is not to formulate and
verify theories of causation, but to construct
an order among observables...A science of
human social behavior is obciously possible
without the notion of causation. 127
Quinney, while admitting that subjectivist- crimin
ology has its conservative drawbacks praises this
kind of criminology for pointing out what should
be obvious:

crime is a dialectical and therefore

political construction based on the activity that
exists in the relations between a powerless self
and powerful o t h e r s :
The legal order, accordingly is human
activity.
It is an order created for polit
ical p u r p o s e s , to assure hegemony of the
ruling class. 128
Since in its main features subjectivist
criminology is valid as a sociological theory,

and

is dialectical even though it emphasizes one side
of the dialectic (the individual), and since it
is in Quinney's terms "political," the question that
begs answering is: why must it also be Marxist?
Taylor et a l 's response is that it must become truly
Marxist to the extent that it retains a conventional
129
political allegiance.
Thus their most severe
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criticism of subjectivist criminology is not due
to an alleged lack of theoretical validity but
it is due to subjectivist criminology's political
affiliation.

Extensively,

this is the authors'

fundamental criticism of all the criminological
theories dealt with in their work,

including pos

itivism,

the "new conflict" theorists, Marx himself,
130
and the old line Marxist, William Bonger.
Would a switch in political allegiance
to strict Marxism necessarily restore a balance
to the dialectic between self and society or the
criminal actor and a crime producing environment
as Taylor et al claim?

Or would such a switch

only tip the balance over to a pronounced emphasis
on social causation with the self being relegated
to the garbage help of conventional ideology?

The

authors' response to these questions suggest that
they do not really want a switch that maintains
the dialectic in balance.

In fact they do not even

want to deal with an orthodox Marxism which by its
terms is patently opposed to their efforts at b uil
ding linkages with subjectivist criminology.

What

the authors really want is what they criticize so
vehemently:

a theory of deviancy which emphasizes
131
individual "purpose and integrity"
in interpre

ting criminal action and not the orthodox Marxian
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economic determinism which as the authors rightly
describe it tends,
...to subsume the question of humanity
or the rationality of human action--to the
larger question of political-economy. Crim
inal action, in practice, is understood—
in terms of interests demanded by the struct
ure of political economy as more or less
"false conscious" adjustment to society rather
than as an inarticulate striving to overcome
it. 132
However to get around orthodox Marxist
determinism with its criticism of the criminal lumpenproletariat, the authors even more confusedly do
not want the mature Marx of Das K a p i t a l , but the
young humanistic Marx of 1844.

Yet to divide Marx

up into so many bits and pieces is a highly dubious
project even though the Marx of 1844 is "openly
133
subjectivistic".
Robert C. Tucker, along with
134
a host of others, both critical of and sympathetic
to the Marxist system, have noted that Marx and
Engels both interpreted their system as an indivis
ible movement from Hegelian philosophy to scientific
socialism:
From their standpoint there were not two
Marxisms but one.
Alternatively, there were
two in the peculiar and limited sense in which
the adult may be said to be a different person
from the child.
For them scientific socialism,
embryonic already in Hegel's Phenomenology,
was delivered into the world in Marx's manuscripts of 1844.
The philosophical terminol
ogy of the latter was simply the umbilical
cord binding the new-born child to its philo-
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sophical p a r e n t . And mature Marxism was
the baby grown to adulthood.
Consequently,
it was perfectly proper to speak of the
mature doctrine in terms applicable to orig
inal Marxism. 135
The indivisible corpus of Marx*s writing on crimin
ality per se does not even allow the dialectic nor
indeed for revision,

thus strictly speaking a neo-

Marxist criminology is an impossibility.
ically,

Dialect-

the Marxist system conceives of criminality

in a decidedly deterministic fasion.

There is

no positive Marxian assessment of the lumpenproletariat or the "criminal classes" as valid contri136
butors to social revolution.
These "contemptible"
classes are more of an enemy to the proletariat
than even the capitalists.
As an unorthodox Swedish Marxist sociol
ogist has noted:
In its propertylessness, poverty and alien
ation, the lumpenproletariat is akin to the
working class.
Even more than the proletariat,
the lumpenproletariat has been victimized by
the power of capital; it lacks even such a
modest instrument of defense as the labor union.
Its chief defenses are total apathy and relig
ious sectarianism, drugged oblivion and p e r 
sonal violence, psychoses and death.
Of the
numerous hallmarks of pure capitalism, a dis
oriented, demoralized, and socially estranged
lumpenproletariat is one of the most distinctive,
tragic and dangerous things...
For all of his structural and historical
thinking, Marx was evidently unwilling to see
the sociological causes of lumpenproletariat
status or to acknowledge the very small gap
between proletarian and lumpenproletarian posi
tions . 137
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One of the fundamental reasons that
Marx and Engels felt as they did about the lump
enproletariat, besides the fact of their active
racism which Franz Fanon and other black radicals
138
have detected
(in America crime and the lumpen
proletariat are as Wilson would have it usually synonomous with oppressed minority people, especially
black y o u t h ) , was that this class was thought to
be a-political and reactionary to working class
struggles.

Further,

the lumpenproletariat were

economically unproductive to capitalism's contra
dictory evolution toward socialism; whereas the
capitalists were productive actors,

in as much

as they produced the conditions for their own even139
tual elimination.
In no way can the historic
activity of capitalism be viewed as criminal,

though

individual capitalists may become criminals in the
orthodox Marxian framework.

In the dialectic the

workers need capitalists and vice-a-versa; hence
to eliminate the capitalists on the grounds of its
criminality as a class is akin to anarchism but not
valid Marxism.
To orthodox Marxism the activity of the
lumpenproletariat is dehumanization in its most acute
form.

This class in its a-political irrationality

weakens the morals and morale of other classes in
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society.
ality.

It especially weakens proletarian m o r 
Ethically,

the lumpenproletariat repre

sent nothing other than a parasitic plague,

and

as such, a constant denial of what Engels described
as "that morality which contains the maximum of
/truth; durable elements" or revolutionary prole140
tarian morality.
Thus, as Alexander Grey a
Fabian socialist historian has well understood,
"real" Marxism cannot "appeal to morality and
justice", no matter the pain and suffering
of the lumpenclass, because such appeals are repla
ced by a scientific socialist "understanding and
141
acceptance of historical development."
Moreover, given, the lack of a Marxist
dialectic on the issue of criminality,

(notwith

standing Anderson's moralistic "appeal" aimed to
resurrect the lumpenproletariat from its death at
the hands of orthodox Marxist labelling) Taylor
et a l 's attempt to revise something that was not
there in the first place is an act of bad faith.
Revision depends on the operation of the dialectic.
Taylor et a l 's goal of synthesis takes the dialec
tical character out of the Marxian approach and
replaces it with a flat static /idealistic;

asser

tion of the inherent rationality of all human act
ion.

A neo-Marxist interpretation of criminology
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is impossible and is an act of bad faith, or what
existentialists R. C. Laing and D. G. Cooper call
142
the "idealist remystification"
of Marxism.
This bad faith i s , to the english socialist p h i l 
osopher G. D. H. Cole, a way of eliminating Marx
altog e t h e r :
It is no doubt, easy under cover of r e 
vising Marxism really to abandon it; and
this tendency has given all attempts at r e 
vision a bad odour among Marxists, and has
often driven them towards a defensively dog
matic interpretation of Marx's doctrines.
But, in fact, no Marxist can escape revision
ism without denying the dialectical principle.
For to lay down hard and fast dogmas is to
fall back from the evolutionary dialectic
into the static categories of formal logic. 143
Essentially,

then a Marxist notion of crime would

have to be based on something very close to Bonger's
"correctional perspective" which has to do with
understanding a social phenomenon (this lumpenprol
etariat) only to the point of being able to rid
144
society of the phenomenon in question.
It is
exactly this correctional perspective that Taylor
et al criticize as being an inauthentic and really
non-Marxist approach to criminology.

But for the

authors to import New Left idealism into the cate
gories of scientific socialism is no less inauth
entic.

To dichotomize a Marxist analysis of crime

into an objective world of society and a subjective
world of conscious individual "idiosyncracy"

145
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is to end up having no real Marxist theory at
all.
"All I know is that I am not Marxist,"
146
is a statement Marx himself made
toward the
end of his life;

a life truly heroic in its intel

lectual and inspirational a bilities.

Like any

heroic figure in world history he left a legacy
abundant in truth and e r r o r .

That which is true

like the bitter historical interaction between
oppressors and the oppressed,
of alienation,

the ever presence

and the vision of dramatic change

or revolution has long informed the vocabulary
and praxis of all great social prophets, from
147
Ooheleth of Ecclesiastes
to Jesus to the more
148
recent example of Martin Luther King, Jr.
Earlier in this work all social and thus
criminology theory was defined as ideological to
the extent that theory necessarily mixes truth
with error.

Marxism is no exception.

The error

of orthodox Marxism with respect to criminality
is that crime is not socially dialectical but
socially determined.

As heirs to the orthodox

Marxian legacy Taylor et al plus Quinney and Platt
are failures.

Yet in the act of failing the orth

odox Marxist legacy they are actually engaged in
a radical transformation of Marxism to something
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other than Marxism.

These radical criminolo

gists have set the stage for a transcendence of
Marx, just as in another prophetic tradition, but
in a decidedly vulgar direction, most of what now
passes for orthodox Christianity is a transcendence
of Christ

(i.e.,

if Christ were living today

Christians themselves would most probably rush to
electrocute him for the crime of radically deviating
from what Christianity has come to m e a n ) .
IV.

Radical Criminology as New Left Criminology

The period from 1973 to the present evidences a
movement of radical criminology towards being that part of
the New Left which thinks about crime rather than having an
attachment to any real Marxism.

This movement closely paral

lels developments within academic social science,
sociology.

especially

The 19th century genesis of New Left ideology

is found in the utopian socialists,

the Left Hegelians and

the anarchists "and as such has a close kinship with radical
religion, rational humanism and philosophical idealism^ among
150
other ideas.
The New Left is engaged in transcending both
liberalism and Marxism, although admittedly with Marxism
the transcendence is still basically implicit.
The parallels between radical criminology and New
Leftism are inexact but enough of comparison can be made to
151
give credence to the thesis asserted above.
Below is a

142

brief comparison of seven themes

: which radical criminol

ogy and New Leftism hold in common (Chapter III will offer
a more intensive comparison of Marxism and anarchism in
relation to radical criminology):
A.

Existential Confusion
Radical criminology,

like New Leftism,

is

actively searching for a philosophical (some say
152
spiritual) home.
It is populated by intellect
uals who matured academically during a period in
which social conflicts threatened to tear America
apart.

Their reaction to the American of the mid-

v die and late 1960's was to experience a loss of
innocence; a loss of the Lone Ranger, Hoppy, Gene
153
and Roy.
The good guys of television shoot-emups were in reality the bad guys:

Sheriff Bull

Connor, Lyndon Johnson and the Pentagon multiplied
by an almost infinite factor.

The loss of inno

cence brought on discontentment and alienation.
Youthful segments of academia began to search for
alternatives to liberal and conservative theories;
alternatives w h i c h would give meaning to their
academic existence.
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Western European Marxism,

itself in mortal combat with state capitalism in
the Soviet Union and national socialist states,
seemingly offered one such alternative.

Radical

criminology completely glossed over the homegrown
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radical tradition which pre-dates Marx and has
been part of the American scenario since the
1638 antinominal revolt against orthodox Puritan
155
morality.
Yet radical criminology in its
existential restlessness is, by the necessity of
dialectical analysis,

implicitly critical of Marxism

and can thus be described as still groping for
an indigenous philosophy.

As radical criminology

becomes more reflexive or critical of itself
this author hopes it will comprehend that the
insurmountable error of Marxism is its one-sided
dialectical epistemology i.e., what another New
Leftist, Jean Paul-Sarte understands as the Marxian
156
attempt to "eliminate all subjectivity,"
in
exchange for pure objectivity.

No valid radical

analysis of crime can long endure such a misguided
political philosophy and praxis .
B.

Antiauthoritarianism
Radical criminology,

like New Leftism,

is

based on negative thinking which involves theorizing
about and building mass movements "toward a negation
of what is through thinking about and practicing
157
what could be."
Here it is well to add that the
normative "could" is to be put into practice right
now rather than waiting for the proletariat and
its vanguard or the contradictions inherent in the
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forces of social production to make the "inevitable"
revolution.

Traditional Marxist-Leninist praxis

which narrowly emphasized instituionalied party
politics will not do.

Institutional authoritar

ianism in all its guises,must be overcome.

Radical

criminology's quest for "popular justice" and
participatory democracy (e.g. the Berkeley refer
endum for community control of the police) are
based on the notion that:
Built into state efforts at citizen partic
ipation is a dialectic that supports autono
mous community action removed from state con
trol.
Developing along-side the criminal just
ice system is a grass-roots approach that is
beyond the design of the state.
The dialectic
undoubtedly will advance in coming years. 158
Of course, radical criminology's criticism of the
advanced capitalist state and its increasingly
repressive crime control tendencies is anti-author
itarian.

Thus it is unlike orthodox Marxism which

lacks a political analysis "in relation to the
nature and role of the state" because "Marx h i m 
self. ..never attempted a systematic study of the
159
s t a t e ."
Presently though radical criminology is
extremely confused in its analysis of the state's
role in criminality.

Quinney in his Class, State

and Crime has recently developed the most extensive
statement on the subject.

On the one hand, Quinney
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views the state as the primary agency for promoting
late capitalist advancement.

In this role the

state referees diverse capitalistic competition
in the goal of capital accumulation and self repro
duction.

The state furthers capitalism's advance

ment by "regulation and control," in which process
the state itself creates employment which is u n p r o 
ductive (e.g. CETA, Job Corps, Vista,
justice workers,

criminal

etc.) and not in demand by "normal"

capitalist production requirements .

If the state

defends capitalist interests it must regularly
offend other interests like those of the lumpenproletariat.

This would be a plausible argument

based on concrete experience.
However, Quinney's New Leftism has almost
obliterated class distinctions.

The workers in

advanced capitalism make up 98.57o of the total
160
population.
Managers or the "petty bourgeosie"
are part of this overwhelming majority of workers.
The 1.5% of the total is the capitalist class
"who wields state power."

Crime has ceased being

merely activity of the lumpenproletariat as in
real Marxism.

Crime has lost its class basis at

least implicitly.
Yet for this author it remains that the
class most immediately affected by detentive repres-
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The state does not patronize certain
interests, and is not allied with certain
classes.
Rather, what the state protects
and sanctions is a set of rules and social
relationships which are presupposed by
the class rule of the capitalist class. The
State does not defend the interests of one
class, but the common interests of all m e m 
bers of a capitalist class society. 162
What are the common interests of the p o w 
erful capitalists and powerless lumpenproletariat?
Love and liberation, morality,
environment or what?

the need for a shared

The commonality of interests

is never defined by Quinney.

This theme of common

interest protection sounds like a radical revival
163
of Roscoe Pound's pluralist theory of law.
Should not the state defend the interests of capi
talists against threats by other classes?
again does not provide an a n s w e r .

Quinney

Yet he proceeds

to an acceptance of the decidedly un-Marxist view
that the state is somehow a protector of outmoded
social relations which neither capitalist nor w o r 
ker, nor for that matter,

V

the usually unemployed

lumpenproletariat adhere to.
The state is therefore
164
politically "autonomous"
from class interests
as such.

The criminal justice apparatus is a crea

ture of monopoly capitalism's need for modern technorational control in a Marcusian New Leftist instead
165
of orthodox Marxist sense.
Is bureaucratic sur
vival and autonomy a more important interest than
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crime control in criminal justice agencies?

Is

the "steadily growing autonomy of organized int166
erest groups”
within capitalist society more
dangerous,

from a radical perspective than capi

talist class power?
seemingly argues,

Quinney,

to both questions,

in the affirmative.

Hence con

trary to the orthodox Marxian category of class
struggle, Quinney*s most extensive radical crim
inological theory of the state transcends Marx
and posits a New Left anarchistic political strug
gle against the increasingly dangerous autonomy
of the authoritarian and bureaucratic state.

The

politically "autonomous” state itself is thereby
the villain which a conscious revolutionary class
composed of the lumpenproletariat and other sur
plus population must smash.
C.

Anti-Racism and Sexism
Radical criminology,

like New Leftism,

likes to think of itself as anti-racist and sexist.
In comparison with conventional criminology and
real Marxism it is anti-racist.

In fact,

it orig

inally took its point of departure from the ideas
and practice of black revolutionaries like the

167
early Eldridge Cleaver, George Jackson and etc.
But theoretical anti-racism is not the same as
practical anti-racism.

Practical evidence to
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substantiate this theme is hard to come by.
What is known,
ience,

from this author*s personal exper

is that New Left groups working in the

area of criminal justice reconstruction are ideolog
ically and programmatically geared unlike liberalism
and orthodox Marxism to defeat racism but their
success has to all appearances been no greater than
168
that of liberals and orthodox Marxists in the area.
Political prisoners groups,

~ v, pri

son moratorium activists and groups organized to
fight police brutality to a large extent reproduce
169
the racism endemic to the whole society.
The
leadership of these groups is predominantly white,
intellectual, middle-class and male and lacks any
real political base within effected black commun
ities.

Black non-Marxist radical groups with an

interest in criminal justice issues are basically
170
anti-white in ideology
and have rejected Old
and New left attempts at coalition politics because:
The established white radical schema has
fostered an axion which says: the Negro can
never, should never, will never, create a
definitive theory on social revolution wherein
he is placed in hegemonic leadership as the
guiding source of inspiration, ideas, strategy
tactics and direction even if the coalition
is interracial. 171
Radical criminology (though Quinney,

and

Taylor et al are silent on the subject) has raised
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"the woman question” in three basic w a y s .

It

has attacked rape as an act of political terror
172
against women.
Rape is a sexist crime produced
by the contradictions of capitalism which continue
"to feed the hatred and contempt of certain men
173
toward women."
Rape laws are seen as a protec
tion of males who are charged with rape and as
such are biased toward the continued male oppres
sion of powerless females.

Secondly, radical crim

inology has begun to analyze prostitution as very
much a victim creating rather than a victimless
crime: prostitutes themselves are victims of "moral
174
degradation and physical danger"
engendered by
the capitalist produced sexual exploitation of
women.

Thirdly,

the phenomena of women as police
175
has encouraged some radical criticism.
These
three areas of radical criminological investigation

will no doubt grow as more women become involved
in social exchange outside the home.

Yet it remains

that the best radical criminology about women may
176
be written by women themselves.
However,

the "woman question",

like racism,

cannot be forced into an orthodox Marxian analysis
merely because Marx and Engels said it could.
The connection between radical feminism and ortho
dox Marxism cannot be merely theoretical, but must
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be born of praxis.

Recently Sheila Rowbotham,

a New Left historian, who has engaged in a long
search for genuine connections between female
liberation and orthodox Marxism in practice, has
concluded that:
They are at once incompatible and in
real need of each other.
As a feminist and
a Marxist I carry their contradictions within
me and it is tempting to opt for one or the
other in an effort to produce a tidy resolu
tion of the commotion generated by the antag
onism between them.
But to do that would
mean relying on pre-packaged formulas which
come slickly off the tongue and then melt
as soon as they are exposed to the light of
day. 177
Utopian Theory
Radical criminology,
and New Leftism,

like real or orthodox Marxism

1/

is utopian at least to the extent that it

projects a future society where the abolition of "crime is
178
possible."
Like orthodox Marxism, but unlike New Leftism,
radical criminology tries hard to not "specify a utopia
because socialist society will be constructed only in the
179
course of the creation."
Generally though, radical crim
inology wants a utopianist crime free society in which "imper
ialism, racism,

capitalism and sexism" are replaced by "truly

egalatarian rights to decent food and shelter...human dignity
180
and self-determination."
Superficially, radical criminol
ogy finds it acceptable to hope and dream of utopia.

The

dream of a crime free future society dialectically informs
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present radical criminological praxis and vice - a - v e r s a .
Thus radical criminological praxis,

is itself a specific

program aimed at the realization of specific strategies which
begin the future here and now.

In the concrete reality of

right now, radical criminology is as its praxis calls for,
dialectically engaging conventional criminology in a critic
ally specific dialogue in order to construct the future
crime free society.
An example of radical criminology's praxis in p rep
aration for the utopian future is Platt's insistence that
"intellectual inquiry should not be carved up into artific181
ial domains like pieces of private property."
For him
criminology would do best to provide answers to the quest
ions of political philosophy,

i.e., freedom vs. control,

authority vs.

legitimacy, estrangement vs. unity, who gov182
e r n s , why and how.
In its faltering attempts to provide
answers to these kind of questions radical criminology is
now in the process of creating a social theory and practice
appropriate to the utopian vision of a crime free society.
As such it has begun and must continue to go beyond the
183
confines of traditional criminology.
In chapter I of this work,

the central understanding

was that all social theory is ideological and as a consequence
has a utopian dimension.

Radical criminology is no exception;

it is ideologically relativized thinking.
it is also utopian thinking.

More importantly,

Thus the question to be ans-
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wered is:

why does radical criminology try to delude

itself into thinking it has no utopian dimension?
Part of the explanation for radical criminology’s
delusion with regard to its utopian tendencies lies in its
confused courtship with real Marxism.

To real Marxism,

theorists of "critical-utopian socialism and communism"
had a primitive and thus reactionary bent:
The undeveloped state of the class struggle,
as well as their own surroundings, causes Socialists
of this kind to consider themselves for superior
to all class antagonisms.
They want to improve
the condition of every member of society, even
that of the most favoured.
Hence, they habitually
appeal to society at large, without distinction
of class; nay by preference, to the ruling class.
For how can people, when once they understand
their system, fail to see in it the best possible
state of society?
Hence, they reject all political,
and especially revolutionary action; they wish
to attain their ends by peaceful means...by small
experiments necessarily doomed to failure and by
force of example, to pave the way for the new
social Gospel.
Such fantastic pictures of future society...
correspond with the first instinctive yearnings
of that class (the proletariat) for a general
reconstruction of society. 184
Digressing briefly,

some of the .Communist M a n i f e s t o 's

above criticism of utopian thinking can be applied to Quinney's
theory of the "autonomous" state, a state which serves only
socially common and not class interests.

One can see Marx

turning in his grave at the thought of the petty bourgiosie
being considered as a "fraction" within the proletarieat.
Marx would certainly not have confused administrators of
the state beaureacracy and presidents

(but non-owners) of
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the multi-nationals with the proletariat or the "contempt
ible” lumpenproletariat.

Alternately, Marx's criticism of

utopian thinking can be applied to Marx h i m s e l f .
to Bertram Wolfe,

According

the Communist Manifesto relies heavily

on the thought of utopian socialist and anarchists; the
185
very theorists Marx was about criticizing.
Four of the
ten transitional measures pronounced in the Manifesto are
borrowings directly from such utopian thinkers as: Saint186
Simon (#3 and #5), Fourier (#8) and Robert Owen (#9).
What is really astounding about the Manifesto is
that the majority of its proposals-including "the abolition
of the family" and the conversion of the function of the
state into a mere superintendence of production"

(with Engels

the state function is to be converted to an "administration
of things")-*
187
character"

are,

in Marx's own words:

"of a purely utopian

Thus the Communist Manifesto can rightly be

interpreted as a heroic piece of utopian literature.
Moreover,

it was from Saint-Simon that Marx's got

the utopian (not economically scientific)

slogan,

"From

each according to his capacity, to each according to his per188
formance."
Even the specifically utopian vision of a com
munist society (utopian society at its best) offered out by
Marx in his German I d eology, comes straight from Fourier,
v i z .:
For as soon as the distribution of labour comes
into being, each man has a particular exclusive
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sphere of activity, which is forced upon him
and from w hich he cannot escape.
He is a
hunter, a fisherman, a shepard, or a critical
critic, and must remain so if he does not
want to lose his means of livelihood; while
in communist society, where nobody has one
exclusive sphere of activity but each can
become accomplished in any branch he wishes,
society regulates the general production and
thus makes it possible for me to do one thing
today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the
morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle
in the evening, criticize after dinner, just
as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter,
fisherman, shepard or critic. 189
Marx himself was thus confused about the utopian character
of his own revolutionary social theory.
as an announced,

Radical criminology

inheritor of the Marxian legacy, has neces

sarily inherited the utopian thought Marx himself would have
repudiated as being unscientific and unreal.
This real Marxian and radical criminological delu
sion about, and concealment of their utopian character,

is

further exacerbated by their preference for a scientific kind
of socialism in contradistinction to utopian socialism and
communism.

Radical criminology wants a praxis informed and

critical inquiry "capable of moving across boundaries of
190
normal science with its normal division of labor."
Yet
the "scientific socialism" of Marx lacks scientific veri
fication.

Most of Marx's critical and purely scientific

predictions about the inevitable demise of capitalism have
191
been refuted as being non-scientific.
Material condi
tions themselves both in capitalist and socialist politicaleconomy have provided the basic refutation of scientific
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socialism.

Engels,

five years before his death in 1895,

wrote to Joseph Bloch regarding his and Marx's overemphasis
on the economic (or scientific)

analysis of capitalism:

Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for
the fact that the younger people sometimes lay
more stress on the economic side than is due it.
We had to emphasize the main principle vis-a-vis
our adversaries,
fLeft-wing communists, i.e.,
utopianists and anarchists: mine} who denied it,
and we had not always the time, the place or the
opportunity to allow the other elements involved
in the interaction to come into their r i g h t s ...
Unfortunately, however it happens only too often
that people think they have fully understood a
new theory and can apply it without more ado from
the moment they have mastered its main principles,
and even those not always correctly.
And I cannot
exempt many of the more recent "Marxists" from
this reproach, for the most amazing rubbish has
been produced in this quarter too. 193
If Engels were living today he would justifiably
declare radical criminology to be a form of left-wing com
munism or New Leftism rather than an authentic Marxist ap
proach to the study of crime (even though left-wing communism
has its own eclectically utopian economic analysis for this
194
present period of advanced capitalism).
"Paradoxically,

(then) the aspect of Marx's thought

that is most alive and relevant to the concerns of men in
the contemporary West is the purely utopian aspect,
part relating to the post-revolutionary future.

the

Otherwise

expressing it, his purportedly scientific analysis of cap
italism was quite utopian, whereas his utopian vision of
the future world was,

if not scientific, at least rather

prophetic of real possibilities.

Marx's concept of commu-
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nism is more nearly applicable to present-day America,
for example,

than is his concept of capitalism.

Capital...

is an intellectual museum-piece for us now, whereas the six
teen page manuscript of 1844 on the future as aesthetics,
which he probably wrote in a day and never even saw fit to
195
publish, contains much that is still significant."
Prescriptively, radical criminology like New Leftism
but unlike real Marxism ought to honestly learn to rejoice
in its utopian vision:
Given the irrationality /’Marcuses's sense: mine;
of the neo-capitalist social system, the function
of utopian thinking is to keep alive counter-images
of rational social existence.
Those who would
decry the utopianism of the New Left should ask
themselves who are the true custodians of reason
in an irrational society: the Utopians who refuse
to be supine and who attempt to construct humanizing
social alternatives to the status quo or the "real
ists" who sheepishly capitulate to the status-quo?
This is not to say that radicalism is synonomous
with building castles in the air, but tnat where
reason is systematically violated the most reason
able course is not to be "realistic", in the same
sense in which this implies accommodation to a
maleficient and irrational system. 196
Radical criminology if it is to become a truly dialectical
social theory ought to appreciate its debt owed to real Marxism
in the same way Marx owes such a debt to the German idealism
of G.W.F. Hegel in his effort, at sitting this political p hil
osopher and theologian "right side up."

Like New Leftism,

radical criminology ought to be thrilled at having a utopian
dream that merits the critical attention of scoffers and
"realists."

The dream of a crime free future where the whole
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apparatus of repressive criminal justice will be no more,
is relevant to not only capitalist society but the world
in general.

In its essentialist form the utopian dream

has informed religious and secular myths since the dawn
198
of history.
Real Marxism has pointed the way beyond
itself, but,

in the paradox of evolutionary dialectics u t o p 

ian and thus unreal Marxism remains to haunt and urge forward
the confused spirit or Geist

of radical criminology.

Rad

ical criminology would do well to transcend real Marxism
by consciously locating itself within the received legacy
of unreal utopianist Marxism if it is to become a truly dial
ectical theory of crime.
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CHAPTER IV
RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY:

IS ITS HERETICAL MARXISM

ACTUALLY AN UNCONSCIOUS ANARCHIST THEORY OF CRIME?
The preceeding chapter*s main contention was that
the guiding force in the late development of radical crimin
ology is in accord with the heretical deviation of the New
Left.

On the one hand, radical criminology has failed to

adequately comprehend the hereticism and confusedly claim
a grounding in and harmony with true Marxism; a Marxism
supposedly derived from the "early" Marx and revised to meet

1
the left theoretical demands of this present "generation."
Yet on the other hand radical criminology is clear about
having,

"little surface relation to the traditional Marxist
2
categories and conclusions."

Given its clarity about being unrelated to Marxist
3
dogma (of which Marx himself was responsible for) , and its
certainty about its Marxist pedigree, radical criminology
must no w be assisted in understanding the character of the
New Left heresy.

Towards that understanding,

this chapter

is concerned to show the following:
A.

That the heterodox tradition within Marxist
socialism has historically been libertarian
in focus and thus critical of authoritarian
4
Marxism.

B.

That the libertarian focus of the heterodox

160

tradition has most frequently been described
by orthodox Marxists and anarchists alike
as synonomous with anarchistic tendencies.
C.

That radical criminology's grounding in h e r 
etical Marxism,

and its libertarian focus

on crime is actually an unconscious anarch
ist statement of criminology.
^D.

That radical criminology should become con
scious of itself and move towards a delib
erately anarchist conception of crime; a
conception which would go far beyond the
economic reductionism of scientific-socialism or orthodoxy.

^E.

That with regard to certain "perennial quest
ions of political philosophy"
order,

coercion,

authority,

(e.g ., justice,

individual alien

ation and equality a consciously anarchist
criminology may possess a more liberative
analysis, of American society,

than the formu

lations of conventional and/or a strict Marxist
criminology.
Movement towards the accomplishment of the above
objectives can be initiated if it is kept in mind that the
New Left has generally transcended or gone beyond the bounds
of orthodox Marxism as understood by Marx and Engels them
selves.

The transcendence is best described by a term from
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Hegelian dialectics, viz., aufheben,

a term which refers

to the changing relationships in paradigmatic interactions
such that in the present case orthodox Marxism, as the p a r 
adigm with hegemony over left thinking, has been destroyed
and yet, dialectically, the residual strength of the liber
tarian elements in Marxism are preserved as part of na new
5
and higher synthesis."
The destruction of orthodox Marxism,
as with its preservation through transcendence has histor
ically been more of a process of internal left criticism
rather than as a primary result of criticism emanating from
6
bourgeois academic s o u rces.
It is ironic that the American New Left in its ident
ification with Marxism turns out to be more the contemporary
expression of anarchistically inclined "left-wing communism"
than authentically Marxist.

The irony dissolves into the

incredible when radical criminologists seek to construct
a Marxist theory of crime by first "explaining away Marx
7
and Engels statements"
on the dangerousness of the lumpen
proletariat and then, after such a distortion,

fail to com

prehend that what has been explained away is the foundation
for their construction.

Without a foundation in authentic

ity "there can be no Marxist criminology," as Mugford has

8
warned.

Thus it shall be argued that radical criminology

has actually engaged conventional criminology in an unortho9
dox, heretical or what Quinney terms "underground Marxist"
criticism, which in its major features

romanticism;
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subjectivism and idealism;
antiauthoritarianism;

individualism and voluntarism;

decentralization and egalitarianism;

rational humanism; utopianism;

conflict vs. cooperation;

revolution and lumpen violence;

libertarian justice----

represents a radical departure from orthodox Marxism and
is, similar to, if not synonomous with the interchangeable
concepts of:

left-wing communism,

secular anarchism.

libertarian socialism or

These features in radical criminology

will be laid out and favorably compared to similar features
in secular anarchism.

But before that comparison can be

made four obstacles must be clear from the argument's path.
Five Obstacles in Associating Heretical Marxism
with Secular Anarchism
Below are five areas of concern which,

if left

unexplained could cause confusion in the present attempt
to associate the unorthodoxy of radical criminology with
secular anarchism.

Historic linkages between radical crim

inology's heterodoxy and anarchism are not easy to draw
because,

although radical criminology understands itself

as being heterodox in relation to orthodox Marxism it has
not yet understood that anarchism has historically exempli
fied that heterodox tradition in its concern for a socialism
with libertarian means and ends.

Anarchism,

as left commu

nism or even left Marxism, has had an irregular relationship
to orthodoxy.

Often it assented to and combined with ortho

doxy and just as often criticized and parted with orthodoxy
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over matters of theory and praxis;
as orthodoxy has not,

yet it has remained loyal,

to those principles in Marx's writings

/which embody libertarian ends.

Thus if the obstacles below

can be overcome the possibility for a clearly anarchistic
\description of radical criminology could be greatly enhanced.
}j^i/

I.

The Myth of Scientific Socialism
The first obstacle emerges from the fact

that Marx and Engels were confused about the sci-

10
entificity of their own system.

As root m a t e r 

ialists and "scientific socialists" they did not
adequately comprehend the metaphysical, unhistorical
and mystical essence of their paradigm.

\f socialism

Scientific

as a science of the class nexus in society

has thus far failed miserably in at least sixteen
important categories of prediction about the social
relations of capitalist political-economy, if New

^

Left sociologist C. Wright Mills and others are
11
correct in their critical observations.
As noted in the preceeding chapter a science
of crime is impossible from an authentic Marxist
perspective because of the nature of the lumpenpro
letariat.

The lumpenproletariat is devoid of

historical importance in all matters concerning the
12
"objective science of revolution", thereby orthodox
Marxism only studies criminal activity in order to
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eradicate it and not to romanticize it as is
the tendency in radical criminology.

The social

dialectic between capitalists and non-criminal
prpletarians are the categories for scientific
investigation.

Both of these economically p r o 

ductive classes can scientifically qualify for
the designation of "a-class-for-itselfV, or for
that matter even a "class-in-itself", but the lump
enproletariat must ever remain as a "repository
for failures from all classes, including the lump13
enproletariat itself".
In short, socially unprojy ductive segments in society have no scientific
meaning for real Marxism.
Perhaps unknowingly the mythical scientificity of the Marxist paradigm serves to provide
radical criminology with a justification for its
contined academic existence,

given the superior

status and appeal of scientific methodology in
14
American academia.
Although radical criminology
does not engage in scientific socialism's utter
contempt for the lumpenproletariat,

it does hold

its criminological conclusions to be scientifically
derived from Marx's statements about crime.
ding to Ouinney,

Accor

"neo-Marxist social science" is

the most dynamic and significant movement in the
15
social sciences today."
However, this author
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suggests that the dynamism and significance of
\Z Marx's statements about crime are clearly repres
sive, and that it is other libertarian features
in the Marxist paradigm that compels radical crimi

inologists to assert that what their doing is
Marxist social science.
^of

The libertarian features

the Marxist paradigm cannot be imprisoned by
s

the theory and praxis of economic reductionism---if these features are to remain liberative.
over,

More

these libertarian features have a metaphysical

and prophetic component that has transcended the
dead corpus of Marxist orthodoxy.

It is thus this

prophetic component of the Marxist paradigm not,
nineteenth century Marxist scientism,

that has

called forth the heresy of the New Left.

The myth

of scientific-socialism may therefore best be u n der
stood as a justification,

A justification that

radical criminologist's strain under because the
prophetic connotations of their heretical Marxism
maybe a bit much for an academia concerned with
16
science (and not religion) to absorb..

\J
j

II.

The Fetishism of Radical Criminology
Given the non-adaptability of orthodox

Marxism as a scientific explanation of crime,

the

reasons why radical criminologists self-identify
their theories with Marxism is open to question.
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Quinney has said that "Marxism is the one p h i l 
osophy of our time that takes as its focus the
17
oppression produced by capitalist society."
^ Y e t Quinney and other criminologists disregarded
heterodox traditions such as anarchism,

syndical

ism, and council communism in their search for
the left paradigm best suited to deal with capi
t a l i s t oppression.
A second reason for this self/
identification may have to do with the ideological
hegemony the orthodox Marxist paradigm has enjoyed
until recently in left circles.
Orthodox Marxism
18
"prevades left thought"
in a way resembling the
hegemony of bourgeois mentality in non-left areas
of mental production.

Until the New Left emerged

in the 1960's American Marxist scholarship slavishly
devoted itself to an orthodoxy that mystified and
obscured social reality in a rote and mechanical
fashion.

It was an orthodoxy that Sartre accused
19
of no longer knowing anyt h i n g .
Other competing
left ideologies were ridiculed as unscientific leftwing childishness (ala L e n i n ) .

It was in this cir

cumstance of ideological dominance by orthodoxy
that radical criminology emerged,

thus its rather

hurried acceptance of Marx is at least understand
able .

^

Probably the most important single reason
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for the self-identification of radical criminology
with Marxism lies in the concept of ideological
^ fetishism.

For radical criminologists the Marxist

\J

paradigm seemingly represents a body of holy dogma
which,

although its scientific validity is highly

questionable,

is the object of a profound reverence.

Just as much of conventional criminology fetishizes
the notion of law and order against the concrete
reality of injustice and disorder in, capitalist
society,

some radical criminologists in turn,

to worship

tend

(at the expense of other variables)

the

^ idol of class struggle, notwithstanding the fact
that the reduction of all social intercourse to
the categories of class is tantamount to the can^ c e l l a t i o n of the independent importance of other
sources of social cooperation and/or conflict.

^

III.

Pejorative Connotations of Secular Anarchism

The academic and popular ” image of anarch20
ists has most often been gross caricature.”
On
the irrational side anarchism, as a political ideol
ogy, has been wrongly confused with "anarchy” or

\}
chaos

(the complete absence of order and protection

in society).

Moreover anarchists have been viewed

(sometimes legitimately)
'/prone:

as: dangerous and violence

"foolish idealists” ; assassins and terrorists

and etc.

Marx and Engels compared Bakuninism to
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a fantastic "secular Society of Jesus" and suc
cessfully sought to expel the Bakuninist heresy
from the International Working Men's Association
21
in 1873.
Lenin regarded the actions of his anarch
istic opponents as "unscientific petty-bourgeois
revolutionism" against which the Bolsheviks should
22
wage a grim struggle.
Rationally, both liberals
and orthodox Marxists have historically "vied with
23
each other in denouncing the forces of anarchy."
The juncture of reasoned polemics between secular
anarchism and its liberal and orthodox Marxist
antagonists is over questions of authority,
State, domination, justice,
dom.

the

individualism and free

Anarchism has normally gone to extreme lengths

in defense,

especially,

of the oppressed individual

against a repressive majority interest and thereby
has become subject to the wrath and fury of most
established political ideologies no matter the
particular place in the left-right political spec
trum .
The historic villification of secular
anarchism by bourgoise elements and orthodox Marxists
may be understood as having two primary effects
on the development of radical criminology.

First,

because secular anarchism has never been a "ruling
ideology,

it has failed to attract as much attention
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from scholars and historians"

24

ideology and orthodox Marxism.

as has liberal
The paucity of

academic interest in and the apparent political
impotency of secular anarchism may have served to
steer radical criminologists away from a serious
investigation of secular anarchism's historic
(some 180 years) role in left thinking.

Secondly,

the libertarian orientation of emergent unorthodox
Marxism is interpreted by radical criminologists
as having originated in the "early"
authentic) Marx.
tially true,

(and for them

This interpretation is only p a r 

at best.

The "early" Marx shared a

libertarian intellectual environment with other
young German revolutionists whose "subjectivism,
idealism and individualism" Marx and Engels only
later criticized as anarchist immaturity on the
part of the remaining group of Left-Hegelians.
The "early" views of Marx may thus be more properly
described as anarchistic and existentialist than
as strictly Marxist.

Ih confirmation of the fact

that the "early" Marx was weaned on anarchist ideas,
offician Soviet Marxism has recently declared that,
"the writings of Marx and Engels show that scientific
communism

emerged and took shape...in criticism

of and separation from the set of ideas which con25
stituted the body of anarchistic views."
From
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this it is obvious that radical criminologists
in their haste to embrace M a r x —

-a humanistic

and libertarian "early" M a r x ------ have at least
misread their "sociology of early Marxism" and
thereby have failed to grasp the clearly anarchis
tic nature of that initial period in M a r x ’s career
development which later resulted in.the founding
of scientific socialism or orthodox Marxism.
IV.

Historic Kinship of Marxism and Secular
Anarchism
Though orthodox Marxism and secular anarch-

/

ism remain frequently at odds,

they do so as quar

reling kinfolk rather than as diametrically opposed
strangers.

In the kinship analogy orthodox Marxism

maybe likened to "Big Brother" who has gained and
exercised left-ideological hegemony over the little
brother or anarchism, only to find that little b r o 
ther has recently been revived by the contemporary

^

circumstances of dominance in capitalist and social
ist societies.

^

Societies wherein orthodox Marxism,

in its sacramentalization of class struggle, had

^ long

since abandoned a libertarian concern with

authoritarianism, hierarchial social organization,
state repression,

participatory democracy,

ual autonomy and etc.

individ

Anarchism's function in the

analogy is to repair the unequal kinship relations
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by resort to criticism and struggle against "Big
Brother's" orthodoxy so the whole kinship group
can wage a relevant and successful campaign given
the changed circumstances of contemporary oppres
sion .
Hence the parting of company between Marxist
orthodoxy and secular anarchism,

as precipitated

by the mutual recriminations exchanged between Marx
and the anarchists Bakunin and Proudhon,

in their

struggle for control of world communism, has never
been one of absolute estrangement;
ogy or p r a x i s .

either in ideol

If radical criminologists were to

sincerely investigate left history they would find
that the interaction between anarchists and ortho
doxy is one where the anarchists have usually func
tioned as the radical left within the perimeters
of the socialist universe,
A.

such that:

An objective interpretation of the theor
etical criticisms levelled against anarch
ists by Marx, Engels and Lenin, would
reveal that these "fathers of scientific
socialism" most often left anarchism u ndis
tinguished,

critically speaking,

formism and revisionism.

from r e 

All of these

strands were usually lumped together as
similar petty bourgoise, ultra-left devia-
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26
tions from the orthodox line.
B.

Also theoretically,

such anarchists as

Bakunin, Kropotkin and the contemporary
anarchist historian Daniel Guerin have
respectively described anarchism as:
27
"revolutionary socialism;11 "anarchist
28
communism"
and "libertarian socialism
29
or communism.11
Secular anarchism has

yf

consistently understood itself as the lib
ertarian strand of socialism,

(e.g., Bakunin

has even been characterized as the most
30
Marxist of the anarchists)
without which
the socialist idea would grow authoritative,
and centralist and become inhumane.
C.

In terms of praxis,

anarchists and rightest

socialists were active in the same inter
national labor organizations until Lenin
consolidated his orthodox hegemony over
the left and forced heretical socialists
to resign enmasse from the Communist Inter31
national in 1921.
Even with this mass
expulsion most secular anarchists maintained
informal relations with Stalinism until
the unsuccessful Spanish Revolution was
crushed by Stalinist duplicity,

thus depri32
ving "anarchism of its only foothold"
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in the practical politics of the left.
During the period between World War II
and the May 1968 uprising in France, by
the anarchistically inspired New Left,
anarchism became philosophically reflexive.
According to Guerin,

anarchism, "without

renouncing the fundamental principles of
32
socialism,"
re-read classical anarchist
theory and sought to rediscover "the toolittle known libertarian areas of thinking
in the works of Marx,

and Lenin."

This

heretical process of "rediscovery" is exactly
the same as that which first engaged Quinney
in his Critique of Legal Order, from a per35
spective of a "rediscovered and recreated"
Marxism.

The same process was also at work

in the Schwendingers, "libertarian and civil35
rights" criminology,
Tony Platt*s "social36
ist, human rights definition of crime,"
and Taylor, et. al*s diverse theory of dev
iance put forth as a defense against both
37
capitalist and Marxist orthodoxy.
^D.

Lastly,

the two variants of the anarchist

position most closely associated with Marxism
have historically been anarcho-syndicalism
and anarcho-communism.

Political philosophers
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such as Robert Tucker and John P. Clark
1/

have noted that "leftist Marxism merges
38
into anarcho-syndicalism."
Richard T.
DeGeorge in his review of anarchist thought
found that "anarchist communists fall back
on a Marxian type of analysis,

though their

views are repudiated by Marxists just as
39
they were repudiated by Marx and Engels."
Several commentators on the subject have
claimed, along with Tucker,

that "classical

^ M a r x i s m while embracing anarchism as a p o l 
itical philosophy,

disagreed with anarchism
40
as a socialist ideology."
The importance
of these commentaries lies in the fact that
the areas of agreement between left Marxism
and those two variants of anarchism are
many.

Since this is the case even persons

skilled in the techniques of political phil
osophy find it hard to make absolute distinct
ions .
The Association of Anarchism with Technological
Reversal
It is certainly true that some anarchists,
most notably the religious and ethical anarchism of
the Tolstoyan and/or the Thoreauist type, have advo
cated a dismantling of m o d e m civilization and a
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return to pre-modern technology.
y hand,

On the other

it can be legitimately argued that most theor-

) ists professing anarchism as a political creed have
\

been concerned more with how technology could be

L

used to liberate humanity from its own irrationality
41
and destructiveness.
The late anarchist philoso
pher of beauty, Herbert Read has considered that:
...the more realistic anarchist of today
has no desire to sacrifice the increased power
over Nature which modern methods of production
have developed.
And actually he has now r eal
ized that the fullest possible development of
these methods of production promises a greater
degree of individual freedom than has hither
to been secured by mankind. 42
Read wrote the above in the early 50's much
in advance of today's environmental politics and
without a proper sensitivity toward the destructive
ness of nuclear power (e.g., Hiroshima preceeded
his reflections by only a few y e a r s ) .

Anarcho-paci-

fism and Christian anarchism will be discussed in
this work's E pilo g u e , but for now the author notes
that this concept of "power over nature" is some
thing that liberalism,

orthodox Marxism and certain

types of anarchism have historically shared.

It

is a shared feature which radical criminology must

j

become critical of, if it is to understand that
within the domination of nature may lie the key to
the domination of humanity.

Towards this understan-
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ding the unorthodox Marxism of Marcuse, Jurgen
Habermas and William Leiss has understood that
in a repressive society technology is used in a
repressive way;

and in such a society mastery of

nature works "to perpetuate and intensify human
domination and irrationality,"

Wat is essential

is to articulate the specific objectives of mastery
over nature in relation to human freedom rather
43
than human power."
Radical criminology should not only attack
44
the emergent "technocratic solution to social order"
as manifested in the activities of agencies like
LEAA,

it should also understand with Marcuse that

technological progress can contribute to the fate
ful continuity between capitalism and authoritarian

^

socialism unless deliberate steps are taken to coun45
teract such a development,"
Thus environmental
destruction,

as repressive society's supreme "power

i/over nature",

carries within itself the strong poten

tial for total human (not merely class) destruction.
And,

as such,

"power over nature" ought to be under

stood as representing the apex of modern criminal

j

irrationality.
or other may,

Technological reversal of some kind
then be interpreted as a contemporary

statement of rationality on the part of criminological
theorists concerned with the salvation of the whole
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human race.
What is Anarchist T h eory?
So far the heresy of unorthodox Marxism has been
interpreted as resembling an anarchist deviation;

a deviation

which has historically been repudiated by classical Marxist
theorists.

It was suggested that five (5) obstacles

myth of scientific socialism,
ogy,

i.e.,

the fetish of radical criminol

the villification of anarchism and the historic kinship

of anarchism and Marxism and finally,

technological reversal

may have played a part in radical criminology's u n c o n 
sciousness of its own fundamentally anarchist heresy.
Now the question of what,
must be addressed.
shall be used.

exactly,

is anarchist theory

In addressing this question a dual task

First,

a brief overview of major classical

and contemporary expressions in anarchist theorizing will be
considered.

Secondly,

a variant of anarchist thinking, one

which strongly resembles heretical Marxism will be defined,
analyzed and designated for use in a later comparison with
the major anarchist features of radical criminology.
I.

Brief Overview of Major Classical and Contemporary
Expressions of Anarchism
A.

William Godwin (1760-1836)
Classical secular anarchism originated in

the writings of the English non-conformist William
Godwin.

Godwin's most important work was his

rationalist treatise, an Enquiry Concerning Political
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J u s t i c e , in which he considered that inequality
of property and political government were the
prime reasons for the existence of social injust
ices and crime.

Godwin felt that human nature

is, by definition good, but that political and
economic institutions have corrupted humanity.
Hence, he argued for the "dissolution of political
government" and cooperative economic arrangements.
In an early statement of importance to
radical criminology (e.g. labelling theory) he
advanced the notion that State "constraint,

employed

against delinquents ... is calculated... to excite
a still greater disapprobation."

In place of the

state and its punishment apparatus Godwin would
substitute a reasoned public opinion to which a
delinquent, under the transformed social conditions
of an anarchistic society, would be expected to
yield.

However,

if the delinquent did not yield

to public reason he or she would not suffer "per
sonal molestation" as is normal under political
governments.

As for positive law, Godwin noted

that "general justice and mutual interest" are
more binding than legislative "signatures and seals."
Finally, Godwin was skeptical of political revolu
tion which merely substituted one form of state
tyrrany and violence for another,

thus, his moral
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sentiments were with non-violent evolutionary
46
change.
B.

Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862)
Thoreau's civil-libertarian position, based

on an intense belief in individualism and a passion
to actively resist state intrusions into social life/
superbly, qualifies him as a philosophical and p r a c 
tical anarchist.

For him the only power which an

individual has is "his integrity" of conscience.
As a result of his arrest in 1846 for non-payment
of a Baystate poll-tax, Thoreau wrote Civil Disobediance,
a treatise which added to classical liberalism the
anarchist motto that the best government was not that
government which governed least, but rather "the best
government was no government at all."
Of interest to radical criminology, besides
Thoreau's voluntary renunciation of work and prop
erty obstacles to true self-development, is his
criticism of state repression.

The state forces

obediance to law not conscience, hence obediance
to such a state is dehumanizing because people tend
to foreswear exercise of their judgement and their
morality, rendering themselves to a level comparable
"with wood,

earth and stones."

To counteract state

repression Thoreau asserted the prior right of revo
lution.

A "peaceable revolution" or non-violent
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action in which the state's only alternatives are
to either annihilate or imprison "all just men."
Thus Thoreau,

like Godwin,

developed an anarchism

based on the dictates of humanity's enlightened
desire to liberate itself from state tyranny in
social life.

However, unlike Godwin, Thoreau's

anarchism's was a theory of extreme individualism,
47
whereas Godwin's was a collectivist expression.
iX/

C.

Continental Secular Anarchism
The leading contributors to the development

of European anarchism were:

the anarcho-syndicalist,

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865);

the libertarian

socialist revolutionary, Michael Bakunin (18141876) ; and the anarcho-communist, Peter Kropotkin
| (1842-1921).

Another minor contributor was the

Left-Hegelian, Max Stirner (1806-1856) .

Marx

identified S t i m e r ' s extremely egoistic anarchism,
combined with his Hegelian idealism, as the "common
48
source"
of European philosophical anarchism and
in turn Stirnerism may be the origin of the anarch
ist heresy that now informs radical criminology's
heretical Marxism.

Proudhon's, Bakunin's and

Kropotkin's theories of anarchism are below anal
yzed together because of their historic condemnation
of strict Marxism.

While there are similarities,

49
each, as will be shown is a unique theory of anarchism.
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1.
^

Similarities
a.

Romanticism:
Each theory contains an element of passion

/ for

and an emotional interest in the political and

economic emancipation of the European working clas
ses.

Bakunin was the most romantic of the three

and "the revolutionary passion that he displayed
in his writings and career was his foremost contri50
bution to the development of anarchism."
Kropotkin,
as a scientist "placed high value on scientific
51
validation of his social theories."
Yet he was
not above a romantic concern for the establishment
of a human environment where "communal solidarity
and cooperation" would abound.
^

b.

^

Subjectivism and Idealism:
By subjectivism and idealism this author

makes reference to two features of classical anarch
ist epistemology.

First classical anarchism placed

a pronounced emphasis on the dictates of human rea
son and conscience in experience over and against
an epistemology of realism which holds that extern
ality exists independent from sense perception or
mind.

Secondly,

that because of this emphasis on

the uperiority of reason and conscience in human
interaction classical anarchism was united in an
idealistic belief that the ordinary individual pos-
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sessed the personal power to think and act in
a way that required little external prodding.
As Kropotkin wrote "rarely has appeal been made
to the good instincts of the m a s s e s
last resort,

only as a

to save the sinking ship in times

of revolution
made in vain;

but never has such an appeal been
the heroism,

the self-devotion of
52
the toiler has never failed."
Bakunin went so

far as to advocate the spreading of sophisticated

53
scientific knowledge among the m a s s e s .

*

c.

Individualism and Voluntarism:
Given the elevation of human reason and

^ conscience,

the individual person,

tion or in a collectivity,

either in isola

is usually thought of

as free to determine his or her choice of action.
jHuman destiny does not depend on God (Bakunin) n o r :
"the inexorable working of social laws through
54
history"
(as in philosophical determinism and
f a t a lism).

At the same time that classical anarch

ism elevates freedom of choice it is aware that
external agencies,

such as the state and existing

economic arrangements,

force individuals into r e 

stricted fields of choice.

Thus human misery,

immorality and criminality are attributed to exter
nal conditions that humanity is forced to live
under.

It is for this reason that most forms of
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anarchism are opposed to social coercion (although
here Bakuninist theory, especially in its emphasis
on "propaganda by the deed" comes the closes to
55
supporting revolutionary coercion).
d.

Antiauthoritarianism:
The term anarchy r e f e r s , in the sense of

y ! etymology to an absence of rule.

Given that polit-

| ical rule is the most apparent form of rule, most
of the advocates of classical secular anarchism
I
I interpreted the authority of political administration
or government as that power in society which was
most repressive to the freedom of European peasants
and working classes.

Moreover,

to classical anarch

ism political rule in governments was unacceptable,
not because of a particular kind of rule (e.g. mon-

[/

archy,

oligarchy,

democracy, republicanism, and
56
etc.) but "because they were governments."
Thus
the state,

as the concrete expression of political

*^rule was a fundamental subject of classical secular
anarchism's attack.

Extensions of this criticism

[I of the state were applied to other non-governmental,
but coercive functions in society,

such as custom,

religion, philosophical dogmas, and repressive moral
57
codes.
In this regard Bakunin passionately e x 
plained that,

"if there is a state there is n e ces

sarily domination and consequently slavery.

A
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state without slavery, open or disguised,
inconceivable—
58
the state.*'
e.

is

that is why we are enemies of

Decentralization and egalitarianism:
Clearly classical secular anarchism did

not deny (contrary to its bourgoisie and orthodox
Marxist critics)

^ employ

that an anarchist society must

some kind of decision-making mechanism that

would provide human intercourse with the minimum
of coherence and orderliness.
reason and instinct,
design,

For Kropotkin human

if left uncoerced by external

could create and maintain "a certain stan

dard of public morals...in spite of judges, police59
y men and rural guards" Kropotkin's anarchist commune
would make decisions geared to influencing the soc
ial intercourse of its members.

^ American

Bakunin admired

federalism and advocated a "universal
60

world federation directed from the bottom up."
As has been shown, Proudhon pushed for voluntary
trade unionists control of society.

Thus, nothing

in classical anarchism precludes "a minimum insti
tutional presence at all levels of social organi61
zation."
However,

classical anarchism was opposed

to centralization, hierarchy instrumentalism,
el pulsion and elitism in social organization.

corn
In
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substitution for centralization and the "evils
of bureaucracy'1 classical anarchism posited decen
tralized control by local "organic" institutions
62
of a cooperate character."
For hierarchial strat-

\/ ification

classical anarchism would substitute an

egalitarian levelling; for political instrumental
ism and formalism, natural spontaneity;

for compul

sion, either cooperation, moral persuasion or non-

S violent

resistance;

and finally for elitist decision

making, unanimty (if at all possible)

and a populist

belief in the decision-making abilities of the com63
com person.
f.

Rational h u m a n i s m :
Proudhon and Bakunin exemplified classical

y
secular anarchism's rational humanism,

i.e.,

the

rejection of all supernatural religious authority
and its replacement with a profound faith in humanity.
But there was another sense in which classical anarch
ism was a humanist credo.

Perhaps borrowing from

the Kantian ethical category of humanity and as "endin-itself" classical anarchism never quite fell into
what philosopher Alfred North Whitehead referred
to as "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness" or
the reification of class analysis.

That is, a l 

though classical anarchism was critical of other
classes and romanticized the working classes,

its

186

analysis

(unlike strict Marxism) did not advocate

the dehumanization of these other classes in order
to install the working class in power in the event
of a successful revolution.

Doubtlessly,

this r a t 

ional humanist feature of classical anarchism also
resulted from its concern for the "dignity of man"
(humanity) and its aversion to coercion and the
historic despoticism incident to political rule.
Even the most violent and passionate of the three
leading figures in classical anarchism could p r o 
pound that "respect for man is the supreme law of
Humanity and that the great,
ory,

the real object of'hist

its only legitimate object,

is the humanization

and emancipation... of each individual living in soci65
ety."

^

g.

Utopianism:
Marx criticized classical anarchism for its

adherence to the utopian doctrines of St. Simon,

66
Fourier and others.

But among the great classical

anarchist, Proudhon and Kropotkin's stand out as
67
"pragmatic libertarians."
The distinctive charac
teristic of classical anarchism was its call for
the immediate and eminently practical institutional
ization of a movement in the direction of antiauthor65
itarianism and libertarian disestablishment;
not
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its impracticality.

In his Conquest of B r e a d ,

Kropotkin identified anarcho-communism as the syn
thesis of "two ideals that have been pursued [.and
incorporated into social existence;

minej

throughout

the ages---economic and political liberty.”

Pro

posing solutions to the great questions of economic
and political liberation, from the bottom up (egal-

/
itarian) rather than from the top down (authoritar
ian) , is what gave classical anarchism its reputation
70
as an impractically naive doctrine.
2.

Differences
From the above discussion of similarities,

the

over-arching theme that seemed to unite the theme
that seemed to unite the theories of classical

j I / European

anarchism was their emphasis on the "liber

tarian potential as the primary constituent of human
'! nature."

Following are some differences in referents

and styles which made each theory unique,
a.

j

Conflict vs. Cooperation:
The anarcho-syndicalism of Proudhon takes

the work place and the work ethic as its analytic
point of departure.
syndicalist,

Because of this, anarcho-

or "mutualist" are concerned with a

heavy economic analysis

(often undistinguishable

from a strict Marxist class analysis).
such as:

Concepts

the general strike, economic boycotts and
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worker's self-management were of extreme import
to the conflict perspective of anarcho-syndicalism.

^

1/ In contrast

the anarcho-communism of Kropotkin

took the commune or total community as its primary
point of departure.

Although Kropotkin was not

above a class analysis, his theory of mutual-aid
was an organic conception of how greater human coop
eration, as against human conflict,

could be the

| methodology for achieving the new society.

Anarcho-

communism analyzes the total reality of living in
communities and; thus is not limited to any singularly
idefined methodology.

Anarcho-syndicalism even today

i

/ remains a theory of social conflict, while anarchoi
72

ff communism remains one of social cooperation.

Both

of these theories differ from Bakunin's emphasis
on the nature of the lumpenproletariat and the use
^ of revolutionary violence:

they both advocated n o n 

violent direct action.
b.

Revolution and Lumpen V i o l e n c e :
In Bakunin's theory there is a kind of

Dionsyian spirit to do violence upon the political
oppressor.

It was Bakunin's experience as a member

of the lumpenproletariat (fifteen years in prison)
that probably informed his theory of revolution.
He was the archetypical man in revolt against all
manner of authority.

For him "the urge to destruction
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is also a creative urge.”

The lumpen class,

being the most alienated and powerless class in
society, was originally romanticized by him as
the class most likely to be in the vanguard of in
surgency.
rebels,
fore,

It was the bandits who were the "first

the first revolutionaries," the first,

there

to begin the Dionsyian festival of socialist

re v o l u t i o n .
II.

Contemporary Expressions of Anarchism
Contemporary anarchist theory is a continuation

of the insights developed in the nineteenth-century
classical anarchism.

All of the original features

of anarchism can be found in the works of contemporary
writers.

The philsophical idealism of anarchism

had an eloquent spokesperson in the late Herbert
Read.

Murray Book c h i n ’s "post-scarcity" theory of

anarchism is a modern equivalent of Kropotkin*s
theory of mutual-aid.

Noam Chomsky*s and Daniel

Guerin*s anarcho-syndicalism echoes Proudhon.

The

libertarian influence of Thoreau upon those contemp
orary social activists employing a strategy of n o n 
violent resistance is well known.

Bakunin’s revo

lutionary passion for the evolvation of the most
rejected elements in society has been represented
in the theoretical conclusions of such left Marxists
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as "Che” Guevara, Franz Fanon, Angela Davis and
Huey P. Newton.

In 1978 the prestigious American

Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, under
the chairpersonship of the anarchist legal philos
opher Robert Paul Wolff, felt "by popular choice’'
74
the need to inquire into the nature of anarchism.
Thus anarchism has survived historical onslaughts
from liberalism and orthodox Marxism and is now exper
iencing "one of its periodic waves of popularity."
Below is a brief inquiry into contemporary libertar
ian notions of justice,

the aim of which is to pre

pare the way for a favorable comparison between it
and radical criminology.
III.

Contemporary Notions of Libertarian Justice
Five fundamental principles seem to inform

contemporary anarchism's theory of the state in rela
tion to its criminal justice system.

These princi

ples can be applied to both private capitalism and
the state-capitalism of orthodox socialist economy.

A A.

The authority and coerciveness inherent
in the nature of state defined criminal
law represents a radical departure from
the human instincts of natural justice or
equity.

v/

B.

The state creates and uses criminal sanct
ions to protect the property interests
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(either private or social property),
of a ruling class against the egalitarian
economic and political interests of sub
ordinate classes.
^C.

State enforcement of unjust criminal laws
produces a greater criminality on the part
of courts,

legislators, police and prisons

than does that crime emanating from lumpen
sources.

Thus the state is deemed criminal

and anti-libertarian.
D.

Since it is the state and its criminal
sanctions which are criminally repressive
to natural justice,

the resort to rebellion

by subordinate classes is a legitimate
strategy in the overcoming of alienation
and in the historic quest for liberty and
human r i g h t s .
^E.

In the movement toward a communistic soci
ety the state and its criminal justice
apparatus must be deliberately dismantled
by a total cultural revolution;

rather than

being left to "whither away" by its own
devices.
In support of the above principles and in
the interest of brevity, the author, in
75
footnote
cites the sources from which
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the fundamental principles of liber
tarian justice were derived.
A Comparison of Secular Anarchism to the Major
Theoretical Features of Radical Criminology
The theoretical foundations of secular anarchism
has been described above.

It is the contention of this section:

that the unorthodox Marxism of radical criminology is, at least,
an unconscious criminological statement of the anarchist heresy
orthodox Marxism has historically repudiated.

^ 1.

Romanticism:

Radical criminology has not adequately responded
76
to orthodox charges that it is a "romanticization of crime."
According to Taylor et al radical criminology incorporates
77
both an "anti-utiliatarian" and political focus.
This comb
ination of anti-utilitarian romanticism and political advocacy
of the non-utilitarian values of social groups places radical
criminology in a position left of orthodox Marxism.

Further,

Taylor et al make the erroneous assumption that romanticism
and politics are somehow mutually exclusive phenomena.

Jwas

As

shown above it is romanticism that may give pragmatic

politics a vision and passion for the achievement of libertar
ian and humanist ends.
_ 2.

Subjectivism and Idealism:
Although,

as was shown in Chapter III herein,

radical criminology has recently developed a political-economy
of crime,

it yet retains a strong tendency toward subjectivism
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and idealism.
philosophy"

Quinney's employment of "a radically critical

(which is Left-Hegelian in origin)

is in his

words an attempt "to destroy the illusion of objectivism
78
(of a realityapart from consciousness)".
Taylor et al's
advocacy of a criminological fusion between the social interactionist philosophy of George Herbert Mead and a Marxist
79
analysis of capitalist economy
is rather like the typical
anarchist attempt to critically capture the libertarian
80
dimensions in both liberalism and Marxism.
The radical search for a political-eoonomy of crime
suggests to this author that radical criminologists are
unaware of the subjective connotations of what it means to
engage in political thinking.

It is one's politics

dismal "science of economics")

that depends on some specific

metaphysical ideal.

Political theory, unlike economics,

thus basically an art.
Williams,

(not the

is

Unorthodox Marxist, Wilson Carey

a political theorist, has criticized political

"science" as dangerous to development of left political thin81
king.
Ralph Miliband and Lucio Colletti, both unorthodox
Marxist theorists have respectively noticed that there is
no strictly Marxist tradition of political studies or if
there is one it is based on the liberal political philosophy
of J. J. Rousseau to which Marx merely added "the economic
82
bases for the withering away of the state."
Yet Rousseau
and Hegel shared the eighteenth century neo-Platonist emph
asis on community and what they both "contributed to socialism,
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utopian or other, was that all rights,

including those

of property, are rights within the community and not against
83
it."
3.

Individualism and Voluntarism:
The Schwendingers proposed a criminology which
84

would "make man, not institutions,

the measure of all things."

Geoff Pearson expressed the point more forthrightly in asser
ting that his vision of "utopian criminology" would help
85
people "to live as they choose."
Taylor et al argued against
a strict Marxist determinism and for an unorthodox Marxian
criminology which would allow for individual "purpose and

86
integrity."

What all of these radical criminologists are

suggesting is that criminal activity is not individually but
socially pathological.

It is the diseased social structure of

late capitalism that is the great culprit in the production
of criminality.

The structural reaction to crime in terms

of the capitalist state*s repressiveness "threatens the abil87
ity of isolated individuals to pursue and realize interests."
Thus deviancy has become the normal method of expressing human
diversity in a society which Taylor et al refer to as the
88
"prison."

^ 4.

Antiauthoritarianism:
Radical criminology rejects the authoritarian im

plications of orthodox Marxist methodology in several important
ways.

First, radical criminology insists upon the freedom

to "choose" its constituencies and opposes orthodoxy’s intol-
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o?
erance toward theoretical diversity.

In other words r a d 

ical criminology is about something other than an analysis
of the organized working class.

Second, radical criminology

when it uses a class analysis supplements or inflates its
v iew

of the working dlass by resort to a "surplus population";

a population which includes, not only unproductive labor,
but students, state workers, welfare recipients, housewives
90
and elite managers of multinational corporations.
Third,
radical criminology addresses itself to the elevation of the
lumpenproletariat,

a class orthodoxy could not stomach.
91

Fourth, radical criminology rejects economic determinism,
though it is unclear that it does because of its penchant
for political-economy.

Lastly, radical criminology,

accepts,

the conclusions of conventional criminology in so far as
these can be reworked into a political-economy of crime.
An example of this process of reworking to fit the radical
mold is Taylor et al's reading of Durkheim in way that his
theory,

along with that of Marx's,

could be equally associ

ated with the "abolition of crime."

^

5.

Decentralization and Egalitarianism:
According to the socialist Michael Harrington,

whom Quinney quotes approvingly, "participatory socialism
requires the elimination of bureaucracies and all hierarchial
f o r m s ... a n d . ,.entails a sense of egalitarian cooperation...
and guarantees invididual r i g h t s ...human rights and individ92
ual liberties."
This participatory socialism is counter
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posed to state socialism and state capitalism and is
93
Q u i n n e y ’s vision of human liberation.
The concept of
^

94
also informs the work of the Schwendingers,
96
Taylor, et al and most of the members of or con

v egalitarianism
95
Platt,

tributors to the radical journal Crime and Social Just i c e .
6.

Rational Humanism and Utopianism:
Radical criminology has repeatedly reported on

its association with the philosophical humanism of the ,,early"
Marx.

Taylor et al make it abundantly clear that their new
97
criminology "stands or falls"
on Marxism humanism.
Quinney
transfers the concept of alienation, which is central to

Marxist humanism,

from the workplace and commodity exchange
98
to "all other areas of life."
The human rights criminology

of Platt and the Schwendingers testifies to the esteem and
vision of the man who called upon philosophers to change the
world and not merely interpret it.

This rational humanism

is also the most anarchist tendency in radical criminology.
It is a tendency which

forces radical criminology to critically

go beyond the scientific confines of conventional academic
criminology;

it is a tendency that culminates in the precept
99
that "man is the supreme being for man"
and as such it gives
radical criminology a prophetic quality that can only be des-

100
cribed as at one with secular religion.
Throughout this thesis the utopianism of radical
criminology has been described.
along with Pearson:

One should merely note here,

"£that a utopian} ... criminology will

197

contribute to the construction of utopias, rather than

101
the confinement of dystopias."
7.

Conflict vs. Cooperation:
There are two levels in which the concepts

of conflict and cooperation are operative in radical crimin
ology.

Theoretically, radical criminology employs the con

flict vocabulary in its polemics directed against conventional
102
social order paradigms in criminology.
Other reasons for
radical c r i m i n o l o g y ^ use of such a vocabulary are: its dis
ruptive perspective of social change;

its interpretation of

society as a contested struggle between opposing interests;
its utopianism;

its Marxist understanding of disalienation;

its support of out-of-power social groups and, lastly its
overt politicization of criminological theory by the devel
opment of a leftist praxis which requires a dual struggle
103
both inside and outside of academia.
To date most American
radical criminologists have remained non-violent exponents
of direct action first against their own in-house repressors
(e.g., Berkeley School of Criminology closing) and second
in community struggles such as the Berkeley community-control
of police issue, prison struggles and other issues.
On the other hand,

criminologists employ an obviously

cooperative praxis in their dealings with one another, with
students and with groups their theory supports.

They have

organized "anarchistic" collectives among themselves to pur104
sue criminological "writing as a political practice";
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they have organized into national and regional groups to
educate themselves and others about left ideology; developed
105
a "people*s pedagogy"
and etc.
In true anarcho-utopian
fashion they are now living the future that they aspire to.
Compared to the politics and styles of Old-Left academics
(e.g., hierarchial party organization,

democratic centralism,

Stalinist dogma, no communal living and purges) radical crim
inologists m a y be more libertarian and egalitarian.
8.

Revolution and Lumpen Violence:
Academic radical criminology at least tacitly

supports lumpen violence as a strategy against state repres
sion.

This kind of strategy is termed, by Quinney, as
106
"politically conscious acts of rebellion."
Conventional

criminology and criminal law terms these acts as political
crimes against which the state should move with all force.

107

On this question greater attention must be given to the works
of non-academic "radical criminologists",

for as Krisberg

has noted the roots of radical criminology can be found in
108
the "writings of participants in political struggles."
Two such participants were/are the revolutionaries Huey P.
Newton and Angela D a v i s .

Both were accused of politically

violent crimes against the state and both were imprisoned
as a result.

Newton's debt to Bakunin is illustrated in

his concept of "revolutionary suicide."

Justifying revolu

tionary violence as a strategy for Third World liberation
groups, Newton asserts:
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Revolutionary suicide does not mean that
I and m y comrades have a death wish; it means
just the opposite.
We have such a strong desire
to live with hope and human dignity that exis
tence without them is impossible.
When reaction
ary forces crush us, we must move against these
forces even at the risk of death.
We will have
to be driven out with a stick. 109
For her part the unorthodox Marxist-Leninist Davis has been,
since her release from prison the organizing genius in the
development of the National Alliance Against Racist and
Political Repression;
professional,
viduals.

a group composed of church,

labor,

civic and revolutionary organizations and indi

The Alliance's pronounced emphasis is on racism

and repression of political prisoners

(not class struggle),

most of whom have been accused

of violent political crimes

by the state.

there is a

In the Alliance

towards "propaganda by the deed".

definite penchant

For example,

the current

struggles for the release of Rev. Ben Chavis, David Rice
and Poindexter, has been exalted (and I think legitimately)
to an international cause c e 'l ebre.

In asserting her r e l a 

tionship to the unorthodox "Marxism" of Bakunin, Davis noted
that:
Too many Marxists £some of whom are presently
members of the CPUSA: mine^ have been inclined
to over value the second part of Marx's observ
ation*
that the lumpenproletariat is capable
of the basest banditry and the dirtiest corrupt
ion
while minimizing or indeed totally disre
garding his first remark, applauding the lumpen
for their heroic deeds and exalted sacrifices. 110
9.

Libertarian Notions of Justice:
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Most radical criminologists are unaware that
their theories of justice are based on what the Schwendingers
111
refer to as " m o d e m libertarian standards."
While ortho
dox Marxism is contemptuous of the term "justice" because
of its supposed juridical support of capitalist economy,
unorthodox Marxism is concerned for a justice that, as Quinney
holds,

"satisfies the needs of the entire working class"

(i.e., the whole surplus population which in Quinney's anal
ysis,

as stated above, includes almost everyone except out

right capitalists).

In other words unorthodox Marxism is

a firm believer in that kind of justice which does not seek
the legal justification of the capitalist class.

Quinney

has called this new understanding of justice "popular justice"
or "socialist justice" and suggests that it is based on a
n e w understanding of morality (another concept that orthodoxy
ridicules).

To this author*s mind what all this confused

double-talk of Quinney is really trying to describe is a

J libertarian

concern for justice for the broad masses of

American people.
This assessment is based on Quinney's notion of

j

the masses "natural desire for a complete unalienated poli113
tics,"
which slightly restated would mean a natural instinct
for a popular justice.

^ juridical

features.

A justice without the state, and its

Justice without the criminal justice sys

tem and an academy without criminology.

The negation of the
114
criminal justice system and its transcendence
is exactly
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where Quinney*s criminology is directed.

In its! direction

Quinney*s theory is libertarian because it is a vision of
socialism that "affords to all individuals the freedom to
exercise human rights and civil liberties that are not mere
//115
abstractions but have concrete day-to-day meaning.
t//

Towards A Deliberate Anarchist Criminology
With the above favorable comparison of present rad

ical criminology to the anarchist position in mind,

the task

is to now indicate what the salient features of a deliberate
anarchist criminology would be.

The most important concern

of this section is to show thad radical criminology h a s ,
within its present formulations,

the capacity to carry through

a libertarian revolution in criminology.

But that capacity

must be consciously put in motion if radical criminology *s
development is not to regress into a new orthodoxy.
!

Hence

f

| this section also speculatively explores ways in which an
anarchist criminology must critically and continually d i s 
tinguish itself from traditional Marxist methods of analysis,
if those methods are theoretically repressive and lead away
from a criminology with libertarian e n d s .
I.

Libertarianism vs. Correctionalism
Taylor et al in their New Criminology have

cautioned that any approach to radical criminology
must meet three essential criteria:
A.

The radical approach must avoid correct
ionalism or "the identification of
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deviance with pathology.”
B.

The radical approach must be a political117
economy of the state crime.

C.

The radical approach must be commited to
the abolition of crime and by virtue of
this commitment critically advocate the
creation of a new society in which "the
facts of human diversity...are not sub118
ject to the power to criminalize."

On the basis of Taylor's first criterion,
most radical criminologists have thus far avoided
correctionalism; yet on the strength of their con
tinued confused identification with traditional
Marxist analysis, one can, with certainty predict,
that if the authoritarian Marxist variety of social
ism were to take power in American, correctionalism
would be the "new criminology's primary pursuit.
Historical events have demonstrated conclusively
that authoritarian Marxist socialism requires a
bureaucratic and ideological apparatus (criminal
justice system and criminology to centralize the
social response to and increase its hegemony over
all kinds of deviancy).

However, even prior to

the capturing of state power orthodox Marxist theory
contains the seeds of a correctionalist perspective
on crime, as shown in this work of Bonger and Marx's
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contempt for the lumpenproletariat.
It is submitted that the reason radical
criminology has thus far avoided correctionalism
is because of its emphasis on unrestricted liberty
in "heteropraxis.11

The coercive implications of

correctionalism sparks an instinctual,

if not rat

ional, reaction in all who are anarchistically
inclined.

Thus, Taylor*s anti-correctionist cri

teria is best understood as an anarchist posture.
However a caveat must be enjoined on this point:
in order to not defeat its revolutionary ideals,
radical criminology must maintain the anti-correctionist perspective.

That is, if the opportunity

for fundamental social change is realized the r a d 
ical approach must remain faithful to a non-coercive
credo unlike established Marxism which has become
repressive.

This caveat being settled the first

feature of an anarchist criminology would be its
libertarian
II.

anti-correctionalism.

Metaphysical Dialectics vs. Strict PoliticalEconomy
Radical criminology has recently begun to

meet the second criterion by fashioning a sort of
political-economy of crime.

It is here that auth

entic Marxism might have had the greatest relevance
for the investigations of criminology for the Marxist
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model is capable of analyzing capitalism as an
historically specific class-determined social form
ation.

Viewed as the "early" Marx himself prophet

ically viewed it radical political-economy is prop
erly the dialectical critique of ''everything exis-

120
ting"

and thus not merely capitalist social

relations.

Yet Marx himself in his scientific

socialism and many of those who call themselves
"Marxists" restrict the universal implications of
that dictum by limiting political-economy to a crit
ique of capitalism's historic development,

liberal

politics,

social order,

i . e ., "various theories of

politics,

sociology and finally conventional econ-
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omics."

Of course, radical criminology employs

the concept to criticize crime and deviancy in
capitalist society.

By a dialectical critique of

"everything existing" this author understands it
to include: religion, metaphysics,

aesthetics,

organic and inorganic matter, and of course author
itarian Marxism among other infinitely possible
topics for criticism.

It is understood that it

may be absurd for radical criminology to consider
studying everything before it offers conclusions
on anything about that which it is uniquely situ
ated to study,

i.e,, crime and deviancy.

But

moving "criminology out of its own imprisonment
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in artificially segregated specifics"

is what

the emergent radical paradigm is supposedly about
anyway.

What is irrational and absurd to one ideol

ogy m a y be the height of rationality to a n o t h e r .
Thus requesting that present radical analysis move
beyond its narrow investigation of crime vis-a-vis
capitalism to broader analysis would not be absurd.
The foregoing request is all the more u r 
gent because,
this thesis,

as has been shown in Chapter III of
the Marxist dialectic does not operate

dialectically with respect to crime.

Radical crim

inologists have had to forge a fiction or leap of
faith to create a "Marxist" political-economy of
crime.

In the process they have shown that it is

not the "scientificity" of dialectical criticism
or political-economy that attracts but rather the
mystique of the device of political-economy.

In

spite of C. Wright Mill's criticism below this
author does not feel that the dialectical method
123
or an analysis of political-economy
is so elastic
that it is meaningless,

on the contrary its meaning

is in its esoteric materialist mysteries which only
the faithful need understand in order to bring the
faith to those willing to hear:
We may also understand that if not for
Marx, for many "Marxists" mere reference to
"dialectical" serves to let one out of the
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determinist trap.
But for self-appointed
’’insiders'* it is all too often an intel
lectually cheap w a y to mysterious insights,
a substitute for the hard work of learning.
Perhaps their insistence upon this language
is due mainly to their having become disciples
before having read much else.
For us, the
"dialectical method" is either a mess of
platitutdes, a way of double talk, a preten
tious obscurantism
or all three.
The
essential error of the "dialectician" is
the know-it-all confusion of logic with m e t a 
physics; if the rules of dialectics were
the most general laws of motion: all phys
ical scientists would use them every day.
CMaybe not if the conclusions about scien
tific revolutions in Thomas Kuhn*s works
are correct: m i n e j . On the other hand, if
dialectics is the "science of thinking",
then we are dealing with the subject matter
of psychology, and not with logic or method
at all. As guide to thinking, "dialectics"
can be more burdensome than helpful, for
if everything is connected, dialectically,
with everything else, then you must know
"everything" in order to know anything, and.^,
causal sequences become difficult to trace.
^
There is little need to tarry long over Mill*s
criticism for all social theories have an ontological
element (metaphysical view of ultimate reality) and
all social theories, as ideologies,

are relativistic,
125
even the unorthodox-Marxism of M i l l s .
Construct
ively, Mills has indicated the mysterious qualities

'Jjof

dialectical criticism and what is important is

I that radical political-economy,

either in its usual

/ or in its mystical sense, ought to be extended beyond
| its captivity of being merely a critique of capital\ ism to:
^

A.

Critically compare capitalist social rela-
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tions with all existing socialist social
relations in order to determine how crime
is produced, handled and how it could be
abolished in a manner that is liberative
rather than repressive.
B.

Incorporate concepts derived from: ecology;
ethology;

sexology; philosophical humanism;
126
aesthetics; occultism;
theology and anth
ropology .
C.

Apply dialectical criticism to the "production
of radical criminology" itself (e.g. Quinney).

D.

Improve present radical analysis by better
127
scholarship.
These proposals for an
extension of radical methodology to cover
most of human existence and experience are
presented in the awareness that crime and
deviancy are universal social phenomena
which require so much more speculation than
the poverty of a naked "class analysis."
Conventional criminology with its many pol
itical and economic drawbacks has been recep
tive to ideas from multiple s o u r c e s .

Radi

cal analysis must not short-change itself
by a narrowing of its scope to the restrict
ive mysteries of class.

If it is to remain

critical and revolutionary even the words
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‘'political-economy’1 may have to, from
time-to-time re-emerge,

as say, anthro-

sexology, racial ecology and etc., ----anarchist criminology would require as
much.

As the secular anarchist philosopher

of science, Paul K. Feyerbend has put it:
There is no idea, however ancient
and absurd that is not capable of
improving our knowledge.
The whole
history of thought is absorbed into
science and used for improving every
single theory.
Nor is political inter
ference rejected.
It maybe needed to
overcome the chauvinism of science that
resists alternatives to the status-quo.^28
Therefore the second essential feature of

^

an anarchist criminology would be m e t h o d 
ological freedom and flexibility.

III.

Utopianism and Philosophical Idealism as
the Basis of Praxis
A close restatement of the New Criminology’s

third essential criterion for a radical criminology
results in the advocacy of a new society where indi
vidual and social variegation are not to be selected
out as criminal activity by some powerful social
agency(s).

Simply, what this criterion envisions

is a new social order where:

a) human freedom

pre

vails over dominance and where crime is no more,
b) the former social power to control freedom is
drastically short-circuited if not completely abol-
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ished.

As a general statement of a desired aspect

of the future this utopian vision presents this
author with no particular difficulty.

However,

there are difficulties that come with the notion
of praxis or the actual means to achieve such an
end;

it is with praxis that critical scrutiny must

be brought to bare.
On the question of praxis
fication of theory and practice)

(i.e., the u n i 

there are two

competing Marxian v i e w s : the orthodox and authentic
one fashioned by Marx and the other a Hegelian
philosophic construct introduced by Georg Lukas
and elaborated upon by Antonio Gramsci and more
recently by Herbert Marcuse.

Briefly,

it was the industrial proletariat,

for Marx,

and not alien

ated intellectuals or the non-productive lumpenproletariat,

that "embodies the unity of theory and

practice," such that the historical development
and revolutionary potential of this class,
...cannot be treated adequately from the
theoretical side alone, as a question that
some general theoretical or philosophical
scheme might definitively resolve, but must
be viewed also from the side of practice,
taking account of the changes in theory
that may be required by the development
of social life in new f o r m s , and by giving
due importance to empirical investigation
of praxis itself, that is of the socially
and historically situated interconnection
of theory and practice. 129
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In contrast to Marx, Lukas developed a
conception of praxis in which truth was not to be
arrived at by mere resort to the activities of
the working-class, because this class is ’’not p r e 
dominantly revolutionary” in the Marxist sense of
history, rather truth is known through ’’rational
insight and thereby is the work of intellectuals,
130
of Marxist thinkers.”
It was this same anarch
istic "Marxist” who held that all of M a r x ’s social
theories could be banished but Marxian dialectics
131
would survive the onslaught.
G r a m s c i ’s main
point was to banish Marxist sociology and replace
it with a neo-Hegelian/Marxist philosophy which
from time-to-time could employ "social statistics”
132
for illumination.
Marcuse, and the Frankfort
School of critical philosophy,

In association with

the left existentialism of Sartre, extended the
idea of the critical thinker as the fashioner of
133
and judge of the "irrationality of existing society' i
and constructed a philosophy of praxis based on
134
individual spontaneity,
which is in fact anarch
ist in pedigree

(though the "early” Marx himself

opened up dialectics to the potential of transcen
ding orthodox M a r x i s m ) .
New Left radical criminology,
from the lumpenproletariat

springing ^

(i.e., black revolu
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tionaries of the sixties) and not the working
classes,

specially not the false working class

of Quinney (i.e.,

the elite managers of m u l t i 

nationals) , and from the minds of alienated intel
lectuals , necessarily conceives of praxis in terms
decidedly different than Marx.

For example, Quinney

in his confused notion of what constitutes the
135
working class, goes well beyond the "positivistic"
proletariat based praxis by his opposition to
the liberal policy sciences which "provide a social
136
engineering model of change"
; but Quinney says
nothing of the present social engineering features
137
of socialist criminology as in say East Germany.
Yet, again Quinney in his confusion apparently
wants a socialist praxis which is sometimes

(but

other times not) aimed at state-socialism which
to date,

like the capitalist state, has only forced

its dominion, over nature^ general .humanity, and
particularly the working c l a s s .
Therefore,

the third essential feature

of an anarchist criminology is that its praxis should
be decided by individuals in isolation or in groups,
and thus the praxis should be voluntary or spontan
eous and not contrived by resort to the specious
interests of particular classes in society.

With

this in mind segments of anarchistic criminology
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may voluntarily decide to push exclusively for
libertarian interests of certain classes in p r e s 
ent capitalist society or no class interests at
all.

In a new society anarchist criminology would

cease to exist from want of a subject field of
study.

Extending Quinney somewhat,

"to move beyond
138
criminal justice is to move beyond"
(both capi
talism and authoritarian socialism), by right now

employing the kind of social praxis which allows
for such a utopian and idealist move.
IV.

Roraanticization of the Lumpenproletariat
It occurs to this author that the orthodox

Marxist criticism of the lumpenproletariat as "the
dangerous class" can be as well applied to the w o r 
king and capitalists classes.

For example,

to the

ethnic minority lumpenproletariat imprisoned in
America*s ghettoes,

the white working-class police

represents an immediate danger to Black political
139
liberty.
Obviously the capitalist class has a
dangerousness about it that threatens the criminal
140
destruction of the entire planet.
As the least
powerful and dangerous of all classes in society,
orthodox Marxism*s contempt for this class borders
on "scientific" insanity.

It is for this over

arching reason that a truly anarchist criminology
would do well to extend the now hesitant romantic
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association of radical criminology to lumpen
141
elements in society.
Above it was ftnoted that anarchist crim-

^ inology

is not mandated to necessarily engage in

a class analysis.

V credibility

Here it is suggested that moral

would rationally persuade anarchist

criminologists to do so.

Besides an obvious rele

vance to normal criminological interest,

the lumpen-

i/class is the most rejected and repressed class in
American society.

The prisons and jails of America

are full of the members of this class as.are the
racially isolated urban and rural slums.

Moreover,

the accelerated incidence of crime among non-minority
sectors has served to enlarge the contemporary ranks
142
of this class.
The social unorthodpxy and dev
iancy of counter-cultural groups, can be the radicalized
sectors of labor,

feminist, homosexual and other

counter-cultural groups expected to enlarge this
143
class even more.
Capitalist state repression
!/
is, via the criminal justice apparatus, primarily
focused on the social elimination of this c l a s s .
Internationally,

the U. S . is continuing its expor

tation of repressive techniques to "authoritarian
regimes a b r o a d"; these techniques are right now
being used to subdue and demoralize lumpen-elements
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in their struggles for national liberation.
^It

is not economic reductionism but human morality

and decency that ought to fire the anarchist imag
ination to aggressively advocate the lumpen cause.
Thus anarchist criminology must in no way
r 'j

be sensitive to conventional criminological and Marxist
criticisms of its romanticism.

In a positive sense

romanticism denotes the imaginative,

emotive and

visionary exaltation of freedom for the common per145
son,
the downtrodden, or the "wretched of the
earth" as the unorthodox Marxist theoretician Franz
Fanon phrased.it.

Even to view the lumpenproletar

iat as heroic is not an act of New Left immaturity
but rather a strategic device in ideological polem
ics.

In this regard one wonders

(knowingly) why,

when the liberals exalt the utilitarian and instru
mentalist values of the bourgoisie or when orthodox
Marxism exalts the manifest destiny of the prole
tariat,

these exaltations are considered as the

zenith of "realism." Yet when anarchists engage
in the same process it is villified as romanticism.
Rejecting this criticism the fourth essential fea
ture of an anarchist criminology would be its delib
erate romanticization of the lumpenproletariat.
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Four Questions Concerning Ultimate Human Realities.An Anarchist Criminological Response
Though a general idea of the praxis of anarchist
criminology has been derived from the immediate discussion
one feels obligated to explore this question in more depth.
On the way to concluding this chapter the four ultimate ques
tions about human realities set forth in the introduction
to this thesis can now be of assistance in a final delineation
of the horizons between an orthodox Marxist and anarchist
approach to a new crime free society.
^^•

What is the Most Rational Approach to a
Crime Free Society, Given the Human Tendency
Toward Dominance and Power Over Others?
From what has been shown herein, one of

the strengths of secular anarchism is that its r a t 
ional humanism holds nature and humanity in high
regard.

To anarchism the domination of nature is

the prerequisite for the domination of man and woman.
It is not that anarchism is not concerned with the
using of nature for constructive human purposes but
instead it posits an

ecologically

(e.g., Bookchin)

balanced view of humanity's interrelatedness to
nature, unlike advanced capitalism and existing soc
ialism.

Anarchist theory is in accord with the evi

dences of ethology, palelontology and anthropology
in their respective conclusions that human-kind are
not innately given to intra-species

dominance;
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destructive aggression; predation; or hierarch146
ially institutionalized warfare.
The human
tendency toward dominance over others is a social

convention, just as much as is the same tendency
to destroy nature guides most m o d e m

societies

rather than preservation and orthodox balance.

"VGiven the innateness of cooperation and mutual-aid
in human affairs it cannot be maintained,
the custom of authentic Marxism,

as is

that economic

scarcity sets the stage for class struggle in
primitive communistic society and thus all history
147
is more or less class struggle.
The most rational approach to a crime
free society would have to be based on the premises
/
148
of life-affirming values,
and thus a social
praxis which, prior to the completed revolution,
"renounces methods of punishing, hating or killing
149
any fellow human being."
The most rational
criminology would conform with most of Miller's
extreme left positions outlined in Chapter II of
this thesis.

The exceptions to conformity with

Miller left idealizations would revolve around the
issue of violence vs. non-violence.

An imminently

rational criminology may not include the sanction
of armed revolution,

"elimination of members of the
150
oppressor police force,"
or the theoretical just*
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ification of common criminal brutality and coer
cion no matter how ideologically understandable
such criminality may be.

Yet the most reasonable

approach must not hold the lumpenproletariat in
historic and everyday contempt as does authentic
Marxism.

Again this approach must not particular-

! ize crime as the activity of only the ruling classes
in society, rather it should view crime as a m a n i 
festation (sometimes destructive,
structive) general to all classes.
^

often times con
Finally,

the

most reasonable approach should not wed itself n to
151
a perspective of economic oppression solely,”
but instead perceive of dominance and the exercise
of superior power in social organization as nonessential and non-innate phenomena which can be
changed (change is not necessarily inevitable as
in orthodox Marxism)

if the "will to power” is

supplanted by the "will to justice" in human affairs.
In sum, a rational criminology must employ a new
kind of revolutionary praxis if it is to realize
its ends.
II.

Can Individual and Social Alienation, the
Basic Foundations for the Existence of
Crime Ever be Overcome?
Quinney,

as does Taylor et a l , has consid

ered that the course of capitalist development sig-
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nifies an increased occurence of alienation which,
in consequence, gives rise to various psycho-social
152
disorders including the bulk of criminal activity.
Crime is one result of or a social reaction to the
alienating conditions of capitalist production.
An overcoming of alientation heralds the simultan
eous overcoming of crime, hence radical criminology's
advocacy of socialism to replace capitalist modes
of production:

"a Marxist analysis of c r i m e ... assumes

that there is a social order in which crime is not
153
inevitable."
However, contradicting the idea
of crime's non-evitability, Quinney inconsistently
views both the transition to socialism and later
to communism as not the culmination of alienation
or crime because "the transformation of human nature
154
and social order never ceases."
Here one may
inquire that if alienation,

and in turn crime,

may never cease even under communism, why should
radical criminology advocate a new socialist arrange
ment of society in the first place?

If even commu

nism holds "the danger of retrogression to capital155
ist relations,"
what is the ultimate reason for
assuming that a new social order can be crime free.
Unlike Marx,

Quinney,

confusedly and contradicting

himself grossly, apparently does not see the post
socialist transition to communism as one in which
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the question of social estrangement (the ground
for crime's existence) will finally be resolved.
On the other hand neither he or other unorthodox
Marxist criminologists show an awareness of alien
ation and crime as antecedent to capitalism because
to "...understand crime we must understand the
development of the political-economy of capitalist
156
society"
; as if capitalist society invented
alienation and c r i m e .
In the libertarian works of the "early"
Marx,

as in those of Hegel and the classical anarch

ists,

the concept of alienation is philosophically
157
the disjunction between existence and essence,
or the awareness that the actual state of human
existence is not what it ought to be for humanity
lives estranged from its essential nature.

The

reasons for this state of ontological separation
may vary, but most left radicals believe that human
ity's existence can be reconciled with its essence.
This belief in eventual reconciliation may be des
cribed as prophetic hope.

In prophetic Marxism

the origin of alienation is found in the primitive
division of labor and the emergence of private
^ property.

Rather than labor being an expression

of the labourer's creativity,

labor and its p r o d 

ucts develop, especially under capitalism, an
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existence which came to be alien from the lab
ourer.

Not only does this labor, now appropriated

by the capitalist in his or her greed to control
surplus value,
labourer,

come to separate itself from the

it assumes a dominance over the lab

ourer rendering the labourer a slave to his or
^ her labor.

Moreover,

the labourer becomes alien

ated from other labourers and finally alienated
from his or her essential self.
Since Marx defined alienation as concretely
connected with economic interaction,

to overcome

such alienation meant to advocate communism as
"the definitive resolution of the antagonism between
man and nature and between man and man.

It is the

true solution of the conflict between existence
158
and essence."
Thus to Marx, in contrast to
^

Quinney's confusion and contradiction,

alienation

can be overcome in the final transition to communism.
Further, Marx understood that alienation and its
"false-consciousness" pre-dated capitalism and
he maintained that the division of labor (which
socialism does not negate and which can happen
under any economic arrangement) has as much bearing
on the presence of alienation as does the institution
159
of private property.
Finally, ultimate disalien^ ation for Marx is located in the abolition of labor,
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l/the wage-system and money,

these to be replaced

by freely willed (voluntary creative activity)
where an i n d i v i d u a l s labor becomes akin to what

160
anarchists have termed art and/or play.

J

If the Marxian prophecy of alienation’s
demise under communism resembles the anarchist
position it is because Marx and the anarcho-commu
nists share the same utopian perception of communism.
Both view communism as the ideal arena where the
potential for human perfectability and freedom can
be realized.

Anarchism in its guise of, what Bakunin

called, revolutionary socialism or Lenin refered
to as left-wing communism necessarily shares the
^

Marxian prophecy of a new social order liberated
from alienation.
that Marxism,

However,

it must be remembered

as a prophetic or utopianist system,

because of Marx's own denial,

is not to be understood

in the same light as scientific socialism;

the former

being heretodox and the latter orthodox Marxism.
Therefore, notwithstanding Quinney's con
fusion, radical criminology by following unortho\A/

dox Marxism is anarchistic with respect to its
vision of transcending alienation the basic founda
tion for the existence of crime.
III.

Are Injustice and Inequality,

in the Forms
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of Class Antagonisms, Racism,

Sexism or

Plain-Old Socially Differentiated Political
Domination Essential or Unnecessary Features
of Human Existence?
From the immediately above it has been
suggested that:

1) alienation is a non-essential

rather than an inherent feature of human existence,
2)

alienation has its origin in economic factors

and 3) alienation understood as dominated labour
can be overcome by the abolition of labor which r e 
sults from the establishment of communism.

Radical

criminology presently assents to this prophetic
Marxian view with the addition that crime, as a pro
duct of alienated class interaction,

can also be

overcome by the transition to communism.

Neverthe

less alienation understood only as a class related
phenomena remains problematic.

To restrict alien

ation to class antagonisms is to exclude other kinds
of injustices and inequalities which result from
differing forms of alienation.

Such restriction

implies that these other forms of alienation such
as racism,

sexism and political domination will

somehow disappear along with class divisions just
because of a change in economic arrangements from
161
private to social property.
While racism,

sexism and political domin-
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ation are,

like class antagonisms, non-essential

characteristics of social intercourse (i.e., they
can be overcome by a change in social relations
as envisioned in communism) an anarchist approach
to criminology would hold that without a strict
attention to their specific elimination crime and
deviancy will remain.

The eradication of these

forms of alienation requires a commitment to revol
utionary transformation at least comparable to,
if not greater than the commitment to overcome
economic exploitation.

An anarchist criminology

j~would agree with Herman and Julie Schwendinger in
their suggestion that radical criminology should
proceed on the basis of " m o d e m libertarian stanit

dards" and define crime in terms of the abrogation
of human rights which include, not only economic
inequality, but racism,

sexism,

imperialism among

other great social injuries inflicted on heretofore
162
powerless people."
A.

Racism
That racism,

in the sense of white domin

ation of blacks, was originally "generated by cap163
italism,"
or was first caused by a fifteenth
century European psychological reaction to biblical
164
color imagery"
are the viewpoints of Marxism
and liberalism respectively.

Both viewpoints are

224

historically inaccurate.

European racism may

have developed along with capitalist expansion
in the fifteenth century and it may have had
a theological mystification but the ideology of
white supremacy is much older than its late
European version. Even earlier than the white
Islamic invasion of black Africa (Makuria) in
165
643 A.D. ,
white Semitic hordes from the West
Orient began to migrate,

settle,

inter-marry

with and eventually dominate black Africa (parts
of the present Sudan, Ethiopia,

and Egypt) as

early as 2000 B.C., or some nine hundred years
after the ’’Golden A g e ” of black civilization begun

^166
by "the Ethiopian leader, Menes in 3100 B.C.
Thus the ideology of racial supremacy preceeded
"biblical color imagery" and was obviously prior
to the rise of European capitalism;

indeed black

Egyptian racism, according to African historian
Cheikh-Anta Diop, set the stage for Hebrew slavery
which in turn gave rise to the development of
the Hebrew Bible's negative racial assessment of
167
blacks.
Certainly the Marxian view of racism as
epiphenomenally related to class exploitation
"points a sure finger at one of the factors involved
in prejudice, viz, rationalized self-interest of
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the capitalist class.”

However, American r a c 

ism has historically been more a matter

of irrat

ional tendencies toward racial and cultural super
i o r i t y than it has economic self-interestedness.
For example,

"slavery was not exclusively an econ

omic institution,” rather it was an institution
that meant a whole way of life for the aristocratic
(not capitalist or bourgeois)

Southern ruling elite;

even when it became apparent that economic progress
meant a transformation from slaveocracy to capital169
ism.
Nor is the racism of today an "integral part
170
of capitalism” (as Quinney erringly suggests)
for the advances in the technology of late capital
ism threaten blacks, not with economic exploitation,
but more desperately, with social annihilation if
the thesis of the unorthodox Marxist economist
171
Sidney Willhelm has any validity.
Moreover,
^

the Marxian view of racism seemingly absolves the
white-working class of racism while putting the blame
on white capitalists; yet white working class atti
tudes of racial superiority result from the reali
zation that blacks of all classes occupy a lower
172
social status.
Finally, it is this same white
proletariat that acts as defenders of racial super
iority by virtue of its role as policepersons, guards
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and enforcers of contemporary racism.
B.

Sexism
Sexual injustices and stratification are

^ r e l a t e d to the sexual division of labor (sexual
inequality),

and like racial antagonisms,

did not

begin with capitalist relations of production. On

/

the contrary,

the bio-social concept of male suprem

acy or patriarchy preceeded private property arrange
ments and evolved through primitive,

slave and

feudal economic organization and is even now pre173
dominate in socialist societies.
Yet the labour
division of the sexes did not lead directly to patriarchial domination for matriarchy in the form of
the maternal clan preceeded the father-family;
"women then were not simply the procreators of new
life,

the biological m o t h e r s ; they were the prime

producers of the necessities of life, the "social
174
m o t h e r s ."
From this awareness Marx's notion that econ
omic production is "the driving force of history"
must take on the addition of sexual interaction as
a comparable if not greater driving force.

Thus

radical criminology ought to view liberation from
alienating sexual activity as at least equally
important for a revolution aimed at the establish
ment of communism.

Communism could then be defined
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as not only the utopian arena where labour is
abolished, but more a society where inter-racial
comradeship and a liberated eros serve as replace-

173ments for sexual repression.
C.

Political Domination
Quinney restricts the concept of political

domination to mean class animosities under capital
ism.

The capitalist class, by influencing the state's

crime control apparatus,
domination.

Whereas,

commits crimes of political

the working class,

"in the

realization of the alienation suffered under capi
talism" either accomodates itself to capitalist
domination or engages in criminal (political) resis176
tance against such domination.
Thus in his
scheme Quinney interprets political activity and
crime as being determined by the course of econ
omic exploitation in capitalist society.
In assessing Quinney's position on polit
ical domination one cannot deny that capitalism
(or any other form of economic exploitation) has
a dehumanizing or alienating effect on the lesspowerful classes in society, although with the
prophetic Marx capitalist relations also dehuman
ize the more powerful capitalist class as well.
Nor can one reason that there is no interdependence
between economics and p o l i t i c s .

Thus one could
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have agreed with Quinney if his scheme proposed
crime as sometimes an economic and sometimes a
political reaction by all classes to the alienation
produced by either political or economic domination
on the part of some ruling segment(s)

in society:

economic power and political power m a y interact,
sometimes in a manner difficult of distinction.
However,

an interdependence of economics and poli

tics is not Quinney's proposal.

What he proposes

is a conception of political dominance which is
linearly dependent upon economic dominance and it
is here that his scheme must be rejected by an
anarchistic model of criminology.
The rejection is concerned that Quinney
confusedly views politics as but an appendage of
economics when the reverse is more nearly the case,
even though as political scientist Robert Dahl notes
in ordinary conversation "the distinction between
177
the two concepts is often blurred."
Though comp
limentary as "arts necessary to efficient human act178
tion"
politics in theory and praxis always preceeds

(logically and temporally) economic activity.

The subjective or objective decision to act with
or against the desires,

interests or needs

(these

can be singularities or combinations of ecological,
economic,

artistic, military, psychological,

sexual
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or spiritual interests)

of others is first and

fundamentally a political decision with political
consequences if actually carried through.

Decis

ion-making and the power to act are thus not lim
ited to naked economic expression,

although they

can be, and will often exhibit levels of economic
179
motivation among other kinds of m o t i v a t i o n s .
On this basis the decision to act in crim
inal or deviant manner should be interpreted first
as a political reaction to the political dominance
such as found in the administrations, rules,

sanct

ions, proscriptions and brute force embodied in
corporate liberalism*s "rule of law"or in state
communism*s "dictatorship of the proletariat." In
this view lumpenproletariat crime is political since
it is first a response to political dominance and
only economic when it becomes conscious of economic
alienation as produced by ruling segments of any
given society.

The person(s) of any class who

become involved in criminal infractions first decides
to and actually does act against a set of political
sanctions created by the state.

The ends of such

an act may be economic (theft), sexual (rape) or
even political

(espionage) but the decision and

action is first political and arouses political
consequences as determined by the state which in
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turn m a y be concerned with the securing of not
only economic interests but others as well.
Whatever interests the state determines as in
jeopardy,

the action of the state is aimed at the

denial of the political liberty of those involved
in criminal activity.

The denial m a y entail econ

omic deprivation, physical abuse, psychological
repression,

status change and death, or it may be

nothing more than police harrassment,
fine or censorship.

an economic

These possible state actions

against the criminal and deviant are a priori pol
itical and ought not be restrively construed as
necessitated by economic exploitation.
Furthermore,

though criminal action and

state reaction are relational

in the sense that

all political action is a correspondence between
entities A and B

the relation is one of inher

ent inequality and coercion.

The criminal is sub

ordinated to the superordinate political dominance
of coercive state power even though most criminal
action is not coercive.

State action by virtue

of its coercive nature exhibits the most alienating
kind of dominating power
ence

coercion and influ

was fatal, as it is now to economic elites

in parts of Africa and South America who find,
often to their destruction,

that they may not
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determine the actions of military regimes who
hold state coercive power.
Thus the simple Marxian view that econom
ics determines politics is misleading.

As C. Wright

Mills has explained "such a simple view of economic
determinism must be elaborated by political determ
inism and military determinism;

that the higher

agents of each of these three domains now often
have a noticeable degree of autonomy;

and that only

in the often intricate ways of coalition do they
make up and carry through the most important decis180
i o n s .n
IV.

The "Withering Away of the State"
Normally the commentators on the subject

have assumed that the greatest distinction between
anarchism and orthodox Marxism revolves around Engel's
concept of the gradual elimination of or the "with
ering away of the state."

According to Lenin its

not the state itself but the kind of state that is
in debate he suggests:
Marxism differs from anarchism in that it
recognized the need for a state for the purpose
of the transition to socialism but not a state
of the type of the usual parliamentary bourgeoisdemocratic republic but a state like the Paris
Commune of 1871 and the Soviets of Workers
Deputies of 1905 and 1917. 181
But subsequent history and Marxist-Leninism,
"plus Stalinism" have shown that the anarchist crit-
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icism of the state was well founded.

As Bakunin

predicted a modern "workers” state

that con

solidates all power in the name of the people
182
would be as evil as the capitalist state."
Even Lenin's comparison of the Paris Commune with
a hypothetical state was erroneous because the
Commune never established itself as a state, but
rather as an economic cooperative; moreover,

the

government of France at that time did not accept
183
its status as a sovereign entity into itself.
Above it was asserted that political dom
ination is prior to economic influence.

Here the

author asserts that political domination is more
entrenched although the m o d e m

state and its crim

inal justice apparatus can be overcome by a total
^ cultural revolution using the cooperative model
of anarcho-communism (Kropotkin) rather than the
conflict model of anarcho-syndicalism (Proudhon)
and traditional Marxism.

The assertion is based

on the fundamental awareness that planetary sur
vival is at stake and not merely the survival of
the oppressed.

We are at a period in human evolu

tion where the wrong set of moves by either the
oppressing or oppressed classes of the earth can
end in sure human and maybe even biological destruc
tion .
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First it must be understood that the
state and thus its formal juridical relations
are relatively recent developments in European
184
history.
Thus the state is not a necessary
feature for human survival.

Secondly, utopian

proposals for new communities and life-styles sat
urate the literature and the most promising of
these need to be acted upon.

Thirdly,

some sort

of technological reversal is in order if humanity
is to reassume power over itself.
Fourthly, an
185
economic theory of "enough"
in contrast to the
political-economies of capitalism and orthodox soc
ialism is in order.

Quinney's suggestion of popular

justice ought to be acted upon as long as it is
modified by the deliberate anarcho-communist idea
that disallows coercive punishment in any form.
Lastly utilitarianism,

instrumentalist and elitist

social values should be countered with the idea
of mutual-aid.
Only if, we as a species begin now to
move, as some of us are, toward these kinds of
ends can humanity have a possibility for survival.
It is in this spirit of hope against hope that the
main part of the thesis closes.
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EPILOGUE: CHRISTIAN ANARCHISM IN
RELATION TO RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY
This concluding section of the thesis proposes a
unique argument.

It is concerned to show that much of American

radical criminology is, in reality, an unconscious secular
statement of Christian anarchist political theology.

The

argument is based on two major assumptions that will be ex
plored in detail.

First it will be shown that the centuries

old Christian libertarian ideal of a "world without law"
has had a profound influence on left-wing social thinking
in general and it now informs the work of leading American
radical criminolpgists the exploration will show how the
libertarian ideal in Christianity originated and developed
up until the movement toward modern secularization began
in the Enlightenment.
Second the argument assumes, on good authority,
that some portion of the American social sciences, specific
ally sociology and criminology, have historically promoted
rational humanism or "the religion of humanity" as the secular
equivalent for the "transcendent" insights of theology.

It

shall be argued that this secular "religion of humanity"
has its own orthodox and heterodox divisions over dogma
and authority;

these divisions are also politically disting

uishable as left vs. right ideological manifestations.
Conventional criminology can be seen as synonomous with
right-wing humanist orthodoxy, while radical criminology
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would be synonomous with left wing humanist heterodoxy,
Radical feminist theologian Rosemary R. Reuther,
in her notice that theologians are now becoming the general
ist par excellence by investigating the whole range of the
human sciences in order to "address the human situation in
its existence

*up 'til now'," has offered the following

insight as to the paradox of secularization in the social
sciences that today seems to be as "religious" as traditional
theology was yesterday:
If the "sacral," as an interpretation of the
sphere of theology, abstracted the transcendent
horizon of human life into a special "religious"
world where it lost its real human context, so
the "secular" was merely the reverse of this one
sidedness, in the removal of a transcendent dimen
sion of human life and the reduction of life to
the purely imminent and one-dimensional... today
we find a criticism of this secularist viewpoint
among those who reflect on a variety of human
activities.
With the formation of an avante garde
in various fields; i.e., "radical historians,
"radical sociologists," "radical psychiatrists,"
"radical educators," "radical economists," and
even "radical technologists," we are beginning
to see the sciences of all human activities
starting to recover a sense of their own trans
cendent horizon and the need to pose prophetic
and iconoclastic questions about the normative
status of the status quo.
Theology today then
integrates itself with this transcendent and
prophetic horizon of all the sciences a n d modes
of reflection upon human existence. 1
A Conventional Criticism of the Religious Dimension
of Radical Criminology
Earlier this year conventional criminologist Carl B.
Klocars, writing in the staid journal Criminology criticized
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American radical criminology (as represented in the works
of Chambliss, Quinney, Platt and the Schwendingers)

for

having the "character of religious prophesy" and as such

2
illegitimate as an academic endeavor.

The grounds for

radical criminology1s dismissal as religious prophecy had
to do with what Klocars determined to be radical theory's
"untrustworthiness" in comparing its conclusions to the act
ual conditions of crime in extant socialist societies;

its

monotonous habit of attributing all manner of crime to the
organization of capitalist society; its scholarly irrespon
sibility in taking leaps of faith where the evidence suggests
(at least to Klocars) a "liberally pragmatic" attitude to
theory construction;

the elevation of Marx to the status of

sainthood; passionately moralizing from "moral grounds" far
removed from extant social reality; having the audacity to
attempt the conversion of academic "nonbelievers" who, being
"disenchanted" are free from the realm of religious illusion.
The present author is inclined to agree with Klokar's
criticism of radical criminology, especially since in Chapter
IV above it was asserted that radical criminology is a heresy
in relation to Marxist orthodoxy and that radical theory
relies instead on secular anarchist formulations that incor
porate an attitude that can best be described as religious
and thus prophetic.
Toward a Positive Assessment of Radical Criminology's
Religious Dimension
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Here the objective is to offer,

in contrast to

Klocar's negative criticism, a positive and detailed exam
ination of the religious facet of radical criminology from
the standpoint of a political theology of Christian anarch
ism.

In marking out the terrain for such an examination

the author is not unmindful of three difficulties;

1) the

unpopular and minority status of religious thinking in secu
lar institutions such as American academia,

2) the tendency

of some theologians and religionists to proselytize such
"nonbelievers" as Klocars,

to the nonbelievers chagrin,

3) the like tendency of the religiously inclined to ration
alize the professed atheism or agnoticism of revolutionary
theorists like say Marx or Bakunin, into the category of
3
"anonymous Christianity";
i.e., the athiest theorist was
an unidentified or anonymous Christian after all.

To diffi

culties two and three the author will shy away from, not
because of a lack of wanting to convert, but because that
is not presently the purpose at hand.
Specifically what will be examined is the concretely
religious facet of secular anarchism in radical criminological
theory.

The examination's purpose is to first explain how

this religious facet originated and developed, mainly from
heterodox Christian anarchist traditions,

and then was trans

formed almost in toto to the secular political theory of
anarchism.

Second,

the examination will offer a sympathetic

apology (e.g., defense)

for the religious dimension in
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radical criminology.

Third,

the author will attempt to

uncover the religious dimension in conventional criminology
in order to lay the religio-philosophical ground for a
dialogue and possible reconciliation between radical and
conventional versions of criminology.
Lack of Historical and Theological Inquiry into
the Nature of Christian Anarchism
Anarchist tendencies within Christianity have received
little attention from either religious historians or theolog4
ians.
Even left-political and liberationist theologians
in their reviews of historical Christianity have often left
anarchist ;
t endencies undistinguished from other kinds of left
5
Christian radicalism.
Understandingly most secular anarch
ists, as atheists, were/are probably loathe to describe their
theories as having been derived,

in large measure,

from theis-

tic insights developed in the two thousand year history of
Christian anarchism.

Yet in their own secular religiousness

secular anarchists have been the equals of Christian anarchists,
such that one can only surmise that the ultimate separation
of secular anarchism from Christian anarchism revolves around
the question of: who will be God, humanity or the supernat
ural Christian diety?

Christian anarchism's historic strug

gle with a more potent Christian orthodoxy may also have
served to steer revolutionary social thinkers

(concerned as

these thinkers were/are with social issues that transcend
in-house religious squabbles) away from a critical distinct
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ion of the two variants of Christianity.

Finally,

for

their part acknowledged nineteenth century Christian anarch
ist theorists auch as Leo Tolstoy and the Americans William
Ellery Channing, William Lloyd Garrison and Adin Ballou
seem to have failed to properly assess historical church
documents that were uniquely anarchist in nature.
The lack of historical and/or theological inquiry
into the roots and subject matter of Christian anarchism has
had the net effect of rupturing the intellectual continuity
of a stream of anarchist thought that first emerged in the
Sayings of Jesus and gospel of grace of New Testament apocal
ypticism.

From this starting point a left-wing Christian

frame of reference applied radical thinking to the Pauline
6
Episteles;
suffered untold persecution and martyrdom at the
hands of Roman power; appeared in the Patristic Age in the
7
anarchist polemics of Tertullian and Lactantius; became
variously heterodox, monastic and grotesquely mystical

(lump

en gnosticism) under Constantianian inspired orthodox imper
ialism;

grew revolutionary as the anti-authoritarian heresy
9
of the "Free Spirit" in the twelfth century became a revol10
utionary schism in the Taborite anarcho-communism of 1419;
struggled against the Lutheran Reformation’s new Protestant
orthodoxy and the power of the German Princes,

e.g., the

11
violence of Thomas Munster and nonviolence of other Anabaptists;
was instrumental in the founding of the "peace sects" (e.g.,
12
Quakers, Shakers, Me n n onites, Bretheran and etc.)
and was
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given an Enlightenment form that helped spark the French
Revolution by the priest Jean Meslier in his Testament
13
for oppressed French peasants.
The religious activities of the “peace sects" made
significant contributions to the religious and civil liber
tarian tradition in America.
anarchists

It was the efforts of Christian

(along with those equal efforts of like minded

non-Christian radicals) that contributed to: the ending of
14
15
slavery;
the political emancipation of women;
the non16
17
violent strategies of the labor
and civil rights movements;
18
the recent anti-war movement;
the present anti-nuclear

19
struggle,

and lastly the human rights struggle for the

abolition of prisons and freedom for political prisoners

20
in America
It should be clear,

that far from Klocar's negative

criticism, religious prophecy has been all but an "illustion";
and if radical criminology has an anarchist derived religious
dimension,

that that dimension is not only a "leap of faith"

but a way of actual existence as effective as any other way
of being.
Historical and Thematic Overview of Christian Anarchism
This section explores some major themes in the devel
opment of Christian anarchism.

Its purposes are to compare

the anarchist tendencies in historical Christianity to the
more orthodox expressions of that faith, and by such a compar
ison attempt an assessment of how this heterodox form of
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Christianity m ay hold within itself an explanation for
the presence of a religious dimension in radical criminol
ogy.

The reader is cautioned on

two counts;

first the

present author will be exploring a tendency in leftist
Christian radicalism which few religious historians or
theologians have bothered to distinguish as anarchism;
second, as the exploration develops no claim is being made
that anarchist Christianity is "authentic" in relation to
orthodoxy, nor that anarchist Christianity has never been
repressive, or always been separated out from orthodox
Christianity.
The authoritative sources of support for the argu
ment of this section are varied but consists of information
culled from the recent works of declared Christian-Marxist
theologians, New Left theologians, Jewish and Pan-Africanist
theologians and philologists, feminist theologians,
and occult historians, a Jewish anthropologist,

church

and works

on the history of pacifism and non-violence.
Some of the themes of Christian anarchism,

those

which have in one way or another informed generation after
generation of left-wing Christians, may have originated in
the sayings of Jesus or. the New Testament period and are
as follows:
I.

Ethical Radicalism and Charismatic
I tinerancy:21
This theme is manifested in "ethos of
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homelessness” in the call to disciple-ship
(praxis); the breakup of family relationships
by the abolition of the family; criticism of
wealth and denunciation of private property h o l 
ding .

The charismatic itineracy of early follo

wers of Jesus emerged from their socio-economic
condition of poverty and their eschatological
expectation that the end was near.

Thus only

itinerate preaching about the coming end held
determinative importance in relation to fixed
locations,
•

family and property.

Lumpen Religion of Liberation to the
Oppressed Masses:
This theme is repeatedly emphasized in

Jesus' affirmation of the alienated, poor, infirm,
prisoners and the generally oppressed in "their
22
acceptability before God.”
For these lumpen
elements at the bottom of Palestinian society
"the good news” was the news that their liberation
from socio-economic, political and spiritual
oppression was at hand.

On the other hand to

the rich the good news was that cataclysmic
23
"economic reversal"
was coming and that spirit
ual preparation for such a reversal meant a renun
ciation of property and/or of sharing wealth with
the rejected masses in society.
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III.

Non-Violent Praxis:
Pacifism,

an abhorrence of coercion,

and non-violence as the methods of dealing with
human evil, (I.e., oppressive political power and
social force*), were most often given preference
24
over revolutionary violence
, although revolution
ary violence was frequently justified in later
eras.

Martyrdom and other forms of invited repres

sion and suffering were early exalted as the epitomy
25
of social action against evil
(e.g., a sort of
reversed "propaganda by the deed" where the will
to martyrdom often evoked a comparative will to
violence on the part of oppressors).
IV.

Faith in God's Judgement over Existing
Systems of Punitive Justice:
Closely allied with the prevalence of n o n 

violence as the ground for social praxis was the
26
understanding that "Divine methods of justice"
are to be practiced by the diety not humanity.
Social oppression is to be overcome with acts of
love and goodness even towards one's enemies.

This

did not mean cooperation with or support of social
evil;

it meant to struggle passionately against

evils in the hope of establishing love of others
rather than power over others as the operative prin27
ciple in human intercourse.
It meant that God
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reserves the right to punish for crimes against
humanity, not Christians,

and especially not

Christians attached to existing systems of p u n 
itive justice.

The kind of love advocated was

agape or self-sacrificial and hopefully rederapt28
ive love.
V.

Conception of Law, State Coercion and
Natural R i g h t s :
Because primitive Christian eschatology

interpreted social praxis in terms

of the coming

climax of history and because of the social marginality and alienation of the great masses to
which primitive Christianity was especially aimed
at, the legal claims of Caesar (e.g., the state)
were originally considered at most secondary to
the claims of God.

That is in the final analysis

God must be obeyed rather than man-made positive
29
law.
Such obediance was grounded in the primitive
Christian concern for the freedom of religious con30
science, both as a ''human and natural right"
and
as obligated by a deity which promised end-of-history
justice.

Freedom from legal coercion was desirable

in order for the congregant to be free to worship
and live the Way;

"liberty was a condition for
31
access to and practice of religious truth."
All
attempts at reconciliation through religious agen-
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cies were required before one had a ground for
32
recourse to the state.
Thus an absolute rejection of positive
law and the state did not emerge.

The Sayings

of Jesus did recognize legal processes as strictly
a last resort but not in matters uniquely spir33
itual.
Some institutional presence was admitted
as having validity.

It is against this non-absol

utist understanding that the Pauline apology for
civil government,

subjection to higher powers

and etc., must be reckoned with.

Of course,

Paul

may have had a conception of law much more exten
sive than that which emerged from the Sayings of
Jesus.

Radical theologian Jose Miranda suggested

that "by law Paul understands not only the whole
of law as law but also law as the normative quin
tessence of the entire cultural and social struc
ture which we call human civilization and Paul
34
calls aion or kosmos" .
Accordingly, Paul divided
history into two parts:

the old age of law and

the new (Christian) age of faith, and thereby,
Paul wants a world without law Las the
case in a clear anarchist view: m i n e j .
Exegesis which avoids this fact makes an
understanding of the Pauline message impos
sible.
Neither Kropotkin nor Bakunin nor
Marx nor Engels made assertions against
the law more powerful and subversive than
those which Paul makes. 35
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VI.

Apocalyptic Eschatology:
Here feminist theologian Rosemary Ruether

offers a definition of eschatology to which this
author assents as that radicalism closely corres
ponding to the Sayings Tradition:
The apocalyptic view of redemption is
basically social and outer-directed.
One does
not look inward to the salvation of some p e r 
sonal essence; one looks outwards at history
and society, at injustice, oppression...It is
historical realm that is to be grappled with
and radically reversed... Salvation can only
come when the present situation is totally
overthrown and a new order is founded on oppo
site principles of life...There must be a great
cosmic showdown between God and the powers and
principalities of "this world", an overthrow
once and for all and the creation of a new order
in which God's justice and righteousness will
be vindicated and prevail.
36
One would only add that social struggle
in a non-violent fashion is implicit in this view,
thus social and personal withdrawal and escape from
changing the world is ruled out here.
VII.

Utopian Withdrawal and the Possibility
of a New Order in the Mowl
Left-wing Christianity, when it began to

realize that the revolutionary overthrow of the exis
ting order may have had a heavenly postponement,
turned inward toward metaphysical rather than hist
orical redemption.

It did this by withdrawing from

active social struggle and repaired to the deserts
to build ideal communal alternatives to the evils
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37
manifested in "fallen and antidivine"
and political structures.

social

Obviously, this was

done in actuality after the Sayings Tradition
but it may have been influenced by Qumran or Essenic
38
communism
and/or the acts of Old Testament prophets
like Elijah (e.g., back to the Sinai desert, the source
39
of Is r a e l ’s faith).
Material denial and a p r o 
found mysticism were characteristic traits of this
kind of inward Christian radicalism.

In brief,

then anarchist Christian withdraw was "counter40
cultural"
and, though a negation of the existing
social order, was instrumental in offering out
ideal models of how faith could be immediately
lived if faith was left to its own devices out
of the range of normal social control.
VIII.

Antinomianism Relative to Auth o r i t y ,
and Equality
The Pauline division of history into

law superceeded by faith in God's justice and/or
gift of grace provided left-wing Christianity with
the awareness that law, of whatever variety, is

of

no use or obligation because grace is the only n e c 
essary condition for salvation from evil.

Such

an awareness is properly termed antinomianism and
makes reference to an inward experience of truth,
communicated directly by spirit;

thus experiences
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of truth mediated by agents like priests or
clerics was considered unnecessary and were thus
41
an obstacle in t ruth’s way.
Salvation was by
faith alone.

Outward acts were neutral for sal

vation purposes, because grace was free and uncon
ditional. Therefore the antinomian position p e r 
ceived "that law and salvation have nothing in
42
common;

the law condemns but the gospel saves."

The antinomian position is "a romantic
43
view of Christian life"
in contrast to an ortho
dox Christian realism that theoretically posits
a dialectic between law and faith but ends up
by practically subjecting faith to the sovereignty
of law, in the process cancelling the dialectic.
Ideally antinomianism attached itself to no such
dialectic but remained absolute, being free to
pursue faith wherever it lead.
not necessarily praxis,

Often faith, but

lead antinomianism to the

following:
A.

Antiauthoritarianism
Though there is no necessary cause-effect

relationship that makes Christian anarchism’s gos
pel of grace alone an enemy of authority,

the notions

of antinomianism and antiauthoritarianism do seem
(to this author) to be related throughout left-wing
Christian history.

It may be that direct illumin-
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ation by the spirit can be positively associated
with "a challenging of the final revelation through
Christ, at least as this had become monopolized
44
by the institutional [orthodox: mine; Church/'
Christian orthodoxy, dogma and hierarchy were
attacked as new legalisms which were obstacles
in the path of the reception of free g r a c e .
This anarchist challenging of orthodox
authority in spiritual matters did lead to early
schisms such as the heresy of Montanism, in which
the illumined Montanus thought himself the incarnate
45
"Spirit of Truth" revealed in the Fourth G o s p e l .
One probably result of the Montanist heresy was
that orthodoxy,

around A.D.

150, moved to deprive

the Christian apocalypses of canonical authority,
except for the Book of Revelation and that only
46
because of a mistake as to who its author was.
Christian left-wing history from the primitive
er a — ---up through the Patristic Age, Medieval
Era, the Reformation, Enlightenment, right up to
and including the Puritan seige of America (e.g.,
the antinomian heresy,

1636-1638,

that pitted the

libertine Anne Hutchinson against the orthodox
legalist John Cotton)------ exhibits heterodox
movements that prominently featured a struggle
against not only the authority of Christian ortho-
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doxy but also that of the state and its l a w s .
B.

Egalitarianism:
47
The Sayings of Jesus and Greek Stoicism

coupled with the gospel of free grace lent leftwing Christianity its ’’class reading” of the
message for the new age.

Grace was for the dis

possessed many, not merely a propertied few.

Grace

was for all who hungered and thirsted for knowledge;
thus wealth and social class often acted to keep
such an appetite from developing.

Hence, Christian

anarchism initially developed an attention to the
libertarian aspirations of the powerless classes,
although ruling classes were invited to come join
and reverse themselves economically by being spir48
itually reborn.
Comparatively the "interclass49
ism”
that serves as a theoretical principle of
orthodoxy has often practically identified itself
with the wealth, power and appetite of ruling
classes.

Especially since the merger of church

and state power under Constantine, orthodoxy (even
in the more modern period of disestablishment) has
remained closely allied with the ruling elements
50
in society.
In contrast, radical religious egal
itarianism, premised on a pre-existent perfect
State of Nature mythology,

is well illustrated

below in a sermon delivered during the English
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Peasant Revolt of 1381:
And if we are all descended f rom.. .Adam
and Eve, how can the lords say or prove
that they are more lords than we are - save
that they make us dig and till the ground
so that they can squander what we produce?
...They have beautiful residences and manors,
while we have the trouble and the work,
always in the fields under rain and snow.
But it is from us and our labor that everything
comes with which they maintain their pomp.
Good folk, things cannot go well in
England nor ever shall until all things are
in common and their is neither villain nor
noble, but all of us are of one condition.?*IX.

Anti-Semitism, Orthodox Imperialism
and Heterodox Libertarianism
Orthodox Christian doctrine promulgated

by the Church Universal and subsequently reaffirmed
by various Protestant movements h a s , since the
Constantinian establishment of the state church
in been mainly intolerable toward religious differ
ences both externally and internally.
As to external intolerance, Christian
anti-Semitism did not begin in New Testament period
52
as is often assumed.
On the contrary, primitive
Christianity was an apocalyptic and unorthodox
Judiac sect composed initially of Palestinian Jews
53
known as Naz a renes.
As a Jewish sect early Christianity
enjoyed the privileges and obligations of Jewish law.
Jewish law during this early period made no distinc
tion between religious,

social or political rights
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and obligations.

Relationships among the

Nazarenes and other Jewish sects were on balance
quite amiable until, according to Jewish hist
orian Solomon Grayzel,

three developments h a p 

pened that may have been instrumental in the
later emergence of Christian anti-Semitism:

1)

Hellenist Jews from diaspora began to outnumber
Palestinian Jews as adherents to the Nazarene
understanding of Judiasm, 2) Hellenist Jews being
for the most part more financially secure, urban
and more educated than their Palestinian counter
parts behaved arrogantly and insulting with respect
to Temple custom and ritual and were viciously
forced out of Jerusalem by orthodox elements within
the Temple leadership; one notes here the tradition
of Stephen and his stoning,

3) Paul, himself a

Hellenist Jew, advocated an extremely extended
view of the Nazarene understanding of Judiasm,
wherein Palestinian Jews were to observe Judiac
laws plus Nazarene-Christian ideals and where,
contrast, non-Palestinian Jews

in

(now deprived of

the legal right to Temple relations) were only
to observe Nazarene-Christian ideals such as bapt55
ism, love of one another and etc.
This Pauline bifurcation of the Jewish
Christians was, upon a positive interpretation,
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not anti-Palestinian Christian Jewry, although
his criticisms and ideological struggles with
orthodox Judiasm may be classified as an excellent
example of the tradition of rabbinic criticism
56
and imaginative exegesis.
The bifurcation was
pro-Palestinian Christian Jewry because Paul used
money and supplies secured from upper-class Hellenist
Jewish-Christians to organize a "poverty program"
57
for Jewish-Christians in Palestine.
The bifur
cation was positively strategic also in the sense
that the Christian freedom from Jewish law enjoyed
by Hellenist Jews was parlayed into an inticement
that could attract pagans who admired Judiasm but
were loathe to observe strict Jewish law.
Probably against the original intent of
the Pauline bifurcation,

the vast increase of

pagan-Christians brought on a movement toward
an outright Christian heresy in relation to ortho
dox Judiansm that culminated in an event which
pressed the "exclusion of all Christians from Jewish
58
life in general."
The event was the Bar Kochba
Revolt in the period AD 132-135.

Jewish-Christians

conspired with Roman power in crushing the revol
ution and the banning of all Christians was the
’result.

However,

from the early days of primitive

Christianity up to this schismatic event Christian
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idealism had been primarily informed by two diver
gent streams of consciousness.
First Jewish Wisdom59
based morality
and an apocalypticism not r a d i 
cally different from the morality and apocalypti
cism of other sects of Judiasm.

Secondly, Greek

Stoicism, Neo-Platonist rationalism and Gnostic
mysticism,

all three of these Hellenist thought

patterns being radically distinct from Palestinian
Jewish mentality (though Hellenist Jews obviously
incorporated both, as the Sybilline Books revealed
60
this may be due to the influence of P h i l o ) .
The
class and political basis of both streams of con
sciousness were respectively lumpen-revolutionary,
61
and bourgiosie/status-quo;
although in subsequent
Christian history the streams tended to merge and
part again in an uneven and erratic m a n n e r .

By

the time of Constantine a profoundly Hellenist
Christianity had emerged as the orthodoxy in com
parison to a Jewish derived apocalyptism, and in
its official imperial establishment became that
orthodox Church Universal among whose first official
acts was to initiate a deliberate policy of antiSemitism,

i.e.,

"everything possible was to be

done to bring about the humiliation,
62
destruction of Judiasm."

if not the
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Moreover, Hellenist Christian imperial
ism, having already deprived apoclyptic writing
of its canonical authority (A.D. 150), now moved
beyond its policy of anti-Semitism toward orthodox
Judiasm and consolidated its position against a
still formidable Judiac-Christian apocalyptism.
In this struggle of a relatively poor and apocalypitic "Church of Martyrs" against a wealthy and
rationalist "Church of Bishops" the apocalyptic
stream became heterodx/dissenting and struggled
for left-wing religious libertarianism in a relig
ious environment soon to be almost completely
imprisoned by right-wing orthodoxy.

The left-wing

stream, was allowed to continue but in a signifi
cantly different form and was even elevated as the
63
"highest of Christian goals"
(outside the goals
of real power, wealth and s t a tus).

The new form

for left-wing radicalism was medieval monasticism
and ascetisism as the prophetic way of life;

it was

in this form that prophetic Christianity would b a s 
ically remain until the "newly awakened" mass con
sciousness of the eleventh century began gathering
to here the gospel of grace from itinerant lay

64
preachers rather than officially authorized priests.
The first grand result of the new lay consciousness
was the series of left-wing Anabaptist Revolts and
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only later the more orthodox Lutheran Reformation,
from there the m o d e m
65
became a reality.
X.

formal diversity of Christianity

Sexism and Christian Cosmological Dualism
The Sayings of Jesus and "Peter and Paul

taught,

in a mutually complimentary way that all

Christians together, each according to the grace
he or she has received is responsible for building
66
up the church."
The Sayings Tradition illustrate
that Jesus*

attitude toward women was one where he

put into praxis a gospel of grace that was p r o 
female equality and anti-male domination, while
it exalted the essential humanity of all.

Jesus

as an unorthodox rabbi taught against the female
62
blood taboo;
held conversations with Palestinian

68
and even hated foreign women;
called for female
69
students or disciple-ship;
rejected the Pharisitic
70
view of women as "evil sexual creatures";
demon
strated the intellectual capacity of women by teaching
them religious truth, social philsophy and Torah
(law);

respected women*s humanity and faculty

for grace by singling them out for public praise
and social deferrence while reproaching orthodox
Jewish leaders for not following suit; and lastly
by an anthro-morphism "projected God in the image
72
of w o m a n ."
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Thus the Sayings and social praxis of
Jesus broke with orthodox Jewish views that were
paternalistic and pro-female subordination.

In

a critical review of such orthodox Jewish views,
covering the Torah, Mishnah and Talmud, Jewish
feminist theologian Judith Hauptman presented the
following daily rabbinic prayer as a summation of
orthodox Jewish paternalism:*' Blessed be God, King
73
of the universe, for not making me a woman."
On the other hand Jesus*

teaching on the divine

liberation of women, via the gospel of grace, may
hark back to an ancient stream of popular Israelite
religion, one that Jewish anthropologist Raphael
Patai associates with lumpen class Judiasm*s hist
oric (prior to Jesus)

"undercurrent of female

divinity answering the need for mother,

lover,
74

queen;

intercessor

even for a divine family.*'

God in the popular Israelite mind was often thought
of as woman and was manifested in such Hebrew
she-Gods as Asherah, Astarte,

the Ivory Cherubims,

Skekhina, Lilith and "wisdom personified as a fem75
inine being".
Paul employed a tri-level approach to the
"woman question."

First he continued the orthodox

rabbinical attitude toward women,

although he tem

pered it with the apocalyptic gospel of grace for
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both sexes on an equal basis.

Second, as a skilled

organizer and because of his concern for the sur
vivability of the new faith, he advocated the kind
of church structure that would be most compatible
with traditional patriarchic social attitudes about
76
woman's proper sphere in relation to man.
Third,
his probable familiarity with the works of the
Jewish Neo-Platonist Philo,

coupled with an edu

cation gained in Hellenist diaspora gives his view
of woman an abstractness which borders on the d i c 
tum of women having "equality in the abstract
77
only",
i.e., in Christ "there is neither male
78
nor female."
The question Paul failed to a d e 
quately answer w a s : what about the concrete rather
than spiritual inequality of females?

It is those

objectionable passages against women in either the
deutero-Pauline or authentic Pauline writings that
have been used for two-thousand years to subject
women to an unequal role both within the Christian
79
and non-Christian communities.
Late first century Christian gnosticism
(from the Greek gnosis meaning knowledge) rein
forced and radically extended the dualism already
present in Paul's thinking with respect to the
spiritual equality of women on one hand, and the
concrete social subordination of women on the other.
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In gnostic cosmology man was viewed as a fully
“rational spirit'* whereas woman was a sensual
creature,

dependent upon man for leadership in

all matters pertaining to the development of gno80
sis.
To become fully spiritual women must become
81
transformed into men,
thus redemption for women
came to mean a denial of their bodily forms and
natural sexual functions.

In an extensive analysis

of the effects of Christian gnosticism on male
and female spiritual symbolism Reuther has explained
that in Christian gnosticism,
The male alone was made in the image of
God, modeled in his inward being after the
intellectual Logos or mind of God (which was
also the theological identity of C h r i s t ) .
The female was said to lack this full image
of God in herself, and to possess it only
when taken together with the male “who is
her h e a d " ...women were seen, literally as
“sexual objects," either to be used instrumentally, as a “baby making body" or else
to be shunned as the incarnation of tempting,
debasing “sensuality." 82
This Christian gnostic soul-body, rationality-sensuality, spirit matter and male-female
dualism came to be the "moral, epistemological and
83
ontological"
basis of subsequent orthodox Christianity
The first term in the dualistic equation was often
symbolic of superiority,
or spirit over matter.

i.e., male over female
Further the first term

in the equation almost invariably made reference
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to a freedom from or overcoming of that which
restricts,

i.e., rational males should be free

from female irrationality, just as much as spirit
has always strived to free itself from matter's
imprisonment.

Lastly,

this Christian gnostic dual

ism, given positive reinforcement by Cartesian
epistemology, presently seems to reappear as
the dicotomous and unequal existence of religion
in relation to science in modern culture.

That

is, as the feminine principle, religion (or its
equivalencies:

faith, moral sentiment, romanticism,

utopianism, politics,

subjectivity and irrational

ity) is subordinated to the masculine principle
of science (or its equivalencies: experimental
datum positive law, pragmatism, realism, value84
neutrality, objectivity and rationality).
In Anglo-America history the drive to
overcome a dualistic Christian orthodoxy with
respect to women received its greatest initial
thrust in the feminist works of left-wing religious
sectarians like the Englishwoman Mary Wollstonecraft
Godwin (wife of William Godwin,

the founder of

secular anarchism and himself an ex-Calvinist m i n 
ister) , Sarah and Angelina Grimke both Quakers,
Lucretia Mott a Quaker and Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
author of the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments

261

(1848) and the first Woman's B i b l e , the Quaker
feminist leader Susan B. Anthony and finally,

the

85
black Baptist feminist-abolitionist Sojourner Truth.
XI.

Racism and the Institution of Slavery
In the early acts of primitive Christianity,

Phillip's baptism of the black ambassador from
Ethiopia illustrated that the gospel of grace was
to transcend racial divisions and that grace was
a gift that could be enjoyed equally by a l l .

Either

Matthew,Thomas or Frumentius carried the gospel
to Axum (Ethiopia) and established Christianity
86
there.
Paul carried the gospel to Europe and
his thought that "there cannot be Greek and Jew,
circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian,

*87
slave,

freeman, but in Christ is all, and in all

conveyed the same message that grace, at least
theoretically, was trans-racial.

According to

classical philologist Frank M. Snowden, Jr., an
Ethiopian-Scythian formula informed Greco-Roman
thought on the "race question" and the essential
unity of mankind,

such that Paul and other early

Christian thinkers were familiar with the poetical

88
works of the Greek Menander and the Roman Simylus.
On the surface, the Ethiopian-Scythian
formula of racial equality was not strictly a doct
rine of white racial superiority,

for it did focus
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classical Christian color symbolism in a direction
toward spiritual equality for all.

However,

as

was the case with the woman question, classical
Christian color symbolism moved, in. a direction, toward
spiritual equality for all.
case with the woman question,

However, as was the
classical Christianity

employed a dualistic cosmology on questions of
race: ultimately whiteness was good and blackness
bad,

thus blackness must be overcome by a trans

formation to spiritual purity or w h i t e n e s s .

Black

ness as a disease or handicap that Christianity
could alleviate came to be a paternalistic and
subtle way of maintaining racist attitudes in early
church practice.

For example, one early tradition

has it that ’’Thomas through baptism whitens
89
Ethiopians.”
For their part the church Fathers
interpreted ” sin as blackness that must be washed
90
away” (Jerome) ;
’’Christ came into the world to
91
make blacks radiantly w h i t e ” (Gregory)
. Perhaps
Origen's comments on Solomon’s "black but comely**
concubine will better highlight the confused rac
ial paternalism of the early church:
Moreover we ask in what way is she black
and in what way fair without whiteness.
She
has repented of her sins; conversion has
bestowed beauty upon her head and hence she
is sung beautiful.
But because she is not
yet cleansed of all the uncleannes of her
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sins nor washed unto salvation.
She is said
to be black but she does not remain in her
black color
she becomes white...if, m o r e 
over, you do not repent take heed lest your
soul be called MblackM and disgraceful and
lest you be stained by a double foulness---"black" on account of your past sins; d i s 
graceful because you continue the same
faults. 91
The institution of slavery must be u n der
stood against the background of social customs in
antiquity.

Orthodox Judiasm had affirmed human

bondage although the Israelites themselves had first
emerged as G o d ’s chosen people or liberated slaves
from Egyptian domination.

Under the Torah Jewish

slaves held by Jewish masters could not become
permanent slaves, but were to be freed upon payment
of the debt for which he or she was sold; in the
seventh year of Jubilee all Jewish slaves were to
be freed irregardless of the debt repayment sched93
ule.
Non-Jewish slaves held by Jewish masters
did not come under Torah except that they like
94
Jewish slaves were to be treated kindly;
thus
the liberation of non-Jewish slaves was dependent
upon the m a s t e r ’s will and moral sensitivity.
Grecian justification of and practice of slavery
is well known and receives excellent appraisal in
Plato's Laws and Aristotle's second book of Politics
and in his Nicomachaen E t h i c s ; while,
the Roman Republic

slavery in

and Empire was regarded as an

264
95
’’economic necessity" by the Roman ruling c l a s s e s .
In comparison to orthodox Judiasm and
Greco-Roman thought,

the Saying, of Jesus,

in espec

ially his call for "the release of captives"

(Luke

4:18 RSV) was a radical departure from the laws and
conventional thinking of his time.

Yet neither Jesus

"nor any of the apostles directly attacked the insti96
tution of slavery as such."
If the teaching of
Jesus on the release of captives,

like those on women,

had been maintained the very roots of racism and
97
slavery would have been "decisively undercut."
As it was later generations of orthodox Christians
hardly felt obliged to denounce the institution
of slavery.

It was not until the emergence of New

World slavery in the Americas that anti-slavery as
a politico-religious program emerged in the works
and activity of the thirteenth century Franciscan
98
Bartolome de Las Casas.
In North American leftwing Christianity,

though theoretically opposed

to slavery on grounds that human property holding
was a form of violence,

actually practiced slave-

holding until a group of Pennsylvania "Mennonites
who had become Quakers "addressed a protest against
99
slavery to the London Yearly Meeting in 1688.
After this address some of the Friends began to
advocate that slavery was not only a form of violence,
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but "wrong in itself as an abrogation of human

100
rights,"

and by 1780 no Quakers in the United

States held slaves.

It was left-wing Christianity

in the United States that played a primary role
in setting up such early secular abolitionist
organizations as the New England Non-Resistance
Society (1838) and the League of Universal Brother
hood (1846) .

It was also the anti-slavery activ

ities of such radical leaders as the Christian
anarchists Adin Ballou, William Lloyd Garrison
and the early Fredrick Douglass that helped cause
the great denominational splits over slavery
101
issue just prior to the Civil War.
The Political Reality of Christian Anarchism
From the above historical and thematic discussion
of Christian anarchism exploration should now move toward an
explanation of the political reality of Christian anarchism.
In pursuing such an explanation some of the insights of polit
ical theology will be employed.

The reasons for using the

approach of political theology are:

1) if left unorganized

the mass of information about the historic anarchist ten
dencies in Christianity would remain on the level of relig
ious discourse without apparent relation to the "concrete"
world of anarchist experience,

2) for the purpose of an illus

tration of the relationship between Christian anarchism arid
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and the religious dimension of radical American criminology
(i.e., between anarchist religion and anarchist criminology
respectively),
of politics.

one would do best to use the mediating agency
That is, anarchist/theist Christianity shares

a common radical political environment with a secular and
anarchist/atheist criminology.

Specifically both share a

radical environment with respect to the essential unity of
humanity, criticism of the State,

law, and punishment, an

elevation of oppressed segments of society, criticism of
the existing social order and the transformation of society
by way of a libertarian revolution.

In short, both points

of v iew spring from basically the same ideological terrain
with regard to the existing social order and both are con
cerned with the theoretical pre-conditions for the existence
of a "new heavens

(anarchist religion) and new earth)

(anarchist religion and anarchist criminology).
I.

What is a Political Theology of Anarchism?
First the question as to the meaning of

the term political theology must be dealt with.
Recent usage of the term in New Left religious
thinking refers to a hermeneutic conception or
understanding of the unity of "kerygma and praxis",
(e.g.,

in non-theological terms theory and practice),

where the gospel of grace is understood as a spir
itual and political message of salvation.

As such

it is not to be confused with traditional and
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orthodox theologies which have normally been
employed to defend existing political and social
orders.

For example, Clement of Alexandria's

convenient defense of wealth and property in his
102
second century The Rich Han's Salvation
is not
political theology in the sense of left theologi
cal thinking.

Nor should political theology be
103
confused with Luther's "two kingdoms" theory
(derived from Augustine)

that radically split the

temporal and spiritual dimensions of social exist
ence and ended in a dualistic theological justifi
cation of German Princes in their programs against
104
Jews
and heretical Christians.
Nor is political
theology the all too typical theologies of glory,
triumphalism or religious imperialism based on
theological "delusions of grandeur" in a world
already full of theological and non-religious ideol105
ogical delusions.
Moreover,

in agreement with libertarian

socialist theologian Dorothee Soelle,

"there are

no specifically Christian solutions to world prob
lems for which a political theology would have to
106
develop the theory."
Thus as Soelle continues,
"political does not mean that theology should now
107
exchange its content for that of political science."
Positively, New Left theological thinking
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in reference to political theology is about
the rescue of "kerygma and praxis" from the
private and individual interior world that ortho
dox Christianity has constructed over the centur108
ies.
Primitive Christianity advocated a gospel
of grace that was "deprivitized"; became public
through the charismatic apocalyptism of itinerate
preachers;

and was made political in its habit of

taking-sides with the oppressed lumpen elements in
society over and against the oppressiveness of bour
109
giosie elements.
In this sense the gospel of
grace was a political gospel first directed toward
the wholistic liberation of the oppressed masses
(i.e., spiritual and political liberation).
simultaneously,

Yet

and on par with lumpen liberation,

the gospel of grace via its ideal of human recon
ciliation with other humans, and only then with
God, directed itself toward the ultimate liberation

110
of all.

For ultimately all were viewed as oppres

sed and alienated in terms of being estranged from
an authentic personhood and God.

Strategically,

the liberation of the "least of these" pointed
the way toward the salvation of the great,

if the
111
great would become as "suffering servants"
and
reverse themselves in normal economic and political
terms.

Hence,

the gospel of grace had a class
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basis but was simultaneously a gospel which
ultimately aimed at the transcendence of class
(not unlike Marxism and secular anarchism which
claims the same transcendence for communism).
Here one is not unmindful of the differ
ences between current European or Western polit
ical theologies which although radical are not
thoroughly grounded in a lumpen class theological
analysis as are some liberation theologies of
112
the Third World.
The present author opts for a middle
ground in this intrafamily theological argument.
That is, a dialectic must be maintained between
the vision of the liberation of all and the lib
eration of the many of the lumpen class.

To

fail to maintain such a dialectic ends in a certain
paranoia about who is evil and who is perfect; a
self-righteousness that re-enslaves rather than
liberates critical consciousness.

As Reuther

notes in this regard "liberation,

...cannot be

divorced from a sense of self-judgement and an
identification with the community which is jud113
ged."
Those who are oppressed cannot seek to
overcome their oppression by oppressing others,
or as Reuther put it, "one cannot dehumanize
the oppressors without ultimately dehumanizing
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oneself,

and aborting the possibilities of the

liberation movement into an exchange of roles
114
of oppressor and oppressed.
II.

Specifics of a Political Theology of
Anarchism
The following four points are an explan

ation of what,

in a pbsi'tlva political theology of

anarchism would be about.

It would be kind of left

theological thinking that is:
A.

Teleologically concerned with projecting
the libertarian ideals of Christianity to
horizons unlimited.

Unlimited because the

physical and immaterial reality of existence
seem unlimited to human comprehension though
at the same moment the limits to human con
sciousness suggest a certain mystery that
also cannot be comprehended.

One believes,

for example that black holes in space have
a beyondness about them that is at once
finite (the descriptive outline of the black
hole itself) but unlimited once one u nder
stands that beyond black holes may be more
black holes.

The same can be said of God;

beyond God there lies God, but the human
impression is that God acts upon the relig
ious and thus finite consciousness.

Accor-
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ding to Sir Julian Huxley, Father Teilhard*s
"point Omega" has at least had the effect
of making scientists, and theologians think
in teleological terms about the unity of
115
spirit and matter.
Both have qualities
116
which often defies comprehension.
A
political theology of anarchism is called
to move in the direction of the unlimited
even though finiteness shares in the deter
mination of each evolutionary step.

Quinney

seconds this kind of thinking in his belief
that "even with the eventual transition to
communism the transformation of human nature
and social order never ceases."
B.

Theologically aware that even the judgement
of God is a God, not a human act.
of human activity,
ogical viewpoint,

The task

from an anarchist theol
is one of faith in the

ability of agape to point the way toward
that which is freedom and steer a course
away from unfreedom.

Reinhold Niebuhr, h i m 

self an advocate of neo-orthodoxy and a
staunch opponent of anarcho-pacifism has
insisted upon "the relevance of this ideal
of love to the moral experience of mankind
on every conceivable level...it is not
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magically superimposed upon life by a
revelation which has no relation to total
117
human experience."
Yet agape is an abnormal and puzzling kind
of love if compared to the sensual dynamism
of e r o s ; it moves down instead of up.

It

finds the best in the least, wisdom in that
which is foolish and power in the power l e s s .
According to Max Scheler's scheme for the
sociology of knowledge,

agape has the char

acter of enough not more, deficiency rather
than sufficiency,

suffering and denial,

instead of power and plentitude.

It reverses

the order of things in such a puzzling m a n 
ner that the "nobler stoops to the vulgar,
the healthy to the sick, rich to poor...
the good and saintly to the bad and common,
118
the Messiah to the sinners and publicans."
Kropotkin's communistic notion of "mutualaid" is a form of agape in the sense that
this system departs from benevolence, altru
ism and paternalism, but rather demanded a
feeling of mutuality which would smooth out
and repair social brokeness without resort
to coercion.
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In its puzzling journey agape negates
"the official religion of the officially
119
optimistic society,"
just as much as
it negates all kinds of realism.

It is

a theology of the cross that "lightens
our darkness" by its abnormality.
C.

Politically concerned with the unlimited
extension of human freedom while critically
conscious of the finite social obstacles
to such freedom.

Christian anarchism would

insist that social relations exhibit a lively
movement toward freedom from domination and
coercion in human affa i r s .

The particular

nomenclature of domination does not matter
thus religious,
ual, economic,

intellectual, racial,

sex

scientific and political

domination must be ruled out in favor of
human freedom in practice.
Furthermore,

since agape points the way

toward freedom,

the gospel of grace holds

that "if we aim at love we shall establish
120
justice by the way."
Justice here is
understood as a "by-product" of love in
that justice depends on mutual confidence
and cooperation.

Retribution does not est-
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ablish justice, nor does a benevolent
or paternalistic rehabilitation ideal.
One does not legally kill to establish
justice, nor does one imprison another
for the same purpose.

Revolutions which

seek to establish justice by brute force
become reactionary and must take steps
to maintain the power won by reliance upon
further force.

Another way of putting

this is that the powerless in order to
establish justice, must avoid becoming
the powerful.

It is the powerful who must

reverse themselves via agape and become
full of love rather than full of power if
liberation is to become a reality.
Thus existing states and their criminal
justice apparatuses must be replaced with
the kind of libertarian social system that
121
incorporates a "will to justice"
and
122
not a "will to power."
To do this means
to employ the kinds of strategy which "resists
evil" by resorting to love.

It may be that

Gandhi*s program of Satyagraha (clinging to
truth) has validity after all.

Satyagraha

is the politics of moral suasion that invites
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suffering upon oneself the motive of
which is to convert the opponent by making
the opponent a friend.

The program can

take on a myriad of forms from direct
non-violent resistance to a form of n o n 
cooperation which is geared to defeat an
evil deed but not the good in the person
who does such a dded, for the Satyagrahi
cooperates with the evil-doer in what
123
is good.
D.

Distinctively,

a political theology of

anarchism would be that kind of New Left
theological thinking that would be preem
inently concerned with questions of polit
ical authority, domination, the State and
its overthrow,

law and social justice.

In contrast to Christian-Marxist theologies,
Christian anarchism would not ground itself
in a strict Marxian economic analysis of
history which pits the oppressed working
class against the oppressive capitalist
class, although it could use a class anal
ysis when that is appropriate.
is beautiful"^

A "small

Buddhist economics might

be more appropriate especially in this age
of plantary depletion of natural resources.
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Moreover, Christian anarchism would not
relegate the woman*s question or the quest
ion of minorities to some vague category
of secondary importance.

Again it would

not view classes other than the lumpen prol
etariat as evil; nor would it view the lumpen
proletariat as dangerous or in fact evil
with respect to the prospects for human
liberation.

Christian anarchism would not

be about a normal struggle for power in
order to use the power won in liberation
struggles to destroy others.

It would,

lastly, reject the ideological pretensions
of other theologies while remaining critical
124
of its own alienated existence.
With the above insights in mind a political
theology of anarchism would have little
more that could be thought of as a unique
contribution to such secular anarchist theor
ies as anarcho-communism.

Chapter IV de

tailed out the differences in classical
anarchist thought, here it is felt that
Kropotkin*s anarcho-communism comes very
close to Christian anarchism*s ideal of
a libertarian revolution to be brought into
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being through mutuality and non-violence.
The next step is to ascertain how it was
that the Christian libertarian ideal came
to be secularized.
The Religious Reality of Secular Anarchism
That secular anarchism has many of its antecedents
in the centuries old libertarian ideal of Christianity is con
sidered below.

The consideration ought not be construed as

assming a rigidly linear causality between Christian and
secular anarchism.

To assume such would be dishonest and deny

contradictory evidence which suggests that the libertarian
ideal has been part of Western political philosophy and praxis
125
at least since Socrates as against Plato.
The uniqueness
of the Christian contribution to libertarian thinking and
praxis has been the left-wing Christian concern to reject p o w 
er, domination, privilege and violence while advocating the
liberty of humanity in individual and social terms.

Grecian

libertarian ideals were based on the primacy and privilege
of elite community elements over and against individual and
126
social anarchy.
The aim then is to interpret the libertarian ideal of
Christianity as highly influential though not necessary deter
minative,

in the development of secular anarchist theory

and practice.
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I.

Secularization of the Libertarian
Ideal of Christianity
Strictly put the secularization of

Christian ideals, in the sense of a rejection of
Christianity per s e , but a reincorporation of v a l 
ued Christian ideals into religio-secular systems
may have begun in the New Testament period.

Indeed

the movement of Christian heterodoxy has always
come perilously close to a rejection of Christianity
per se, though heterodoxy has always managed to
retain its religiousness.

Here secularization is

taken to mean that antiecclesiastical process of
desacralization and dechristianization which was
127
begun in the Enlightenment.
It was in this
post-Christendom period of the eighteeenth century
that left-wing radicalism rejected Christianity
128
per se and yet retained Christian apocalyptism.
Atheism and rational humanism emerged as the secu
lar equivalent to a now superceeded theism and
irrational supernaturalism in secular left-wing
thinking.

Christian apocalypticism reappeared

as a mystical faith in the imminent workings of
the forces of history.

The Kingdom of God was

transformed into the concretized doctrine of human
129
progress toward perfectability.
The "inward
journey" of Christian mysticism,

acesticism and

voluntary social isolationism returned in movements
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toward communalistic utopianism.

Revolutionary

activity lost its "otherworldly" character, while
transferring heavenly spiritual goals to earthly
"rational" objectives.

Finally,

the Christian ideal

of liberty from political authority and domination
was given new birth by the ex-Calvinist pastor Godwin
and later given a formal secular name by Proudhon.
The reborn libertarian ideal of ancient Christianity
was,

in this author's estimation,secular anarchism.
One strain of secular anarchism,

that of

anarchists like Kropotkin and the later Emma Goldman
(who as a result of visits with Tolstoy became con
vinced that non-violence was the best methodology
for revolution), elevated non-violence to an equal
position with the revolutionary violence advocated
by Bakunin and his disciples.

At least this was

the case with European anarchism.

On the other

hand, Anglo-American secular anarchism from the
most part accepted Godwin's and T h o r e a u 's views
on the need for non-violence as the best revolu
tionary strategy:

Also in the American social

milieu secular anarchism was given a big send-off
by the activities of pre-Civil War Christian anarch
ists who were instrumental in organizing various
secular peace,

feminist,

tionist associations.

labor (I.W.W.) and aboli
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A clear evaluation of the above process
of secularization suggests that secularism has
been the flip-side of orthodox Christianity.

Sort

of like Marx turning Hegel's heavenly system u p 
side down or "right-side up".

The secularist and

athiest exist mainly in relation to the ecclesiastic
(clergyman or woman) and theist.

What is interes

ting about that relation is that the religious ele
ment has not vanished from left-radical secularity
but merely taken on a character outside the domain
of orthodox Christian reference.

The religious

element was secularized as the transcendent m o v e 
ment of history (i.e., the spirit of historical
progress).

Mysteriously, history is inevitably

calling humanity to move forward to a state of
perfection.

Reuther has even proposed that liberal

and conservative secularism "gave rise to an ideol
ogical viewpoint and ideological sciences that dei

nied the existence of a transcendent horizon of
life whereby the oppressive status-quo could be
130
judged and transcended."
But though her suggest
ion is well-intended it forgets that secular leftradicalism maintained that transcendent element
and used it to prophetically criticize both religious
and secular ideology.

Moreover secular anarchism

went one step farther than strict Marxist secularism
and employed prophecy (judgement in its criticism of
Marxist duplicity with regard to the question of
human liberty.
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II.

Left-Radicalism as Secularized Religious
Activity
A.

Marxism
As is well known Marx repudiated religion

on three major grounds.

First following the Left-

Hegelian Ludwig Feurerbach he viewed the God thesis
as a fantastic mental projection of humanity alienated
131
from itself.
Second he ascertained religion
to be reactionary to the progress of proletarian
revolution.

That is, religion was ’’the opium of

the people" a phenomena of false consciousness.
Third religion was a class tool employed by ruling
classes to check the advance of progressive forces.
Thus for Marx,

"the criticism of religion is...the
132
premise of all criticism."
What is not well known is that Marx, Engels
and latter Marxists such as Edward Bernstein, Karl
Klausky and Ernest Bloch regarded Christian radical
ism, as historically represented in the Anabaptist
and the Cromwellian (radical sectarisns) revolutions,
133
as esteemed "forerunners" of Marxism.
It is inter
esting that these Marxists would "appreciately" seek
their origin in Christianity.

So interesting that

one is convinced that Marx's criticism of religion was
directed at a Christian orthodoxy which in fact
was. historically used as a class weapon in sup-
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port of the economic and political status-quo.
More importantly though orthodox inpower Marxism as the flip-side of orthodox
Christianity has all the trappings necessary
for religious fulfillment;

and although the

orthodox Marxist will not admit it "Marxism
is a creed to be clung to when the intellect
134
questions and rejects."
Bertram Wolfe,
a leading left-liberal critic of orthodox Marxism
has isolated some of the cultic practices of
in-power Marxism; he writes:
It is a deeply emotional faith, with
true believers, orthodoxy, dogma and its
.inevitable show of heresy, dedication,
confession, schism, anathema, ex-communication, even imprisonment and execution
and erasure of one's name, where the
faith and the secular arm are one. 135
In discussing the religious essence of
Marxism philosopher Robert C. Tucker has isolated
six major structural characteristics of Marxist
theory that can be favorably related to
136
Christianity:
1) the atheism of Marxist
theory signified "only a negation of the
transmundane God" which was superceeded by
humanity as "the supreme being",

2) Marxism's

all-inclusive view of reality" that attempts
to provide an answer for everything existing
whether animate or inanimate,

3) its material-
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ist conception of history moves from primitive
communism (paradise) lost to future communism
(paradise) regained, and even has an apocalyptic
"closing chapter of the prehistoric stage of
human society",

(i.e., judgement day brought

on by the final revolution, 4) its concept of
redemption of humanity through a program of
revolutionary regeneration,

5) its unity of

theory and practice, which calls for the believer
to participate in a prophetic implementation
of the faith.

Faith divorced from works are

dead to the Marxist system,

6) its moralistic

zeal which demands "this worldly" punis h m e n t ’
for social oppressors.

To Tucker's inventory

one should note that Marxism may have more
affinity with Jewish apocalyptism and messianism that it does with Judiac-Christian apoca
lyptism.

The fatal difference being that

Jewish apocalyptism as practiced by first
century Zealots included hate for one's oppres
sors and a will to power and violence that
was contrary to the anarcho-pacifist element
in New Testament Judiac-Christian apocalyptism.
B.

Secular Anarchism
As has been asserted throughout this

thesis anarchism is unorthodox in relation to
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orthodox Marxism.

It is left-communism when

it identifies itself as Marxism and when
orthodox Marxism criticizes it as such.

When

viewed as a secular religion it retains the
same unorthodox and left position vis-a-vis
Marxist orthodoxy.

Thus the six structural

points that Tucker used to criticize Marxism
as religion may be applied in toto to anarchism.
However, Wolfe's criticism's of in-power
Marxism's cultic practices cannot be applied
to anarchism for the simple fact that anarch
ism or left-communism has yet to be institu
tionalized, just as Christian anarchism has
not been institutionalized.

Further, the power

hungry anarchism of the Bakuninist variety
may,

like in-power Marxism, be more influenced

by Jewish apocalyptism and Grecian libertar
ianism.
Peculiarly, anarchism by its nature
must always remain a heresy with respect to
religious domination or domination of any kind.
It is this libertarian nature of anarchism that
has given it the bad reputation it has had at
least since the times of Jesus.

The practice

of anarchism seems so impractical and outlandishly simplistic that it just does not seem
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to make sense to ears in need of elaborate
analyses and minds geared to conquer the
world.

One is reminded here of a face to

face criticism Lenin levelled at Kropotkin,
upon Lenin's consolidation of power in the
Soviet Union.

Said Lenin,

"you can't make a

revolution wearing white gloves...we have made
m i s t a k e s ... But we have preferred to make m i s 
takes and thus to act."

Of Kropotkin's coop

erative method of revolution.

Lenin said,

"these are children's playthings,

idle chatter,

having no realist soil underneath, no force,
no means..."

Kropotkin's probably response

was that "the choice of such means perverts
137
and dooms the ends."
Thus secular anarch
ism

as religion just may be that kind of r a d 

ical religious talk "which can be understood
138
by children,"
but not by hard-headed realists.
Religious Dimension of Radical Criminology
The discussion following is divided into two parts.
First American radical criminology's critique of the religious
foundations of legal order will be
secular attack on

interpreted as a religio-

Christian orthodoxy's traditional support

of State power by virtue of its moralisms with regard to deviancy and criminality.

Second the religious dimension of radi

cal criminology will be interpreted as a criminological version
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of the left-wing "religion of humanity" and will be under
stood as being in anarchist opposition to orthodox versions
of precisely the same kind of religion of man, whether liberal
or Marxist.
I.

Orthodox Christian Foundations of
American Legal Order
It is interesting that radical criminology's

criticism's of the Christian underpinnings of legal
order is directed against the orthodox Christian
habit of pressing for the State's application of
Old Testament morality and legalism to deviant and
criminal social conduct.

For example, Quinney notes

that "our contemporary reaction to crime has been
139
shaped by the Puritan concept of crime."
More
over, Quinney asserts that from the beginning of
the American experience
The legal authority of the state was relig
iously supported.
The implications for the
further development of American law were that
law (and government in general) existed to reg
ulate imperfect man, that the welfare of the
whole is more important than that of the indi
vidual.
For the Puritans crime was an act
against G o d . ..The criminal, following Puritan
theological doctrine, belonged to a category
to oppose society.
140
Adding to Quinney's assessment, religious
historian George Lee Haskins has shown that most
provisions in the Puritan code were annotated by
141
chapter and verse from the Old Testament.
Even
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English common law was based on Old Testament
legality "because of the tendency of Protestant
theologians to equate natural law with Mosaic law.*1
Radical criminology's critical assessment
of the American penal system is also directed
against orthodox Christian notions of punishment.
According to criminologist David J. Rothman
Christian values contributed greatly to the "inven
tion of the penitentiary" in America; an indigenous
invention that has not drastically changed since
the antebellum debate between advocates of the
Auburn (New York) and Pennsylvania models of penal
142
organization and discipline.
The values of
"separation,

obediance, and labor became the trin

ity around which officials organized the peniten143
tiary."
If prisoners were to repent and be
saved from their "evil ways",

they must be exposed

to a reborn monastic (reform) discipline that
separated them from a sinful environment.

The

ne w penitentiary methodology was geared to save
Christianity and the American republic from demonic
human forces.

Rothman quotes prison chaplain

and advocate of the new penal methodology,

the

Reverend James B. Finley, who obviously felt that
the question of penal organization was an issue
of "the triumph of good over evil, of order over
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c h a o s ,"
Could we all be put on prison fare, for
the space of two or three generations, the
world would ultimately be better for it.
Indeed should society change places with the
prisoners, so far as habits are concerned,
taking to itself the /Christian values/ regu
larity, and temperance, and sobriety of a
good p r i s o n ... then the goals of peace, right
and Christianity would be furthered...As it
is taking this world and the next together...
the prisoner has the advantage. 143
Thus radical criminology has understood
the influential relation that orthodox Christianity
has had on the development of American legal order.
However, radical criminology has not, to date, become
aware that just as much as Christian orthodoxy has
supported legal order, unorthodox Christianity has
traditionally set itself against legal order.
Puritanism also incorporated the libertarian ideals
of first religious toleration, then civil liberties
and later the prison abolition movement,

as the exam

ple of Roger Williams and others well illustrate.
145
Williams held a rather limited anarchist
view
of legal order.

He felt that Puritan magistrates

’’had no right to enforce any of the first four com
mandments"; moreover, his reading of the Bible, by
"a dangerously metaphorical method of typology"
enabled him to emphasize the New Testament gospel
146
of grace over the legalisms of the Old Testament.
It was the same "dangerously metaphorical"
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reading of the Bible that spawned Anne Hutchinson*s
Puritan heresy of insisting ’'upon the priority
of persoan conscience as something that super147
ceeds the law.”
Such a reading led William
Lloyd Garrison to conclude in his Declaration of
Sentiments

(1838)

that,*we cannot sue any man at

law to compel him by force to restore anything
which he may have wrongfully taken from us or others;
but if he had seized our coat, we shall surrender
,,148
our cloak rather than subject him to punishment.
Again at the first (1870) meeting of the Congress
of the American Prison Association, radical sect
arian voices led by Judge Carter of Ohio protested
that "any system of imprisonment or punishment was
degradation, and could not reform a man";

these

early prison abolitionists (in contrast to reformers)
wanted to "abolish all prison walls and release all
149
confined within them."
By analogy radical criminology's libertarian
stance toward crime and punishment was not influenced
by orthodox Christianity's support of American legal
order.

On the contrary,

left-wing Christianity,

beginning with William's and Hutchinson's heretical
Puritanism, may have shaped radical criminology's
contemporary concept of crime (ala Quinney,

a b ove).

If this holds up then radical theorizing about crime
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is a dechristianized secular restatement of u nor
thodox Christianity's historic rejection of legal
order.

Radical criminology as the criminological

manifestation of the "religion of humanity" may
then be interpreted as a left religio-secular crit
ique

of orthodox Christianity's influence on the

development of American criminal law and penology.
II.

The Radical Criminological Version of
the Religion of Humanity
Unorthodox Marxist sociologist Alvin Gouldner

in his massive The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology
attacks the Christian "piety" of Parsonian funct
ionalism and in so doing admitted quite openly that
150
Marxist sociology in America is "a religion of man."
He contrasted this religion of man with Talcott
P a r s o n ’s structural-functionalism and concluded that
Parsonian sociology, for several years the leading
liberal brand of sociology, was pietistic "religion
of society" that was conformist and supportive of
the established social order.

Admitting the "scien

tific demerits" of Marxist sociology Gouldner lashed
out in profound anger at liberal social thinkers
"who profess to a respect for religion (but then)
should act so triumphant when they uncover a relig
ious side to Marxism."
R.adical criminology as a sub-field of soc-
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iology and in its guise as left-wing Marxism car
ries a religious zeal for the liberation of humanity.
In its epistemology and cosmology there is "little
151
difference between human nature and the devine."
152
"God is man" to.quote Engels.
In confirmation
of this fact Quinney in late article has held that
"our criminology ^radical type: mine;is a cultural
production.

It is part of the structure that shares

the function of such productions as philosophy,
153
religion and art."
To affirm the religious
character of his cultural criminology Quinney quotes
the libertarian socialist theologian Paul Tillich
who calls forth our "liberative memories" and w i t 
nesses thus
The most intimate motions within the depths
of our souls are not completely our own.
For
they belong also to our friends, to mankind,
to the universe, and to the Ground of all
being, the aim of our life. 154
It is a pity that Quinney did not continue
the line of thought he touched upon in his cultural
criminology.

As it was he theorized that "art as

a way of seeing,

feeling and perceiving is prophetic
155
in its form and content."
If he would have

read Tillich a little farther he would have found
that the theologian used aesthetics to give meaning
to the idea of God as the Unconditional.

Specific

ally in art, the theologian found that, religion
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156
is the highest cultural value.
even more so than art that sees,

It is religion
feels and per

ceives in a prophetic way.
As a secular and academic system of proph
ecy radical criminology must be expected to take
uncertain "leaps of faith."

S. K. Kierkegaard did

and it resulted in a new and distinctively Protestant
synthesis that was set in opposition to the estab
lished Lutheran Church and the Christian state of
157
his day.
Given radical criminology’s all but
admitted religiousness, Klocar's criticism of it
as academic prophecy is a redundant though potent
way of gaining academic "brownie points" with his
fellow "liberally pragmatic" criminologists.

His

criticism is a kind of intellectual posturing that
attunes itself to a surface "discovery" of an issue
that has been debated in academic departments of
religion and philosophy at least since Ernest B l o c h ’s
atheistic de-theology.

Moreover, his negative crit

icism of religion in sociology/criminology suggests
that he is unconscious of the religious quality
of conventional criminology, as will be shown in
the next section of this thesis.
VJhat remains here is to remember (Chapter
IV)

that radical criminology as left Marxism is

in anarchist opposition to all kinds of Marxist
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orthodoxy.

Radical criminology may be thought

of as the secular embodiment of the libertarian
ideals of Christianity.

Like anarchist Christianity

in relation to Christian orthodoxy, radical crim
inology goes orthodox Marxism one step further by
faithfully following the spirit of that which was
anarchist in Marx's thought.

Also like anarchist

Christianity in relation to orthodox theology,
radical criminology is dead to the laws and dogmas
of Marxist orthodoxy.

Its religion of humanity

has the prophetic potential to go beyond the repres
sive categories of class struggle to the higher
"ground of all being"

(ala Tillich, above).

Its

next step just maybe a de-theology of criminology,
if Quinney's work on art and culture is a valid
158
lead.
Sociological Criminology as the Liberal and
Orthodox Religion of Humanity
The history of sociological criminology in America
suggests that religious feeling and prophecy is not foreign
to a liberal reading.

Sociological criminology became "cen

tered in the United States" in the first two decades of the
159
twentieth century.
Social thinkers of the liberal stripe
were looking for the social causes of crime in an urbanized
and industrialized America which had overcome its backwardness
and "come of age."

Radzinowicz felt that attempts to explain
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the social causation of crime mixed well with sociology
because sociology "accords with the fundamentally optimistic
American outlook on life in general,

into which the thesis

that crime is a product of remedial social forces would fit
more naturally than insistence on the part played by endog160
enous forces."
The upshot of this was that in the offic
ially optimistic society crime had to be viewed as an individ
ual problem that could be corrected by benevolent social
forces,

if properly investigated by method of sociology.
The doctrine of optimism,

(i.e., the American soc

ial experience was the best possible arrangement of human
society) was triumphalistic but not complete because of the
lingering existence of crime and other social evils.

Lib

eral social philosophy of the period provided the new social
investigation of crime with a set of operative values such
as: "pragmatism,

institutionalism, behaviorism, legal realism,
161
economic and historical determinism."
Nor was the new
sociological criminology above social moralisra (social

homilectics) as one of its early academic advocates, C. R.
Henderson, made clear thusly,

"in the new social science,

the investigation of evil brings us nearer to an understan162
ding of the good and helps us on the path upward."
Regressing somewhat to nineteenth century European
sociology one finds the French father of liberal sociology,
Auguste Comte, advocating in extremely zealous terms the
positive religion of humanity as replacement for the waning
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moral authority of Christian orthodoxy.

To Comte and his

followers sociology was such a positive religion and in
all respects,

except the theistic-atheistic nexus, and was
163
the secular equivalent of Roman Catholicism.
In discus

sing the "normative doctrine" of Comte's sociology, Lewis A.
Coser explains that Comte
...elaborated a complex blue print of the good
positive society of the future, a society directed
by the spiritual power of priests of the new posi
tive religion and leaders of banking and industry.
These scientific sociological-priests...would be
the moral guides and censors of the community,
using the force of their superior knowledge to
recall men to their duties and obligations...The
scientific priests of the religion of humanity,
having acquired positive knowledge of what is good
and evil, would...help suppress any subversive
ideas...The things to be administered were in fact
human individuals. 163
Emile Durkheim's religion of humanity was concerned
to explain "the forces that created within individuals a sense
165
of moral obligation to adhere to society's demands."
In
a less zealous fashion than Comte his sociology sought to
answer the question of how social order could be maintained
since "God is dead."
answer;

A secular religion of society was his

"society is the father of us all;

therefore,

it is

to society we owe that profound debt of gratitude heretofore
166
paid to the gods."
Society as God for Durkheim,
...was not at all the illogical or a-logical,
incoherent and fantastic being which has too
often been considered.
Quite the contrary the
collective consciousness is the highest form of
psychic life, since it is the consciousness of
consciousness... it sees things only in their
permanent and essential aspects.
At the same
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time that it sees from above, it sees farther;
at every moment of time it embraces all known
real i t y . .. 167
Max Weber in his Protestant Ethic and the Spirit
of Capitalism explained that a "spiritualistic causal inter
pretation of culture and history" is on par with a material168
istic interpretation of the same thing.
Moreover, he
argued for Verstehen or a hermeneutics of sociology that
could penetrate to the subjective realm of individual meaning
and action.

His reason for employing this hermeneutical pro

cedure was based in his concern that,

"There is no absolutely

objective scientific analysis of culture,

or of social phen

omena independent of special and one-sided viewpoints accor
ding to w h i c h

expressly or tacitly, consciously or uncon

sciously

they are selected, analyzed, and organized for
169
expository purposes."
Thus values, be they political,
religious or whatever cannot be isolated from the sociological
investigation of crime because as Coser n o t e s , "every man
170
must follow his own demon, his own moral stance."
As Gouldner has laboriously written in his critical
review of Parsonian functionalism the whole of American lib
eral sociology,

including criminology, is bound up with the
171
question of "good and evil."
Talcott Parsons, as a secu
lar theologian, boldly put is this way
There can be little doubt that the main outcome
of (modern social progress) has been a shift in
social conditions more in accord with the general
pattern of Christian ethics than was medieval soci
ety. . .The millennium definitely has not arrived
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(but in a whole variety of respects modern
society is more in accord with Christian values
than its forebears have been.
172
It was thus from orthodox Christianity that liberal
sociology derived its penchant for authority and order in
a world seemingly full of evil and chaos.

If Parsons failed

to attribute everything in liberal sociology to orthodox
Christianity,

(he did not include Christianity's anarchist

and socialistic impulses) he did understand that orthodox
Christianity "has been the central source of the order,

the

unity and the progress of Western society” as much as it has
173
been "the most important single root of modern democracy”
and etc.,

ad infinitum.
Liberal sociological criminology's emphasis on a

science of crime,

one that can explain, predict and recommend

courses of action to prevent, reduce or eliminate crime may
be a secular religious way of apprehending sin and evil.

The

reasoning here is based on the understanding that every m e t h 
odological rule is associated with some cosmological (i.e.
metaphysical)

assumption that often goes unstated.

Since

this is the case liberal criminology has a relation to trans
cendence and myth in the same sense that scientific socialism's
dialectical materialism is grounded in some kind of cosmol174
ogy.
Moreover in the realm of praxis both liberalism and
orthodox Marxism are by nature engaged in apolegetics for
their particular definitions of social order.

Both politically

support state power and their respective criminal justice
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apparatuses, just as Christian orthodoxy has traditionally
done through its fine maze of authoritarian rationalizations.
Both in point of fact have often been repressive and frequently
"one-dimensional’1 justifications for the continued existence
of power over humanity.

Recently the philosopher of physical

science Paul K. Feyerabend has acknowledged in this regard
that sciences itself (no matter the political label)
...is much closer to myth than a scientific
philosophy is prepared to admit.
It is one of
the many forms of thought that have been developed
by man, and not necessarily the best.
It is
conspicuous, noisy, and impudent but it is inher
ently superior only for those who have already
decided in favour of a certain ideology, or who
have accepted it without ever having examined
its advantages and its limits.
And as the
accepting and rejecting of ideologies whould be
left to the individual it follows that the sep
aration of state and church must be complemented
by the separation of state and science, that most
recent, most aggressive, and most dogmatice relig
ious institution.
Such a separation may be our
only chance to achieve a humanity we are capable
of, but have never fully realized. 174
From all of the above one can only note that the
liberal criminological critique of radical criminology as an
"academic prophesy" is itself a secular religious polemic;
a polemic between religious orthodoxy and religious hetero
doxy in secular guise.

As it stands this author prefers

religious heterodoxy because it has historically been more
faithful to the libertarian ideals of primitive Christianity,
even though in its orthodox Marxist and Bakuninist anarchist
form that ideal has been disgraced when one would have expected
its exaltation.
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Is Reconciliation Possible for Liberal and Radical
Variants of American Criminology?
On the face of it reconciliation at least in the
short run seems impossible.

Kox^ever, the recent dialogue
176
between left-wing Christianity and left-Marxism.
in addi
tion to detente* between liberal American policy-makers and
post-Stalinist policy-makers in the Soviet Union may prove
a good lead for the academic reconciliation of liberal and
radical criminologies.

What is needed is a secular ecumenism

that would allow for the diversity of secular ideas while
at the same time approaches to what is commonly held can
be maximized.
Yet a proposal for reconciliation would be dishonest
if it did not understand that radical criminology by virtue
of its prophetic quality necessarily stands in judgement
of liberal criminology.

Radical criminology has a rational

for existence because of the political and religious bias
of liberal criminology.

Thus in order for reconciliation

to be realized both approaches must change by moving from
self-righteous sufficiency to humble defiency.

Radical

criminology must become self-critical and understand its
own estrangement.

Liberal criminology must become aware

of its habit of supporting social injustices and oppression
(in the name of order) and must discontinue such support.
Both approaches should be aware that they will pay a price,
i.e.,

suffer for such a move.

slightly,

To rephrase Frederick Douglass

"social power concedes nothing without a struggle."
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In a sense the greatest price will have to be
paid by liberal criminology.
most to lose

This is because it has the

-such as: its conception of itself as science;

its status and close relationship to the power centers of
the criminal justice system;

its job security in academia;

in sum its power, wealth and prestige.
radical criminology,

On the other hand

as of yet, does not have all of the

trappings of social acceptance that liberal criminology h a s .
However, radical criminology must lose its desire for power
as "power over others" and take on a multi-sum approach
to the question of power.

Both will have to lose the "ivory

tower" mentality that sets them apart from the everyday
world of complexity,

strife,

love and natural truth.

Both

must overcome the philosophical dualism that separates off
different segments of humanity and often ends in racism,
sexism,

elitism, and classism, a few of those old irrational

forces that creep into both theories.

One could go on with

V

a litany of things each could do for reconciliation but that
would be counter productive.
The essential quality for reconcilation must in
the last analysis be a willingness to connect the core of
that which is liberative in each theory.

To this author's

estimation such a connection requires a different kind of
love.
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of the ontological basis of logical positivism the socialist
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But, beyond this impression,
the following argument can be put forward.
If the
restriction of philosophy to the logic of the sciences
is a matter of taste, it need not be taken seriously.
If it is based on an analysis of human knowledge, it
is based like every epistemology, on ontological
assumptions (emphasis: mineJ.. There is always at
least one problem about which logical positivism...
must make a decision.
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Technological
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employed by police agencies is best illustrated in Anthony
Platt et a l 's The Iron Fist and Velvet Glove: An Analysis
of the U. S. Police (Berkeley: Center for Research on
Criminal Justice, 1977), pp. 82-92.
The often bloody and
fearful outcomes of such repression is well documented in
Cointel Pro: The F. B. I.'s Secret War on Political F r e e d o m ,
(New York: Monad Press, 1975 , e d . by Cathy P e r k u s .
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10
Clark's concern that criminals care little for the
"systems and standards of society" is balanced by Chambliss'
retort of "whose law, what order?"
Chambliss restated could
ask whose systems and standards of society?
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Chambliss, Whose Law, What Order?: A Conflict Approach
to Criminology, a b o v e .
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Actually according to Hobbes the state of nature is
the "time men live without a common power to keep them all
in aw, they are in that condition which is called Warre;
and such Warre, as is of every man, against every man..."
Thus Hobbes as a monarchist justified the state power of
the king, the great Leviathan, because man is an animal
motivated by only two concerns: fear and self interest.
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Wilson's idea of crime as a calculated risk taking venture
fits the Hobbseian scheme to a neo-conservative tee.
For
the source of the foregoing quote of Hobbes, see W. T. Jones
"Thomas Hobbes," Political Philosophy", vol. II: Masters
of Political Thought: Machiavelli to Bentham, e d . by Edward
McChesney Sait (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968)
p. 99.
In contrast to Hobbes, John Locke, the father of liberalism,
generally held that humanity even in a primitive state of
nature rationally adhered to moral or natural law and could
even be altruistic.
Hocke's social contract was the medium
of passage from an "uncivilized" state of nature to a polit
ically organized and thus "civilized" society.
Such a soci
ety promised a greater degree of security (for one's property
and p e r s o n ) , convenience and happiness than the primitive
state of nature.
Yet one did not enter society without
giving something up in return for society's protection.
The
primary individual power given up was the individual authority
of decision and action with regard to punishing for criminal
infractions.
This authority was to be exchanged for regula
tion by laws made by the state for the "common interests of
all." As Locke theorized,
The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and
engages his natural force, (which he might before employ
in the execution of the law of nature, by his own single
authority, as he thought fit) to assist the executive
power of the society, as the law thereof shall require.
For being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy
manyconvenience, from the labour, assistance and society
of others in the same community, as well as protection
from its whole strength; he is also to part with as
much of his natural liberty in providing for himself...
since the other members of the society do the like.
The above quotation is, like the quote of Hobbes, taken from
W. T. Jones, "John Locke's, Political Philosophy" Masters
of Political T h o u g h t , p. 183.
13
Early twentieth century economist Ameriacn Thorstein
Veblen charged the capitalist class of his era with "the
predatory seizure of goods without work," according to the
contemporary economic theoretician Robert L. Heilbroner
in his The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times and Ideas
of The Great Economic Thinkers (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1967
p 210. M o r e o v e r , Hielbroner notes that official
economics of the period was "apologist and unperceptive"
of the fraud, staggering dishonesty, blackmail, kidnapping,
property distruction and intra class violence among the
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’’Robber barons” themselves, not to mention the capitalist
conflict with labor.
The idea of corporate social respon
sibility was laughed off by J. P. Morgan in his classic
statement, ”1 owe the public nothing” (p. 196).
Yet the
activities of these kind of people were exalted by official
economics of the period and winked at by the criminal law
and its prosecutors while labor militants were jailed and
persecuted.
T o d a y ’s criminal assault on the p l a n e t 's environment by cor
porate capitalism (i.e. chemical spillage and waste, nuclear
pollutants and, etc.) is not entirely undifferent from the
capitalist attitudes held at the turn of the century.
Pres
ently, greater profit, productivity and exponential growth
are the key values of such modern barons as David Rockefeller
who puts social responsibility low on his list of priorities
in his belief that ’’unrealistic pollution abatement costs
on industry" will mean that the U. S. will price itself
out of world markets and that jobs will sufferV... it seems
clear that we will be forced to step up our productivity
through ever improved technology,” quoted in Richard J.
Barnet and Ronald E. Muller Global Reach: The Power of The
Multinational Corporations (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1975) 7 pT“ 34"3“
Given this historical attitude of American capitalism toward
social responsibility one would have to agree with Edwin H.
Sutherland s description of much business activity as "soc
ially injurious” and disagree with Paul W. Tappan in his
assertion that Sutherland's and other views that broadly
define upper-class crime outside of legal definitions are
"not social science;” see White-Collar Crimi n a l : The Offender
in Business and the Professions, ed. by Gilbert Geis (New
York: Atherton Press, 1968), p p . 369-370.
14
W e b s t e r ’s New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass:
G and C Merriam Company, 1974) , p"! 656 defines the left as
"those professing views usually characterized by a desire
to reform or overthrow the established order especially in
politics."
This dictionary also defines reform as synonomous with the act of correcting (p. 971) . Thus reform
would be to correct the abuses and/or defects in the estab
lished order to make it work better.
On the other hand,
this dictionary defines overthrow to mean a bringing down
or defeat of something (p. 819).
Hence, there is a differ
ence between reforming the established order and desiring
to defeat or overthrow that order.
Left liberalism may
call for reform but the true left, in a radical sense is
about the revolutionary defeat of what left liberals are
about reforming.
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15
Ibid., p. 997.
One notes here that the right can
and does advocate change reform and even revolution but
in the opposite direction from the left.
Wilson's n e o 
conservatism would have to be considered reformist in the
sense that he is proposing changes to meet his philosophy
of how the criminal justice system should function.
For
an excellent overview of conservative political philosophy
in contrast to liberalism, see Peter Viereck Conservatism:
From John Adams to Churchill (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold
Company, 1956).
The best studies of right-wing radicalism
in America may be Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab
The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in A m e r i c a ,
1790-1970 (New York: Harper and R o w e , 1970) or Benjamin R.
Epstein and Arnold Forster, The Radical Right: Report on
The John Birch Society and Its Allies (New York: Vintage
B o o k s , 1967).
16
That the courts and lawyers are mostly not of the left
should be clear from a reading of Law Against the People:
Essays to Demystify Law, Order and the~Courts, e d . by Robert
Lefcourt (New Y o r k : Vintage B o o k s , 1971) , especially
Lefcourt.'s "Introduction," (p. 3-17) and David N. Rockwell's
"The Education of the Capitalist Lawyer," (p. 90-104).
Also see, Abraham S. Blumberg Criminal Justice (Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1974), p. 32-35 where Blumberg analyzes
"the role of idology," (i.e. due process and the ameliorativetherapeutic models of the court) in the legal adversary system.
17
On the contrary the radical argument is that social
science is conservative by virtue of its support of the
established order; a support that seemingly takes pains
to not be critical.
See, Alvin Gouldner The Coming Crisis
of Western Sociology (New York: Basic B o o k s , 1970), espec
ially his analysis of functionalist conservatism, (p. 331-337).
18
Wilson, Thinking About C r i m e , p. 63. Wilson's argu
ment here depends on how close different criminologists are
willing to align themselves with conventional notions of
what criminology is about.
Presuppositions are not generated
from inside the discipline but from the political environment
one chooses to attach oneself to. Moreover, most of these
presuppositions (e.g. order, control, liberty and etc.) are
found in political philosophy and have been debated In the
west since Plato and the Stoics.
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19
William Kunstler "In Defense of the Movement," Law
Against the People, p. 271.

20
"The tendency to solve social ills with technical
means...is a consequence of trying to reduce certain social
ills to manageable dimensions in order that precise solutions
might be applied...what is overlooked, however, is the possi
bility that ^technical; solutions to social ills are them
selves an intimate part of the problem, "The Triple Revolution
Emerging: Social Problems in Depth e d . by Robert Perrucci
and Marl Pilisuk (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971),
p. 158.
What is required is total structural change not
shoring up of defective institutions, by resort to mere
techniques.this would mean a move away from viewing criminals
as a product of social pathology to a radical political view
of crime and deviancy; see Ian Taylor, et a l , The New
Criminology: For a Social Theory of Social Deviance (New York:
Harper ana Rowe, 1973), p p . 268-282.

21
Wilson, Thinking About C r i m e , p. 198.

22
George Kateb, "Utopia and the Good Life," Utopia and
Utopian Thought: A Timely Appr a i s a l , ed. by Frank E. Manuel
(Boston: Beacon P r e s s , 1966; , p . 27+0.
23
Judith Shklar, "Political Theory of Utopia," Utopias
and Utopian T h o u g h t , pp. 103-105.
24
Crane Brinton, "Utopia and Democracy," Utopias and
Utopian T h o u g h t , pp. 55-56.
25
See, Friedrich Engels criticism of utopian socialism
and his advocacy of a scientific socialism which would give
nineteenth century socialism "a real basis" in contrast to
the metaphysical basis of utopian socialist thought in his
"Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," The Marx-Engels R e a d e r ,
e d . by Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,
1972), pp. 605-649.
That scientific socialism is sympathetic
to the ideology of social Darwinism (i.e. survival of the
fittest in struggle) is explained in Richard Hofstadter,
Social Darwinism in American Thought (Boston: Beacon Press,
1955) , p p . 115-117.
If Hofstader s view is correct the
scientificity of Marxism is actually a left statement of
nineteenth century scientism.

320

26
For conservatism is not a policy; nor is
it a program to solve economic or political
problems.
It is hardly more than an instinct
ive belief that today's society is built on
several thousand years and that in those years
men have found things they should fasten to.
Out of this grows not opposition to change in
political institutions or in economic methods
but an awareness that in too hasty a flight
from the old we can flee to evils we know not
.of...The instinct to conserve, we think, never
left the American people.
The above quote is from a 1955 Wall Street Journal article
and is in Peter Viereck, Conservatism, above, p. T86.
This is a complimentary r e a ding, b u t c o n s e r v a t i v e in America
has had its ugly side which has included "political extremism"
that has historically repressed minorities, women, social
deviants, the radical left, ethnic Americans such as Jews,
non-Protestants and etc.
On the future of political conserv
atism see Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics
of U n r e a s o n , above, pp. 484-515.
27
Mircea Eliade, "Paradise and Utopia," Utopias and
Utopian T h o u g h t , p. 262.
28
Frederik G. Polak, "Utopia and Cultural Renewal,
"Utopias and Utopian T h o ught, p. 286.
Exploring Plato's
thoughts on the function of "divine madness" in human thinking
Polak relates such madness to the utopianist's "images of
the future" and classified this visionary madness as being
sociall practiced by: "(1) prophets and seers, (2) the poet
ically bemused, (3) those pre-elected for ritual and religious
derangement, (4) those exalted by erotic madness, and (5)
those chosen for inspiration or naturally endowed with an
affinity for God-sent dreams of therapeutic and predictive
significance," (p. 284).
Thus to hold a utopianist vision
of how society is to be organized with respect to crime
and deviancy is to be prophetic; radical criminology has this
prophetic role within the discipline of criminology, at least
this is the present author's thesis (see Chapter IV and the
Epilogue, following).
Yet liberal and conservative criminology can also be prophetic-utopianist. This is probably so because all human beings
hold "images of the future ' though some are guided to such
futures as result of visions of the past.
Radicalism is
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equivalent to carrying something to an extreme: radical
criminology in comparison to conventional criminology
employs an extreme ideal of the future based on what could
be rather than what was (conservative) and what is (liberal).
Each political ideology, being human in nature, obviously
participates, whether materially or transcendently, in the
three tenses of temporal reality: past, present and future.
However each seems to practically emphasizes one tense over
the other.
In the modern era the majority tendency, at
least in the scientific west, has been to deal heavily with
what is. What was still has popular attraction and what
will be/should be is the extreme minority view.
On this
one must note that within the three major political ideol
ogies conservative, liberal, socialist/anarchist are leftto-right v a r i a t i o n s . Finally from all of this one can
for example, interpret Clark's criminology as left liberal
and utopianist-prophetic.
29
See Life magazine statement on the back cover of the
pocket book edition of Ramsey Clark, Crime in A m e r i c a :
Observations on Its Nature, Causes, Prevention and Control
(New York: Pocket B o o k s , 1971).
30
Plato's Republic was patterned after "Athenian culture
and Spartan discipline," while Plato himself was not con
cerned with advocating revolution but was an advocate of
social order.
Thomas More's Utopia "was a satire on the
anarchy inherent in his own society," see Northrop Faye
"Varieties of Literacy Utopias" Utopias and Utopian Thou g h t ,
p. 27.
Moreover the utopian socialists (St. Simon, Charles
Fourier and Augusta Comte) were idealistic liberal social
reformers, who valued "order, hierarchy, moral community,
spiritual power and the primacy of groups over individuals"
and were "beholden to the vision of social order," see
Lewis A. Coser Masters of Sociological Thought: Ideas in
Historical and Social Context, (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, I n c . , 1971) , p . 2*5. Thus on this point of
support for the existing social order, while entertaining
visions of a new society, Marx and Engels may have been
correct in criticizing the utopian-socialists.
31
Wilson, Thinking About C r i m e , p. 208.
32

Norval Morris and Gordon H a w k i n s , The Honest Politicians
Guide to Crime Control (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1959) ,“ p. '254.--------
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33
See Michel Foucault's history of how the ideology
of social retribution or plain old social punishment often
called rehabilitation, functions, as it has always to
isolate and repress delinquents Discipline and Punish:
The Birth of the Prison (New YorlTi Pantheon Books, 19?7),
especially the final paragraph of p. 256.
34.
Thoughthere is with reference to the classical criminal
law reformers Cesare Beccaria, Jeremy Bentham and Samuel
Romilly, see Richard Quinney The Problem of Crime (New York;
Dodd, Mead and Company, 1970), p p . 44-46.
35
It is indeed strange that the radicals suspect all
non-radical criminology of perpetuating a capitalist con
ception of reality which is ideological.
The suspicion
is strange because as Quinney notes "every society is founded
on and supported by some ideology that serves to establish
and justify the existing order," Critique of Legal Order:
Crime Control in Capitalist Society (Boston: Little Brown
and C o m p a n y , 1974), p . 138.
If every society has its own
ideology then obviously orthodox Marxist societies are
included.
Moreover, ideology becomes relativized and by
such a relativization all who hold a political perspective
must at the same moment hold onto a particular ideology,
whether conventional or radical.
All of humanity, except
for isolated hermits, live in society and support some
image of the good, the just and the orderly.
36
Barry Krisberg, Crime and Privilege: Toward a New
Criminology, (New J e r s e y : Prentice H a l l , I n c ., 1975) pp.
1-10.
See a l s o , National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence: To Establish Justice, to Insure
Domestic tranquility (New York; Award Books, 1969) and
Jerome H. S k o l n i c k , The Politics of Protest, Report to the
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence,
March 21, 1969 (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), espec
ially the forward by Price M. Cobbs and William H. Grier.
37
Quinney The Problem of C r i m e , pp. 74-93.
Also Donald
H. Riddle suggests that criminology is derived from such
fields as "anthropology...psychology, political science
and l a w . ..economics, philosophy, literature, history and
the natural sciences."
One should add religion to Riddle's
list of academic sources for criminology, see his "Faculty
and Curriculum Development in Criminal Justice Programs,"
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(paper presented at the Conference on Key Issues in Criminal
Justice Doctoral Education, University of Nebraska at Omaha,
NE, October 1975), pp. 1-19.
38
Quinney, Critique of Legal O r d e r , pp. 140-143.
39
On the police and courts as problems in themselves
see Skolnick The Politics of Protest, Chapters VII and VIII.
Specifically on the police see American Friends Service
Committee, The Police Threat to Political Liberty: Discoveries
and Actions of the Committee's Program on Government
Surveillance and C i t i z en1s Rights (Philadelphia: American
Friends Service Committee \ 19/9) . For prisons as the problem,
see the New York State Council of C h u r c h e s ' Prison Research
Education Action Project, Instead of P r i sons: A Handbook
for A b o 1itionists (New York! Faculty Press, 1976) and Marc
M i l l e r , "The Numbers Game," Southern Exposure: Still Life
Inside Southern P r i sons, vol. VI (Winter, 1978), p . 25-32.
40
Alan Wolfe, The Seamy Side of Democracy: Repression in
America (New York: David McKay Company, 1973) , pp. 25-51,
wherein Wolfe discusses the "bias of the democratic state."
41
In criticizing the liberal pluralist thesis in polit
ical science, Ralph Miliband notes that the "remarkable
paradox is that the state itself as a subject of political
study, has long been unfasionable," see his The State in
Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, I n c ., 1969),
p . I.
Quinney relies heavily on Miliband in his Critique
of Legal O r d e r .
42
Anthony Platt, "Prospects for a Radical Criminology
In the USA," Critical Criminology, ed. by Ian Taylor et a l ,
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 95-111.
43
As noted earlier the present author advocates the
idea of Christian anarchism as a political theology.
See
t*ie Epilogue herein for an explanation of the political theol
ogy or Christian anarchism.
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NOTES
CHAPTER III
Radical Criminology:

Is it a Marxist

or A New Left Theory of Crime?

1
Ian T a y l o r , et. al. Critical Criminology (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 5.

2
Richard Quinney, "Crime Control in Capitalist Society:
A Critical Philosophy of Legal Order,” in Critical Criminology
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angry prose of the underground press and the writings of the
"New Left;" see p. 14.
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Marxism...in the sense that orthodox and latter-day
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argue that the object of Marxism is the science of
revolution and that that science is about the contra
dictions in commodity productions.
Any other in this
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of crime, the political economy of race, ...of sexism,
the political economy of any subject.
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et al and other unorthodox Marxist criminologists have no
sound basis in the ideas, work and political programs that
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